Michigan\u27s Environmental Protection Act of 1970:  A Progress Report by Sax, Joseph L. & Conner, Roger L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 70 Issue 6 
1972 
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress 
Report 
Joseph L. Sax 
University of Michigan Law School 
Roger L. Conner 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and 
the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph L. Sax & Roger L. Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 
MICH. L. REV. 1003 (1972). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol70/iss6/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MICIDGAN'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
ACT OF 1970: A PROGRESS REPORT 
Joseph L. Sax and Roger L. Conner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. STATUS OF THE CAsEs: A BRIEF SUMMARY • 
III. FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS AND FAILURE • 
A. Negotiated Solutions . . . . 
B. Politically Volatile Controversies . . . 
C. The Ambitious-Case Problem . . . 
IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE EPA AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 
A. Primary Jurisdiction . . . • . . • . 
B. Augmentation of the Enforcement Process . 
1004 
1007 
1010 
1010 
1014 
1017 
1019 
1019 
1027 
V. JUDICIAL R.EsPONSE • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1031 
A. Cases Tried on the Merits. . . . . . . . 1031 
I. Payant v. Department of Natural Resources. . 1031 
2. Muskegon County v. Environmental Protec-
tion Organization . . . . . . . . . . 1035 
3. Crandall v. Biergans . . . . • . . . • 1037 
4. Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources 1038 
5. Lakeland Property Owners Association v. Town-
ship of Northfield . . . . • • . . . . 1041 
B. Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions 1042 
VI. IMPACT OF THE EPA ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND INDUS-
TRIAL BEHAVIOR 1050 
VII. QUESTIONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION • • 1054 
A. The EPA as a Source of Substantive Law . 1054 
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . 1054 
2. The Public Service Commission 1055 
3. Eminent Domain . . . . . 1058 
4. Roberts v. Michigan . . . . 1059 
5. Relation of the EPA to Other Statutes . 1060 
B. Constitutionality of the EPA . 1064 
C. Intervention in EPA Cases 1069 
D. Jurisdiction and Venue . 1072 
E. Security Bonds . 1076 
VIII. CONCLUSION • • • 1080 
[ 1003] 
MICHIGAN'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
ACT OF 1970: A PROGRESS REPORT 
] osepk L. Sax* and Roger L. Conner** 
It is true that the Natural Resources Commission, upon my rec-
ommendation, approved construction . ••• It is likewise true that 
suit has been brought under the Environmental Protection Act by 
persons who disagree with that decision. The Act-one of the land-
mark pieces of environmental legislation in the nation-was passed 
for precisely that reason; to allow dissenting citizens an opportunity 
to register their dissents in court. Even though we have been made 
the defendants in this suit, we welcome it as an expression of public 
interest in the environment, and another step toward redefining 
the law so that we can better interpret the wishes of the people. 
-Ralph A. MacMullen, Director, Michigan Department of Natural 
Resourcest 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (EP A)
1 
represents a departure from the long-standing tradition under 
which control of environmental quality has been left almost exclu-
sively in the hands of regulatory agencies: it gives to ordinary 
citizens an opportunity to take the initiative in environmental law 
enforcement. 
The statute is uncharacteristically brief and plain-spoken. It au-
thorizes any person to bring suit against either a public agency or 
private entity for: declaratory or equitable relief to protect the "air, 
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from 
pollution, impairment or destruction."2 Once the plaintiff has dem-
onstrated that such harm has occurred or is likely to occur, the 
defendant may prevail only if he can demonstrate affirmatively that 
there is "no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct 
and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard University; J.D. 
1959, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
•• Second-year student at the University of Michigan Law School. Member, Michi-
gan Air Pollution Control Commission.-Ed. 
Our research for this study has been made possible by a grant from the Council 
on Law Related Studies, for which we are most grateful. 
t Letter to the Editor, State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 28, 1972, at A-6, col. 6. 
I. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 691.1201·691.1207 (Supp. 1972). The full text of the 
EPA is reprinted as Appendix. H. A brief legislative history of the Act appears in Note, 
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act: Political Background, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 
358 (1970). 
2. EPA § 2(1), MICH. COllIP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1972). 
[ 1004] 
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act 1005 
health, safety and welfare .... "3 If regulatory proceedings are avail-
able to pass upon the defendant's conduct, the court is authorized 
-but not required-to remit the parties to such proceedings,4 and 
is, in any event, empowered to grant equitable relief pending the 
outcome of such proceedings to protect the rights recognized by the 
Act.6 · 
Beyond giving private citizens the right to initiate or participate 
in environmental proceedings, the EPA is a significant departure in 
another way. It enlarges the role of courts because it permits a plain-
tiff to assert that his right to environmental quality has been violated 
in much the same way that one has always been able to claim that a 
property or contract right has been violated. 6 In taking this step, the 
legislature reduced the broad discretion that regulatory agencies 
formerly had. Previously these agencies had been given a sweeping 
mandate to enforce environmental standards as they thought best, 
and their decisions were subject to judicial review only for arbitrary 
and abusive use of their authority or for violation of explicit statu-
tory language. Now these agencies must be prepared to defend them-
selves against charges that their decisions fail to protect natural re-
sources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.7 
This combination of increased private initiative, expanded ju-
dicial involvement, and restricted regulatory-agency authority, all 
brought together in Michigan's Environmental Protection Act, elic-
ited considerable doubt: Was it unrealistic to expect private citizens 
and environmental groups, however well intentioned, to play a sig-
nificant part in law enforcement-especially considering the technical 
complexity of the questions likely to be raised and the expense 
usually incurred in litigation? Would circuit judges be able to un-
derstand and deal with intricate environmental issues? Could court 
orders, issued case by case, significantly ameliorate environmental 
problems? Finally, would the regulatory agencies themselves find 
their well-developed programs subject to continual attacks in the 
courts? 
3. EPA § 3(1), MICH. CollIP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1972). 
4. EPA§ 4(2), MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1972). 
5. EPA § 4(2), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1972). 
6. Thus the EPA both recognizes and makes enforceable a new substantive right. 
The Act implements art. IV, § 52 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963: 
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby 
declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety 
and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection 
of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impair-
ment and destruction. 
7. The EPA governs private conduct as well as the conduct of state agencies. 
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Because these questions are difficult and important, it seemed 
desirable to follow the Act during its early days and to try to de-
termine how well, or how ill, it fulfilled the expectations of those 
who worked assiduously for its enactment. We have attempted to 
monitor all the litigation instituted under the Act during its first 
sixteen months.8 What follows is a report on what we have learned.0 
It did not take us long to discover that a comprehensive evalu-
ation of even one statute ·within a single state over a brief period of 
time was beyond our competence. Plainly, a statute's influence is not 
limited to lawsuits actually instituted. Industrial and administrative-
agency behavior may be modified by the fear of a lawsuit and its 
attendant publicity; developments in one suit may bring about in-
stitutional changes of behavior in similar matters; and, of course, 
it is never possible wholly to isolate the presence of a statute from 
the public atmosphere in which it was enacted. If there have been 
behavioral changes, it is not easy to identify them as the product of 
the EPA rather than as responses to increased public concern with 
environmental quality. 
We made no effort to investigate systematically all the matters 
just mentioned. Such an inquiry would be useful, and we hope it 
can be undertaken at a later stage. We did, however, acquire some 
informal data about the general effects of the statute.10 
To monitor suits filed, we regularly read daily and weekly Mich-
igan newspapers, as well as bulletins and newsletters of environ-
mental, industrial, and government organizations. We tried to attend 
all hearings on motions and trials on the merits; when this was not 
possible, we attempted to acquire stenographic transcripts or tapes. 
Files were also kept on newspaper publicity that the cases received. 
In addition we developed a state-··wide network of informants, which 
included officials of citizen organizations, journalists, and attorneys, 
and we exchanged information with the Attorney General's office, 
which also maintained a list of suits filed. In March 1972 we sent a 
follow-up questionnaire to all Ia-wyers involved in EPA cases. Our 
questions, with a summary of answers, appear in Appendix I. 
8. See EPA § 2(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1201(1) (Supp. 1972). The report 
is current to March I, 1972. Additional information received after that date, but prior 
to publication, has been inserted. 
9. One of the authors, Joseph L. Sax, drafted the original EPA. Both authors 
worked toward enactment of the bill. Obviously, we arc interested parties, We have 
made no effort in this Article to conceal our own views, but we have tried to present 
an unbiased report on what has occurred. 
IO. See text accompanying notes 181-93 infra. 
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II. STATUS OF TIIE CAsES: 
A BRIEF SUMMARY 
At the time this Article was being ·written, no case had reached 
either the court of appeals or the supreme court.11 Thus every sig-
nificant legal issue, including the Act's constitutionality, remains 
unresolved by appellate courts.12 This in itself is interesting and 
invites speculation about the way in which a statute like the EPA 
evolves. 
Despite a much-invoked fear that enactment of the EPA would 
flood the courts with suits, only thirty-six cases have been filed in 
sixteen months, and they have been evenly distributed over that 
period, with nvo or three filed each month.13 The modest number 
of cases filed is neither cause _for joy nor for gloom. It implies that 
both the proponents and opponents of the Act were wrong; the 
statute is not as easily accessible a tool as its supporters had hoped 
or its opponents had feared. 
The cases have been widely spread among the circuit courts in 
the state. Only two counties have had more than two cases filed.14 
In one sense, this dispersion of cases is caused by the provisions of 
the statute, for the EPA limits plaintiffs to the circuit court "where 
the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur."15 Plaintiffs have 
not wholly been deprived of choice of forum, however, in those 
cases in which a state agency is a defendant and the issuance of a 
11. But see note 170 infra. The status of the cases is set out in Appendices F & G 
infra. 
12. The constitutionality of the EPA is discussed at notes 244-66 infra and accom-
panying text. See also text at note 71 infra. 
13. See Appendix A infra. Cases cited in this Article are referred to' by name only; 
other citation details are contained in Appendix A. Two of the thirty-six matters are 
not court cases, but are administrative-agency interventions. Three new cases have been 
filed since this Article was completed. (1) Irish v. Green, No. 14306-C (Cir. Ct., Ingham 
County, filed April 12, 1972) challenges a subdivision development in West Traverse 
Township, Emmet County. A change of venue was granted to Emmet County, where 
the file number is No. 162-3 (Civil). (2) Wayne County Health Dept. v. City of Dearborn, 
No. 203110-R (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, filed April 1972) seeks a preliminary injunc-
tion to stop open burning of trash pending the outcome of the lawsuit. A hearing 
was held April 7, 1972, and continued to May 5, 1972, when testimony was taken. An 
order has not yet been issued. (3) McPhail v. Corps of Engineers, No. 205-941R (Cir. Ct., 
Wayne County, filed April 24, 1972) challenges a channelization project on the Rouge 
River. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan where the file number is 38203. 
A fourth case, just discovered, Braun v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 5552. (Cir. Ct., 
Washtenaw County, amended complaint filed Jan. 18, 1972) challenges condemnation 
proceedings for a transmission line easement. See text accompanying notes 220-24 infra. 
14. See Appendix A infra. 
15. EPA § 2(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1972). 
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permit or license is an alleged "tVTong.16 In such cases, plaintiffs may 
sue at either the state capital or at the place where damage to the 
environment occurs. Thus four cases have been filed in the circuit 
court for Ingham County, the site of the State Capital, in three of 
which the conduct of a state regulatory agency has been at issue. The 
only other circuit in which more than two cases have been filed is 
Wayne County, which includes Detroit; there the Wayne County 
Health Department has been the most frequent user of the Act. 
Public agencies have been plaintiffs under the Act more often 
than was anticipated. Government entities, including cities and coun-
ties, have been plaintiffs in about one third of the cases filed.17 They 
have been defendants in about one half of the cases.18 Some agencies, 
not surprisingly, have been both plaintiffs and defendants in differ-
ent cases,19 and in one case there is a state agency on both sides.20 
Environmental organizations-despite their intense efforts to ob-
tain enactment of the law-have not used the bill frequently.21 Ap-
parently, environmental groups in Michigan were not well prepared 
to use the law when it came into force. Although several of these 
groups have the benefit of volunteer attorney-members, no Michigan 
group retains regular litigation counsel. These groups have thus far 
neither the funds nor the staff to undertake an organized litigation 
program.22 More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that no group has 
clearly defined a target problem (such as air pollution or highway 
construction) or a target industry (such as foundries) for which to 
develop a well-defined legal strategy. This observation is not made 
critically; it well may be that these organizations, poorly funded 
and insufficiently aided by technically skilled professionals, are not 
now prepared to do much beyond responding to problems that are 
brought to their attention. Perhaps, too, they have been spread thin 
in valiant efforts to "plug the dike." The problem is exacerbated 
by the absence of public interest law firms in the state. In light of 
the preceding observations, it should come as no surprise that suits 
under the EPA have varied widely in character and have shown no 
16. For a discussion of venue, see text accompanying notes 280-97 infra. 
17. See Appendices B &: C infra. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. Water Resources Com.nm. v. Chippewa County [Water Resources Commission 
hereinafter WRC] (State Highway Department as third party defendant). 
21. Sea Appendices B &: C infra. Only organizations with more than local interi:sts 
and membership are included in the figures. Many cases involve groups of local resi• 
dents and ad hoc organizations. 
22. For comments on the economics of EPA litigation, see Appendix I infra. 
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evidence of a concerted attack on any one phase of environmental 
problems.23 
Two encouraging features in the EP A's early history are the 
expedition ·with which most cases have been handled24 and the will-
ingness of the courts to face up to the environmental issues that 
truly divide the parties. The thirteen cases already concluded have 
averaged approximately six months in length.25 Of course, most of 
these cases have been settled out of court, but a number of them 
were controversies that had previously dragged on for years. Plainly, 
the EPA is serving as a useful prod to negotiated settlements. 
Of the eighteen cases that are still active, only a few have stood 
for much more than six months without decisive action.26 Five have 
gone to trial on the merits. Most of the others have been quite 
promptly brought on for hearings on motions for preliminary relief.27 
One case is being held in abeyance because the issue is not yet ripe 
for decision.28 We are aware of no case in which a defendant is un-
der a restraining order and ready for a trial that is being delayed 
either by the plaintiffs or by court congestion.29 
· Beyond the willingness-indeed, the expressed eagerness-of the 
judges to bring pending cases to trial, so there has been an admirable 
readiness to get to the merits of the cases as soon as possible, rather 
than to tolerate delaying technical issues interposed by the parties. 
The courts have, in almost every instance, resisted the temptation 
to dispose of cases on jurisdictional grounds as a way of avoiding the 
merits.31 When the environmental issues have been presented, the 
23. See Appendix E infra. 
24. See Appendix G infra. Slower moving cases are WRC v. Chippewa County (delay 
in getting to trial despite judge's efforts) (see note 78 infra); Lakeland Property Owners 
Assn. v. Township of Northfield (seven months from trial to issuance of decision); 
Beaman v. Township of Summit (summary judgment expeditiously granted, but appeal 
has delayed termination): and Blunt v. Apfel (partial summary judgment granted for 
defendant; confusion concerning next steps). 
25. See Appendix G infra. 
26. See id. 
~- Preliminary injunctions and restraining orders are discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 151-80 infra. 
28. Leelanau County Bd. of, Commrs. v. DNR, Order of Judge Brown ijune 14, 
1971) (denying motion for summary judgment). 
29, Of course, when an EPA suit has been joined with an action for damages in 
a jury case, there is delay. Bise v. Detroit Edison Co. is the only such case so far. 
30. E.g., Ray v. Raynowsky, Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Tem-
porary Injunction (Nov. 23, 1971) (Ray went to trial on June 19, 1972); WRC v. 
Chippewa County, (Sept. 1, 1971) (authors' notes from pretrial hearing) (see note 90 
infra). In Tanton v. DNR, Judge Brown quickly brought the case on for full trial, 
rather than hearing extended testimony on preliminary motions. 
31. See text accompanying notes 280-97 (venue and jurisdiction), 72-101 (primary 
jurisdiction) infra. See also Appendix I infra. 
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courts have in the vast majority of cases understood them and been 
able to cope ·with them intelligently.32 To be sure, some of this ju-
dicial success is attributable to the limited scale of the cases brought 
thus far; but perhaps this limited scale is a desirable feature of an 
evolutionary process. 
III. FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
A. Negotiated Solutions 
Experience thus far suggests that the EPA, at least during its 
early development, is most likely to be successfully applied33 in what 
may be called the natural small-scale case.34 One of the most inter-
. esting of these cases is Wayne County Health Department v. Chrysler 
Corporation. Chrysler's Huber Avenue foundry in Detroit had in-
stalled modem air pollution control equipment that broke down 
with disconcerting frequency. Efforts over a period of several years 
by the Wayne County agency to correct the situation had been un-
availing.35 Chrysler knew that in the event of litigation, a trial judge 
might respect Chrysler's need to keep the foundry operating lest 
automobile production lines be forced to close down. 
As the Wayne County Health Department (WCHD) viewed 
its authority prior to the EP A's enactment, it had only two alter-
natives from which to choose when handling problems like those 
in Chrysler. It could in some situations seek a judicial order closing 
the plant, a stem remedy it had never previously invoked; or it could 
institute a criminal misdemeanor proceeding and recover a $100 
fine, a tactic it had followed frequently in other cases with predic-
tably unsatisfactory results.36 Once the EPA was enacted, however, 
32. See text accompanying notes 113-50 (trials), 151-80 (preliminary relief) infra. 
33. See Appendix F infra for a "won-lost" record. 
34. Frequently the scale of a case depends on the lawyer's strategy. West Michigan 
Env. Action Council v. Betz Foundry, Inc., involving illdustrial air pollution, might 
well have been developed on a larger scale. Some cautious preliminary skirmishing by 
plaintiff, West Michigan Env. Action Council's [hereinafter WMEAC] lawyer led the 
company-which had not complied with Air Pollution Control Commission regulations 
for four years-finally to order control equipment. The case might have been used 
as a vehicle to challenge the Commission's casual enforcement policy and its generous 
use of the variance. 
35. Morris, What Pollution Has Cost a Community: A Four-Year Record of a 
"Clean" Foundry, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 22, 1970, at 1-B, col. 1. 
36. Wayne County, Mich., Health Department, Air Pollution Division Regulations 
art. XIV, § 14.3 (1972), provides that suit can only be brought with formal approval 
of the County Health Board after findings of repeated violations. However, this provi-
sion was inapplicable in Chrysler's case, since art. VI, § 6.6 of the regulations e.xemptcd 
"upset conditions" or "breakdowns." This exemption has recently been eliminated. 
Adopted Amendments and Revisions to Wayne County, Mich., Health Department, 
Air Pollution Control Regulation Guly 22, 1971). 
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the agency's attorney immediately used the new statute to file suits 
against three large industries. One of these was Chrysler, ·with which 
he had unsuccessfully sought negotiated solutions.37 
It was clear from the first day suits were filed that the agency's 
attorney intended to use the case as a lever to extract a settlement 
from Chrysler rather than take the case to trial. He knew that a 
hard-fought suit by so substantial a defendant could be protracted 
and expensive; yet he was obviously sensitive to the fact that this 
prospect could be used to his advantage in negotiating a settlement. 
If Chrysler appeared to be recalcitrant in front of a busy judge, who 
was unlikely to be interested in trying a complex air pollution case, 
the plaintiff would have a powerful weapon with which to force 
Chrysler to the bargaining table. 
But the defendant had a counter weapon. The statute was new 
and its constitutionality untested. Chrysler's lawyers gave warning 
that if too much were demanded of them, they would be ·willing to 
turn the case into a test litigation. 
For several months, negotiations seemed stalemated. Ultimately, 
the dilemma was resolved in a most interesting way. Several hundred 
local residents, who had damage suits pending against Chrysler under 
the common law of nuisance, intervened as plaintiffs in the Chrysler 
case.38 This action broke the stalemate by casting the WCHD as a 
moderate and by setting determined, private plaintiffs against a 
determined, industrial defendant.39 
With their eyes on their own damage cases, the private plaintiffs 
insisted that Chrysler, as part of the settlement, admit to its wrong-
doing. Such an admission was the last thing Chrysler wanted. A 
search was thus begun for a compromise solution. The demands of 
the WCHD began to appear eminently reasonable. 
Within sixty days, a proposed settlement was presented to the 
judge.40 It provided that Chrysler would carry a ten-day inventory 
at all times so that if the foundry had to close down for repairs of 
the pollution control equipment, the automobile production lines 
would not have to close down as well. In addition, the proposed set-
tlement required Chrysler to close down its foundry if the equip-
ment malfunctioned and could not be repaired within twenty-four 
37. Subsequently, five more cases were filed; see Appendix A infra; note 13 supra. 
38 Intervention is permitted by EPA § 5(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1205(1) 
(Supp. 1972). 
39. Ultimately, the judge dissolved the intervention order; see text accompanying 
notes 272-79 infra. 
40. The consent judgment was entered by Judge Rashid, Oct. 14, 1971. 
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hours. Chrysler was also required to make periodic reports to the 
WCHD in a form of imposed self-surveillance. 
The order exemplifies an innovative response to a troublesome 
conflict between the demands of a major industry for continuity and 
the demands of the community for air pollution control. Without 
judicial intervention to prod Chrysler toward compliance, it seems 
likely that negotiations with the county might have continued inter-
minably. Without private intervenors to give an added push to a 
well-meaning, but cautious agency attorney, the case might have been 
permitted to slip onto the inactive docket. The Chrysler case repre-
' sents a most important success under the EPA in respect of the scope 
of the order issued.41 It also typifies the expeditious and inexpensive 
solution that the EPA seems best suited to promote.42 
Another in this species of case is Trout Unlimited v. Milliken. 
The controversy here arose when a heavy ·winter snowfall raised 
cottage-lined Otsego Lake to record levels, threatening the homes 
with flooding. The Governor declared a state of emergency and re-
quested the United States Corps of Engineers to assist local officials 
in the designing and funding of a lake drainage project.48 A pro-
posal was made to dig a channel from the lake to the nearby Au 
Sable River, one of the most famous trout streams in Michigan, and 
to drain the Lake into the Au Sable at up to eighty cubic feet per 
second. 
Fearing erosion, siltation, and eutrophication of the river from the 
drainage, a coalition of conservation groups, led by Trout Unlimited, 
threatened a lawsuit if the proposal were approved in its existing 
form. Local officials responded to the expressed concerns with an 
agreement to limit maximum drainage to forty cubic feet per second, 
to install a shutoff valve, and to allow the Natural Resources Com-
mission to monitor the project. On this basis the Commission-
despite a staff report44 that delineated the problems inherent in the 
project-gave its approval, and the Governor authorized the project.4G 
The next day Trout Unlimited, several property o-wners along 
the Au Sable, and the Board of County Commissioners-dissatisfied 
41. Communications from local residents indicate that the foundry is still causing 
environmental problems; thus the effectiveness of the consent order remains in question. 
42. A consent judgment was also expeditiously obtained in WCHD v. American 
Cement Corp., Consent Judgment of Judge O'Hair (Dec. 8, 1971). The other WCHD 
cases are still in negotiation. 
43. Detroit Free Press, June 18, 1971, at 8-A, col. 2. 
44. DNR Statement on the Environmental Consequences of the Otsego Lake De• 
Watering Project into the North Branch Au Sable River, June 14, 1971. 
45. Detroit Free Press, June 18, 1971, at 4-A, col. 6. 
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with the agreement approved by the Commission-filed suit under 
the EPA. The court granted a temporary restraining order, and the 
following day the defendant county officials sat down to bargain in 
earnest with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs knew exactly what conces-
sions they would require: a reduction in the maximum rate of flow, 
an explicit monitoring agreement that spelled out the conditions 
under which the flow would be reduced or stopped, and control over 
the shutoff valves in the hands of the Department of Natural Re-
sources (DNR) rather than under the control of the County Road 
Commission's engineers. 
Each of these demands, as the intensive bargaining sessions dem-
onstrated, was consistent with the cottage owners' minimum needs. 
Under the shadow of an imminent courtroom hearing, each was ac-
cepted; a detailed order formalizing the results of the bargaining ses-
sion was then signed by the judge.46 
Trout Unlimited was a classic version of successful citizen-
initiated litigation in which plaintiffs who know what they want-
but who also know that what they need is somewhat less-are pre-
pared to negotiate with their adversaries. In such circumstances, a 
court is used most efficiently, for its potential power gives leverage 
to the plaintiffs and suggests to both parties that they ought to hone 
their demands down to the point that would be sustainable if the 
case went to trial. This manner of using the courts to change the 
balance of power, while leaving the court itself in the background, 
has been one of the most successful tactics for plaintiffs under the 
EPA. It suggests that in a number of environmental controversies a 
central problem has been a power imbalance among the interested 
parties-a concern that was central during the legislative considera-
tion of the bill.47 
Trout Unlimited suggests also that the EPA works most efficiently 
when used as a lever to press regulatory agencies into seeking new 
solutions to environmental problems. Although the Natural Re-
sources Commission had done a study on the Otsego Lake drainage, 
it had not fully considered all the alternatives; and the negotiations 
carried on under the threat of a trial pushed into the foreground 
other possible solutions, including-as it turned out--one sufficient 
to satisfy all the participants. 
46. Trout Unlimited v. Milliken, Interlocutory Consent Order of Judge Hughes 
(Aug. 9, 1971). 
47. Testimony of Joseph L Sax on H.B. 2055, before the Committee on Conserva-
tion and Recreation, Michigan House of Representatives, Jan. 21, 1970, excerpts re• 
printed in 14 Mich, Law Quad, Notes Z1 (1970). 
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Finally, the case demonstrates the usefulness of a law like the 
EPA in "liberating" regulatory agencies from political pressure. 
Given the highly political content of the controversy, which in-
cluded meetings with the Governor, it would have been difficult 
without the EPA for the Commission to hold out for important, 
but not highly visible, constraints-such as a detailed procedure for 
monitoring rather than a simple, more general agreement, and use 
of its own staff rather than that of the Road Commission to control 
the shutoff devices. Yet, when forced to anticipate what might have 
to be proved in a courtroom-in a suit instituted by a private citizen 
under the EPA-the Natural Resources Commission was able to re-
spond more professionally and less politically. As the assistant director 
of the Commission described the outcome of Trout Unlimited in 
responding to an inquiry about the case: "The settlement definitely 
strengthens our hand ·with respect to controlling any possible adverse 
effects .... I am certain that without the order, we would not have 
[been able] to completely control the situation."48 
B. Politically Volatile Controversies 
Trout Unlimited was only one of several cases in which the EPA 
has been a useful device for relieving pressures in highly charged 
political controversies. These cases emphasize the special importance 
of permitting private citizens to take legal initiatives. 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony40 was filed 
under the EPA to require Indians to comply with State fishing regu-
lations. The controversy, arising out of a concern with the depletion 
of Great Lakes fisheries, reached an interim crisis in 1971 when the 
Michigan supreme court decided People v. ]ondreau,r;o The defen-
dant in that case, a Chippewa Indian, was prosecuted for violating 
the State fishing laws; the court concluded that the law could not be 
applied to him because a treaty between his tribe and the United 
States guaranteed him certain rights to hunt "without limitation, 
restriction or burden."51 
The Attorney General orally advised the DNR that the decision 
applied to all Indians, and the DNR, as a result, suspended enforce-
ment of game and fishing laws against all Indians.52 Shortly thereafter 
48. Letter from A. Gene Gazley, Assistant Director, DNR, to Roger Conner, Aug. 
2, 1971, on file with author. 
49. See text accompanying notes 175-77, 290-97 infra. 
50. 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W .2d 375 (1971). 
51. 384 Mich, at 552, 185 N.W.2d at 381. 
52. Evening News (Sault Ste. Marie), Sept. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 3. The DNR con-
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Donald Anthony, an Indian, began fishing with large, mesh-nylon 
gill nets. Given the long struggle to control the use of gill nets and 
existing tension between whites and Indians, the ensuing conflict was 
not surprising. Reports began to circulate that Indians could wipe 
out sport fisheries in Grand and Little Traverse Bays in a year with 
their gill nets,53 and rumors that sports fishermen were threatening 
to "[ d]estroy the Indians' nets, sink their boats and, even, shoot the 
netters,"54 ran rampant. 
Finally, the Governor, in an attempt to bring the opposing fac-
tions together, personally intervened by calling a meeting. The tone 
of the meeting was bitter. 'We will make up our own peace force 
and do what we have to do to protect ourselves and our equipment," 
one Indian warned darkly.55 A task force was appointed by the Gov-
ernor, but-beyond recommending that the DNR work with Indian 
leaders to seek a solution-it was unable to find a compromise ac-
ceptable to all parties. In a sense, government was paralyzed; the 
buck had been passed from the DNR to the Attorney General, to the 
Governor, to a task force, and back to the DNR. 
With tensions continuing to xise and no solution in sight, Michi-
gan United Conservation Clubs (MUCC) filed suit under the EPA to 
enjoin all Indians not specifically covered by Jandreau from violating 
state fishing regulations. The suit relieved the pressures mounting 
from newspaper attacks and focused attention on legal issues that 
would have to be resolved in the courtroom. Following an extensive 
hearing, in August 1971 the court issued a preliminary injunction 
requiring compliance ·with fishing regulations. 56 The decision, though 
not warmly received by the Indians, at least provided an opportunity 
for passions to cool. By September the DNR had announced that, 
while it would begin enforcing the fishing laws against the Indians, 
it would nevertheless issue some free "compassionate" commercial 
licenses to Indians for areas in which additional netting "[w]ill not 
place undue pressure on Great Lakes Fish stocks."57 
tinued its suspension of enforcement of the law against Indians even after the su-
preme court in denying a petition for rehearing on Aug. 30, 1971, clarified its ]ondreau 
opinion indicating its narrow application to particular bands of Indians. See Evening 
News (Sault Ste. Marie), Sept. 1, 1971, at 8, col. 1. This is indicative of the politically 
heated nature of the controversy. 
53. North Woods Call, June 30, 1971, at 6, col. I. 
54. Id. 
55. Pontiac Press, July 8, 1971, at C-3, col. 3. 
56. :MUCC v. Anthony. The hearing and order are discussed at text accompanying 
notes 175-77 infra. 
57. Michigan Daily, Sept. 22, 1971, at 3, col. 5; State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 26, 
1972, at B-4, col. l; North Woods Call, Feb. 9, 1972, at 5, col. 1. 
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In Payant v. Department of Natural Resources,68 the EPA was 
used effectively to moderate another highly controversial local issue 
-the hunting of antlerless deer. The DNR's policy of allowing 
antlerless-deer-hunting was strongly opposed by public opinion in 
Dickinson County, where suit was brought to enjoin the Depart-
ment's program shortly before the beginning of the 1971 hunting 
season. 
In 1970, the county commissioners had held a referendum in 
which the county's citizens voted by a three-to-one margin to support 
a three-year moratorium on the hunting of antler less deer. 69 This 
referendum placed the DNR in an unenviable position. It was en-
forcing a program it believed to be scientifically sound, but the pro-
gram was in perpetual jeopardy because of political pressures gen-
erated by its unpopularity. At the same time, the DNR feared the 
outcome of a lawsuit in hostile territory. When suit was finally in-
stituted-by the state legislator who represented Dickinson County 
-the Department's worst fears seemed to be coming true. It was 
reported that "nvo of three judges assigned to the case were known 
to be lacking in sympathy for the deer management program,"00 and 
one DNR staff biologist was quoted as saying that "an Upper Penin-
sula judge might give more credence to 'some old hunter's opinion 
than to ours ... : "61 The suit was prominently played up in local 
newspapers, the court galleries were filled during the trial, and 
pickets paraded outside the courtroom.62 One of the judges even 
received anonymous threatening phone calls.68 The case promptly 
went to trial, and soon thereafter the court issued an opinion com-
pletely vindicating the defendant DNR. 
Perhaps the final comment on this subject should be left to A. 
Gene Gazley, Assistant Director of the DNR: 
With respect to the Payant case, it is certainly true that the Depart-
ment is better off after proving its case than it would have been 
58. See text accompanying notes 113-23, 198-99, 237-38 infra. 
59. Payant v. DNR, Complaint 6. 
60. Letter from A. Gene Gazley, Assistant Director, DNR, to Roger Conner, Dec. 14, 
1971, on file with author [hereinafter Gazley Letter]. Three judges were appointed to 
hear the case under MICH. Cr. (GEN.) R. 9253 (1969). It is interesting to note the 
availability of this rule in controversial local cases. It eases the responsibility of any 
single judge without requiring abdication of judicial responsibility. 
Three judges were also appointed in Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection 
Org., another highly controversial case. 
61. North Woods Call, July 21, 1971, at 1, col. 4. 
62. Interview with Judge Brown, Jan. 29, 1972, on file with authors. 
63. Id. 
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had the case never occurred ... the unanimous opinion that resulted 
from the trial was a ringing endorsement of our program. 
It is reasonable to expect that an opinion of this sort is bound 
to impress some of the people that were either skeptical or against 
our management program ... the fact that the complaint was dis-
missed in the homeland of the adversary was reassuring and a 
definite credit to our management program. It should make it easier 
to ·win some of the future battles that are certain to occur in the 
Legislature and on the home front over this very controversial topic 
of deer management.64 
C. The Ambitious-Case Problem 
Having discussed some of the prototype small-scale suits under 
the Act, we tum to a case that was intended to be big and important, 
Roberts v. Michigan.65 
The plaintiff in Roberts was an inventor of equipment for the 
control of automobile exhaust emissions.66 Concerned that the state 
had been lax in controlling automobile air pollution, Roberts could 
have brought suit against the Michigan Air Pollution Commission 
and challenged their program of monitoring, regulating, and enforc-
ing automobile exhaust. Instead, he chose a much more radical 
course, suing the State, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the 
State Department of Highways. Roberts alleged first that the Secre-
tary of State violated the EPA by granting licenses to operate motor 
vehicles that polluted the air and by failing to adopt standards and 
regulations to control motor-vehicle-caused pollution. The plaintiff 
sought to have adequate standards imposed by court order and to 
have the licensing and operating of motor vehicles enjoined until 
such standards were established and enforced. 
Roberts also alleged that the State Highway Department was vio-
lating the EPA by allocating tax money for construction and main-
tenance of highways in the state, the use of which caused air pollu-
tion. Plaintiff sought the establishment of regulations to govern 
pollution arising from the use of the highways, and also asked that 
highway construction be enjoined unless and until adequate safe-
guards dealing with this problem were adopted. 
64. Gazley Letter, supra note 60. The issue is not yet dead; some still oppose antler-
less-deer-hunting. Ann Arbor News, March 19, 1972, at 34, col. 1. 
65. See text accompanying notes 225-30, 239-41, 256-60 infra for further discussion 
of Roberts. 
66. So far as we know, Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit is the only other 
EPA case in which the plaintiff was a business competitor. Bertrand has a disposal 
business, and the suit involved an allegedly polluting city incinerator. 
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While the underlying issues in Roberts-the adequacy of Michi-
gan's automobile air pollution regulations and their enforcement-
were hardly shocking, it was inevitable that the relief sought would 
impair whatever value such a case might have had in calling atten-
tion to the automobile exhaust question. Newspaper reports on the 
case were predictable: A typical one was headed "Pollution Foe Bids 
Roadbuilding Halt,"67 but a more extreme article contained the 
heading, "Inventor Sues to Halt Pollution by Eliminating Cars,"08 
and began with the sentence: "Michigan will have to go back to the 
horse and buggy for transportation if Charles G. Roberts has his 
way." 
The Roberts case cannot be put aside simply as a valiant, if mis-
guided, early effort to use the EPA to its fullest extent in dealing 
with a serious environmental problem. Indeed, Roberts demonstrates 
one of the most troublesome issues arising out of the enactment of 
a law designed to benefit what may loosely be called a movement or 
a cause-the inability of any leadership to control the kinds of cases 
brought or the manner in which they are litigated. Ironically, the 
real problem is quite the opposite of that feared by those who op-
posed the EP A's enactment; these critics had been worried that 
overzealous environmentalists might concertedly organize to tie the 
hands of regulatory agencies or to attack in overwhelming fashion 
certain agricultural or business interests. 69 Instead, the danger is that 
inadequately planned litigation will produce damaging legal prece-
dents and will generally impair the reputation of plaintiffs who use 
the statute. 
Roberts also potentially opened one of the most complex ques-
tions in environmental law: Upon which regulatory agencies does 
the task of environmental management rest?70 The EPA, properly in 
our judgment, is drafted so that the issue can be raised. The disturb-
ing thing about Roberts is that the plaintiff seemingly stumbled into 
this question, posing a dilemma for the judge. If the question of 
what parties were proper defendants was to be resolved, difficult 
legal issues, which none of the lawyers were prepared to confront, 
67. Grand Rapids Press, Oct. 28, 1970, at 8-C, col. 4. 
68. Detroit News, Oct. 29, 1970, at 17-A, col. 1. 
69. See Mining Journal, Jan. 22, 1970; Michigan State Chamber of Commerce State 
Legislation Report, Jan. 15, 1970 at 2; Michigan Riparian, Sum. 1970, at 4, col, I. 
70. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (duty of Corps of Engineers 
to consider effects other than navigational); New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 
419 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (obligations of the AEC other than protection against 
radiation hazards). 
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had to be untangled. Predictably, the judge responded by lashing 
out at the statute itself, finding it in part unconstitutional as applied 
to the facts of the case. 
Fortunately, the opinion on unconstitutionality in Roberts has 
not been treated as a significant precedent in other EPA litigation. 
Roberts has been appealed, and it appears that the plaintiff-appellant 
will substantially tone dmvn his case in an effort to win a reversal 
of the trial court's order of dismissal.71 
IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE EPA AND THE 
.ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
A. Primary Jurisdiction 
The EPA permits lawsuits to be instituted on matters cognizable 
before administrative agencies even though administrative action has 
not been completed.72 Our single-track tradition in law enforcement, 
which is manifested in the primary jurisdiction doctrine, is so well 
established that considerable concern was expressed about the feasi-
bility of an enforcement system in which different legal routes for 
dealing with a given environmental problem would be simultane-
ously available. 
The theoretical potential for conflict is obvious, but the legisla-
ture was persuaded that in twn respects the risk was worth taking. 
Because regulatory agencies are not always diligent, it was hoped that 
private plaintiffs, using the potential power of a court order, could, 
when necessary, prod the agencies to a more energetic fulfillment of 
their responsibilities. In addition, it was thought that the range of 
environmental problems is sufficiently great that a more flexible 
arsenal of enforcement techniques would be helpful. Thus, while 
71. Roberts v. State appeal docket, No. 13640, Mich. Ct. App. In Marble Chain of 
Lakes v. Water Resources Commn., the only other "big" case brought thus far under 
the EPA, the WRC was challenged for allowing discharges of water that are of lesser 
quality than the receiving water. In short, the case questioned the legitimacy of using 
water for waste assimilation. The complaint was filed in December 1970, and the case 
was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff on May IO, 1972. Certainly, the plaintiff would 
have faced great difficulty in obtaining the extraordinary technical evidence that would 
have been necessary in such a far-reaching case. In essence, he sought to obtain by 
judicial mandate what other environmentalists hope to accomplish through the pending 
federal Water Pollution Control bill: a no-discharge rule for Michigan streams and 
lakes. See S. 2770 &: H.R. 11896 (92d Cong., 2d Sess.) (1972). A weaker version of H.R. 
11896 was passed by the House March 29, 1972. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1972, at 18, 
col. 4. 
The federal bill is itself hotly controverted as an unrealistic aspiration-even for 
ten years hence when the bill takes effect and even with a multibillion dollar authoriza-
tion for treatment works construction. The bills are discussed at length in Barfield, 
The National Journal, Jan. 15, 1972, at 84, Jan. 22, 1972, at 136. 
72. EPA§ 4(2), MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1972). 
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in some cases it is no doubt more appropriate to follow the elaborate 
process of notice-hearing-final order that many regulatory statutes 
incorporate, 73 there are also cases in which immediate resort to the 
courts for injunctive relief might be more serviceable. 
Because the most desirable enforcement technique could not be 
easily identified and reduced to a statutory formula, the EPA left 
considerable flexibility to a judge before whom suit was brought to 
decide whether to carry the case directly through the judicial process 
or to return it, in whole or in part, for administrative action. The 
statute provides in section 4(2) that whenever administrative pro-
ceedings are available to determine the legality of the challenged 
conduct and suit is brought under the EPA, "the court may remit 
the parties to such proceedings,"74 and in-doing so may grant interim 
equitable relief if necessary to protect the interests governed by the 
Act. 
While in theory the alternative-route approach should solve the 
problem of the need for judicial maneuverability, whether such 
flexibility would in practice be achieved was one question that could 
only be answered after the EPA had been in effect for some time. 
Though several Michigan statutes incorporate similar schemes,71l 
vigorous application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by the 
Michigan courts76 has made administrative proceedings, for the most 
part, the sole legal tool available to complainants. 
In Water Resources Commission v. Chippewa County, the EPA's 
alternative-route strategy was soon put to the test in a rather un-
expected setting. The Water Resources Commission (WRC) brought 
suit against Chippewa County and the Board of County Road Com-
missioners alleging a violation of the EPA.77 The conduct challenged 
by the Commission was the storage of salt for winter road-clearing on 
the Road Commission's land. Allegedly, the salt seeped into the 
73. See, e.g., Air Pollution Act § 7-14, MICH. ColllP. LAws ANN. § 336.18-.24 (1967); 
Water Resources Commission Act § 7-13, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.7-.13 (1967), 
as amended, (Supp. 1972). 
74. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1204 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). 
75. For instance, the Water Resources Commission Act § 6(c), MICH. Co111P. LAws 
ANN. § 323.6 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972), allows the Attorney General to abate 
water pollution as a public nuisance while section 12-12(a) of the Act, MICH, CoMP. 
LAws ANN. § 323.12-.12(a) (1967), explicitly makes the Act ancillary and supplementary 
to the existing law governing water pollution. 
76. White 'Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 279-80, 
177 N.W.2d 473, 481 (1970). 
77. The suit also alleged that the conduct constituted a continuing trespass upon 
the underground waters of the state and a public nuisance under § 6 of the Water 
Resources Commission Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.6 (Supp. 1972), abatable pur-
suant to the Revised Judicature Act, § 2940, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2940 (1968), 
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ground water from which nearby residents took their domestic water 
supply by wells. 
Under the facts as asserted by the plaintiff WRC, the case was 
impressive. The concentration of chlorides in the nearby wells had 
been ·within the limits established by the United States Public Health 
Service prior to the defendant's act, but shortly thereafter it was 
found to be substantially in excess. As a result, the residents had to 
transport water from a nearby city in five- and ten-gallon cans twice 
a week. 
The salt stock.pile had been removed by the time the case began, 
but one problem still remained. There was no feasible way in which 
to decontaminate the already saline water. The suit, therefore, must 
have been brought to obtain at least one of two practical solutions 
for the nearby residents: the acceptance of financial responsibility by 
the Road Commissioners for an interim supply of water,78 or an 
arrangement to tap the residents on to the nearest municipal water 
supply. 
One is naturally curious why the WRC departed from its cus-
tomary administrative procedures and went directly into court under 
the EPA, for there was no evidence that the WRC ·was search-
ing for a case in which it could test the EPA. A likely answer is 
suggested by examining the background of the controversy. Follow-
ing complaints by local residents, the WRC undertook an investiga-
tion that demonstrated to its satisfaction that there was contamination 
caused by the salt storage.79 At that time the WRC called in the 
Board of Road Commissioners to try to work out a solution.80 The 
Road Commissioners, however, refused to take any corrective action, 
78. The complaint did not expressly seek damages. It sought an injunction against 
further storage and "to the extent that abatement ••• is necessary ••• [a] mandatory 
order directing said Defendants to pump, or otherwise remove, said contaminants 
from the underground waters." WRC v. Chippewa County, Complaint at 6.. This 
relief was probably designed to force the defendant to accept financial responsibility 
for the costs of an alternate supply, for there is no accepted way to decontaminate the 
ground water. As to a claim that any damages would have to be sought in the court 
of claims, the court held that the Court of Claims Act did not oust a circuit court 
of jurisdiction it otherwise had under a statute. WRC v. Chippewa County, Opinion 
and Decision of Judge Hood (May 27, 1971) (denying defendant's motion for summary 
judgment or accelerated judgment). The following comment was recently made con-
cerning this litigation in a letter from Raymond F. Clevenger, attorney for defendant, 
to Joseph L. Sax, May 31, 1972, on file with author: "[T]his case was scheduled for trial 
in May [1972]. But it wasn't tried, and I still doubt that it will be-or should be •••• 
At the 'final' pre-trial, a greater consensus was found that the entire matter should be 
resolved by building a water system. The cost • • • is now estimated at $220,000. In 
addition, the property owners want approximately $40,000. We're trying to find the 
money." 
79. Affidavit of Ralph Purdy, Executive Secretary WRC, Feb. 10, 1971, at 2. 
80. Id. at 1-2. 
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arguing that they were merely agents for the State Highway Depart-
ment. 81 
Chippewa County thus presented none of the usual problems for 
which the WRC's ordinary administrative approach was especially 
useful. The WRC was satisfied that the facts had been established; 
the usual problems of financing or scheduling that arise in an ordin-
ary industrial- or municipal-pollution case were not present. The 
case called for an imaginative solution to the question of who should 
bear the costs for the harm done. The local residents were, under-
standably, seeking as expeditious a solution as possible; and the stick-
ing point seemed to be a purely legal question: upon whom did 
responsibility lie, the county or the State Highway Department? 
Chippewa County must have seemed a particularly appropriate 
case for the invocation of the new direct-action EPA. The WRC 
referred the case to the Attorney General, and suit was filed in 
February 1971. Predictably, the defendant County Road Commis-
sioners, seeking indemnity for any liability imposed upon them, 
joined the State Highway Department as a third-party defendant.82 
At this point the Board of County Road Commissioners sought 
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff WRC had not 
complied with its own regulatory statute, which, the motion asserted, 
"requires that said Water Resources Commission give notice of any 
violation of said act and that its findings be made after proper 
Hearing, with a resultant Order .... No Hearing was had and no 
Order has been made by Plaintiff to this Defendant."83 
Judge Hood, noting two often forgotten provisions of the Water 
Resources Act, responded that there is no statutory requirement and 
no state policy requiring all water pollution controversies to follow 
the WRC's routine administrative procedure: 
The Water Resources Act contemplates and permits alternate pro-
cedures where a violation of the act is claimed. One procedure 
81. Id. at 3. 
82. This development created the unusual situation in which the Attorney General 
was counsel for both plaintiff and defendant. Apparently, no serious problems de• 
veloped from this extraordinary arrangement; separate lawyers were assigned to each 
client and each seems to be representing his client with appropriate vigor. Of course, 
the Highway Department attorney is not invoking constitutional objections to the EPA, 
but that is consistent with a policy of the Attorney General's office in all cases under 
the EPA. During the legislative consideration of the EPA, the Attorney General sup• 
ported the bill's enactment; and he has also testified in favor of similar federal legisla-
tion. Hearings on H.R. 49 & 5071, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife of the 
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Scss. at 7 (1971). 
83. Motion of Defendant for Summary or Accelerated Judgment, April 28, 1!171, 
"WRC v. Chippewa County. Reference is to Water Resources Commission Act § 7, 
Mica. CoMP. LA.ws .ANN. § 323.7 (Supp. 1972). 
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involves notices, hearings, findings and orders by the Water Re-
sources Commission itself, as set forth in Section 7 of the Act; but 
the alternate procedure is direct court action as set forth in Sections 
3 and 6.c of the Act. If direct court action is used, notices, hearings, 
findings or determinations by the Commission are neither necessary 
or pertinent to the court action; and it is immaterial that the Water 
Resources Commission may have had some proceedings without 
proper notice or proper hearing. 84 
Turning then to the court-made doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 
Judge Hood noted the view of the court_of appeals85 that adminis-
trative agencies, such as the WRC, "normally should not be by-
passed. "86 However, he continued: 
[As] the Court of Appeals indicated, there are no hard and fast rules 
for application of the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine; and whether 
to apply it to a particular case depends upon many circumstances. 
In the White Lake case the Water Resources Commission had taken 
jurisdiction and acted after a dismissal order had been entered in the 
Circuit Court suit ... to take the matter out of the hands of the 
Water Resources Commission and return it to the Circuit Court 
would require the Circuit Court to duplicate the efforts of the Water 
Resources Commission. It was noted that considerable sums may 
already have been expended on engineering and other like work in 
connection with the implementation of the existing Water Resources 
Commission orders. . . . In our case there has been no agreement, 
decision or order by the Water Resources Commission .... The 
interest of justice ·will not be served by the Court passing the 
problem back to the Water Resources Commission at this time.87 
What Judge Hood did not say, although it may perhaps be read be-
tween the lines of his opinion, is that it would push the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine-a doctrine that cautions against excessive judi-
cial intervention in the administrative process-to a ludicrous ex-
treme if it were enforced against the very administrative agency that 
has itself come into court as a plaintiff seeking judicial aid and has 
84. Chippewa County Opinion, supra note 78, at 3. Water Resources Commission 
Act§ 3, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 323.3 (Supp. 1972) provides: "The Commission shall 
be authorized to bring any appropriate action ••• either at law or in chancery as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act, and to enforce any and all laws 
relating to the pollution of the waters of this state." Section 6(c) of the Act, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6 (Supp. 1972) provides: "Any violation of any provision of 
§ 6 shall be prima fade evidence of the existence of a public nuisance and in addition 
to the remedies provided for in this act may be abated according to law in an action 
brought by the attorney general in a court of competent jurisdiction." 
85. White Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 279, 
177 N.W.2d 473, 481 (1970). 
86. Chippewa County Opinion, supra note 78, at 4. 
87. Id. 
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asserted that "further administrative proceedings would not alleviate 
or correct the [problem]."88 
Finally, the judge made clear that whatever rigors might have 
been thought to characterize the law of primary jurisdiction previ-
ously, the EPA had added a significant statutory dimension to the 
question: 
This Court notes that under the Environmental Protection Act of 
1970 the court under some circumstances, while retaining jurisdic-
tion, may remit the parties to proceedings before administrative 
agencies. It may be that during the course of these proceedings such 
remission ·will appear advisable and may be ordered. At this stage, 
however, the Court feels that the interest of justice will be more 
swiftly served by this case proceeding as rapidly as possible to issue 
before this Court. After the case is at issue, determination can be 
made as to the procedural steps then to be taken. Perhaps it will 
then appear expedient for this Court to decide certain factual issues 
which might dispose of the case; or which could furnish the founda-
tion for remitting the parties to the Water Resources Commission 
for determination of the measures to be taken to eliminate contami-
nation.89 
Beyond its usefulness as a precedent on the relationship benveen 
the EPA and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the salt pollution 
case is important because it suggests that the EPA may be playing a 
significant role in liberating both the administrative agencies and 
the courts from their traditional approach to disputes. To be sure, 
the WRC might have brought a suit similar to this one as a conven-
tional public nuisance suit; but that power has long existed and has 
been used very rarely in situations subject to the routine hearing-
order practice. Similarly, judges might have been able to break 
away from traditional notions of primary jurisdiction, but in the 
absence of the new EPA, such a move might have seemed unduly 
innovative. 
There is, naturally, a large measure of speculation in these 
analyses of the EPA's impact, but it is important to consider that the 
legal system, like all institutional structures, is highly inertial, and 
that a strong statutory invitation, such as that provided by the EPA, 
may be most significant in its power to suggest new ways of doing 
business. Plainly, the EPA cannot press an agency or a court to take 
initiatives that it feels are imprudent. But if, as seems to be the case, 
the WRC felt frustrated with the recalcitrance of the Board of Road 
88. Purdy Affadavit, supra note 79, at 3-4. 
89. Chippewa County Opinion, supra note 78, at 5-6. 
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Commissioners and uneasy about the efficacy of its usual procedures; 
and if a judge feels that the case is an important one,90 and one that 
he is likely to be able to handle, the EPA can work as an effective 
catalyst. 
The primary jurisdiction problem arose in a more conventional 
setting in Lakeland Property Owners Association v. Township of 
Northfield. The defendant township was piping its treated sewage 
some miles and discharging it into bodies of water situated near the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, claiming that the waters constituted pollu-
tion, challenged a proposed enlargement of the treatment plant and 
sought an alternative place of discharge. Among the plaintiffs' alle-
gations was the complaint that the public needed effluent standards 
more restrictive than those established by a WRC order91 previ-
ously issued against the defendant township. 
The WRC-having issued the order just mentioned-was appar-
ently finished ·with the case except for possible monitoring of compli-
ance. When suit was filed under the EPA, however, the defendant 
sought a remand to the WRC under the doctrine of primary juris-
diction.92 The plaintiff replied that among its claims were issues not 
cognizable by the Commission, such as trespass and nuisance; and-
most important-that it was challenging "the reasonableness of 
orders of the Water Resources Commission, and it would thus be 
improper to remit this action to the Commission and ask it to pass 
on the reasonableness of its own orders."93 
Certainly, the court was not being asked to interfere with any 
ongoing proceeding before the WRC,94 nor was it obvious that there 
90. The judge opened the pretrial Sept. I, 1971, with the following comments: 
How close is the matter to being ready for trial? • • • This is an important case. 
The situation should be resolved as soon as possible. If there is responsibility in 
one of the defendants or not, it should be known at the earliest possible time •••• 
Is there anything I can do to push this along? • • • There is no point in playing 
games with witnesses and discovery. 
Authors' notes taken at hearing. 
91. Final Order of Determination, Proceedings Against the Township of Northfield 
for Abatement of Pollution of the Horseshoe Drain and the Huron River, No. 1316 
(August 20, 1969). 
92. The defendant relied heavily upon White Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of 
Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970). 
93. Response and Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion for Reference 
to WRC at 2, Jan. 7, 1971, Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield. 
94. See text accompanying note 90 supra. See also note 84 supra. See discussion of 
Lakeland in text accompanying notes 146-50, 171, 261-66 infra. A variant situation 
arose in WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc. See note 34 supra. The foundry had failed 
to comply with the Air Pollution Control Commission's regulations for almost four 
years. The Commission began to take an active interest in the case just as the lawsuit 
was filed and, shortly thereafter, negotiated an agreement with the foundry for the 
installation of control equipment. To protect itself, the plaintiff, after filing suit, 
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was any further contribution of technical expertise that the Com-
mission was prepared to provide for the suit. Accordingly, the judge 
held that 
there were matters before this court not triable by the ... Water 
Resources Commission or any administrative tribunal. It -was the 
further opinion of this court that the court 'Would retain jurisdiction 
of the suit now pending in those areas where it does have primary 
jurisdiction ·with specific reference to the setting of effluent levels 
currently being discharged by defendant .... The court was further 
of the opinion that the convenient administration of justice -would 
necessitate retaining jurisdiction.90 
He then denied the motion for reference to the WRC, adding "this 
order shall not be construed to deprive ... the Water Resources 
Commission of any jurisdiction they may have under the statutes 
... and such administrative bodies may pursue any proceedings they 
are currently engaged in with respect to Northfield Township's 
sewage treatment facility .... "96 
With this decision the judge maintained a posture of great flexi-
bility. He permitted a significant controversy to go forward by reject-
sought to intervene in the Commission proceedings under § 5(1) of the EPA, MICH, 
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(1) (Supp. 1972), while the court maintained jurisdiction, 
The agency denied the application for intervention, and the court refused to require 
the Commission to permit the plaintiffs to intervene before the agency. The court 
stated that "the plaintiffs have no inherent right to be joined [in the Commission's 
proceedings against Betz] without the consent of the Commission." WMEAC v. Betz 
Foundry, Inc., Opinion of Judge Hoffius at 4 (Dec. 10, 1971). The reason given for 
denying intervention was that "to permit each and every interested person ••• to be 
made a party to the administrative proceedings ••• could so deter the Commission that 
it could fail by reason thereof to carry out its responsibilities." Id. The court observed 
that the plaintiffs could get review of Commission action through the review procedures 
provided by the Air Pollution Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. In short, 
the judge simply ignored the plaintiff's right to sue under the EPA, and he thus failed 
to take advantage of the opportunity to integrate the pending court case with the 
pending administrative proceeding involving the same parties. This decision has been 
appealed. WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc., appeal docketed No. 143355, Mich. Ct. App,, 
Grand Rapids. 
95. Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, Decision and Order 
of Judge Mahinske at 1·2 (Jan. 26, 1971) (denying motion for reference to WRC), See 
also Lakeland Decision of Judge Mahinske at 20 (Feb. 29, 1972): 
••• this Court is not unmindful of the law set out in White Lake Improvement 
Association v. Whitehall •••• This Court is of the opinion that White Lake, and 
the rules set out therein, is no longer controlling in that [the EPA] specifically § 2 
thereof, denies the Water Resources Commission primary jurisdiction in matters 
such as are now before the Court. The primary jurisdiction doctrine was the con• 
trolling factor employed by the Court of Appeals in its disposition of White Lake 
but such doctrine was coupled with considerations of the lack of advance judicial 
proceedings when such doctrine was asserted and the fairness or unfairness of 
remitting plaintiff therein to another proceeding, and further, such doctrine iVas 
employed in the absence of the language now found in [the EPA]. It should be 
understood that this Court does not disagree with the rationale for nor the neces-
sity of the primary jurisdiction doctrine but merely points out that the same is 
not absolutely controlling herein. 
96. Lakeland Decision and Order of Jan. 26, 1971, supra note 95, at 2, 
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ing defendant's argument that an appeal under the Water Resources 
Act was the only way the plaintiffs could challenge the standards in 
the Commission's order. And he retained the opportunity to pass 
on those issues raised by the plaintiff that were not cognizable by 
the Commission ·without depriving the WRC of any contribution it 
might wish to make by taking independent action or by participating 
in the litigation. 
This judicial ploy was successful. Having lost the primary juris-
diction motion, the defendant went back to the WRC and obtained 
a revised, and more detailed, order of determination that set specific 
effiuent standards for a number of substances.97 The new order, ac-
cording to a Commission expert, contained "some of the strictest 
standards which have ever been applied to any municipal sewage 
treatment plant."98 Thus the suit prodded the WRC to far-reaching 
action of a kind it had previously failed to take. 
As subsequent events demonstrated, the WRC did not go far 
enough to satisfy the court. Following a full trial, Judge Mahinske 
issued a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, holding, inter alia, that 
compliance even with the new standards, was not sufficient in all 
respects to prevent unlawful pollution.99 Judge Mahinske, when 
later interviewed by the press regarding his decision, noted that the 
standards he imposed in Lakeland "are a compromise between the 
zero-pollutant levels one expert witness ... called for in testimony-
that is, pure drinking water ... and the WRC original standards."100 
Thus far, Lakeland is the only EPA case in which detailed quantita-
tive standards of an administrative agency have been revised.101 
B. Augmentation of the Enforcement Process 
Kelley v. Tannehill & DeYoung, Inc., involving the Northern 
Reduction Company, a rendering plant that manufactures pet food, 
97. Amended Final Order of Determination, Proceedings Against the Township of 
Northfield for Abatement of Pollution of the Horseshoe Drain and the Huron River, 
No. 1478 (March 18, 1971). 
98. Testimony of Mr. F.B. Frost, at trial, July 22, 1971 (authors' notes taken at 
trial). 
99. Lakeland Decision of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95. 
100. State Journal (Lansing), March 6, 1972, at B-5, col. 5-6. The judge said that 
he relied on the WRC Water Quality Standards for total body contact waters that were 
devised for Northfield. 
101. The detailed deer hunting regulations of the DNR were vindicated in Payant 
v. DNR (discussed in text accompanying notes 113-23 infra) and more general agency 
authorizations have been put in question in a number of other cases. E.g., Blunt v. 
Apfel (WRC new use permit; Dept. of Public Health septic tank approval); Ray v. 
Raynowsky and Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (Dept. of Agriculture orders); Tanton 
v. DNR (dam permit). 
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dealt ·with what may be the most notorious case of industrial recalci-
trance in recent Michigan environmental history. The history of this 
case dramatically demonstrates what can happen when an industry 
committed to delay faces an agency with almost limitless patience 
operating under a statute that requires it to use "conference, concilia• 
tion and persuasion • . . to the fullest extent possible.''102 
After a Health Department site visit in 1963, which was prompted 
by local complaints of nauseating odors coming from the plant, 
regulatory officials wrote, pleaded with, and issued orders to the 
company, hoping to induce some cooperation from Northern in 
eliminating the odors. Prior to 1968, Northern had undertaken some 
housekeeping reforms to eliminate the odor, presumably to pacify 
the Health Department, but when approached by the Air Pollution 
Control Commission in 1968, Northern claimed that the odor, which 
was caused by its waste treatment lagoon, would soon disappear. 
When complaints continued to be made to the Commission-many 
of these from a nearby factory manager who claimed that his em-
ployees were made sick by the smell-the Commission threatened 
further action. Northern responded this time by agreeing to apply 
an "odor counteractant" (a deodorant). The Commission staff was 
convinced that more extensive controls on the company's cookers 
would be necessary, but still the Commission took no formal action 
that would lead to a judicially enforceable order. In 1969, the 
stench still emanated from Northern's plant. The Commission sent 
Northern a letter requiring a cleanup by November, but it then gave 
the company a thirty-day variance,103 thus suspending enforcement 
of its regulations during that period. Just prior to this action, a staff 
officer of the Commission had made another in a long line of site 
visits, and he later reported: 
Every person interviewed felt that the odors from this plant were 
102. Air Pollution Act § 8, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 336.18 (1967). The Air Pollution 
Act was enacted in 1965. Prior to that time jurisdiction was in the Department of 
Health. 
103. The function of a variance under the Air Pollution Act is not clear. The 
statute provides that the Commission may suspend enforcement of any rule or regula• 
tion if enforcement would be inequitable or would create an unreasonable hardship, 
and that the Commission should take into consideration the progress that the person 
requesting the variance has made in eliminating air pollution. Air Pollution Act §§ 19· 
20, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 336,29-30 (1967). 
The statute also sets out a procedure for enforcing rules and regulations, which 
begins with issuance of a notice of violation and progresses through a hearing to a 
final order of determination. It seems that a final order is a prerequisite to invocation 
of penalties for a violation, and thus it is not clear why the Commission issues variances 
prior to the time that it issues a notice of violation. The polluting company docs not 
appear to need a variance during this period to protect it from penalties, See text 
accompanying note 185 infra. 
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severe and resulted in an unreasonable insult to the community. I 
personally found the odors from this plant to be sickening at a 
distance of over a mile from the plant.1M 
After the counteractant failed to eliminate the odor, the company 
promised to build an afterburner ( equipment the Commission had 
recommended), and the Commission granted an additional six-month 
variance during which time the afterburner was to -be installed.105 
Instead, without further notice or permission, the company installed 
a quite different kind of equipment that the Commission had not 
approved. This equipment failed to solve the problem. 
At this point, spring 1970, the Commission activated its enforce-
ment machinery for the first time. A notice of violation was issued, 
a statutorily required hearing was held; and in November 1970 the 
Commission issued a final order of determination that required the 
odor to be eliminated by May I, 1971. On April 30, one day before 
the pollution control equipment approved by the Commission was to 
have been installed and operative, the company sought permission to 
install yet another type of equipment, a so-called wet scrubber. The 
long-suffering Commission gave its approval, but by June 1971 the 
staff, having visited the plant again, reported that "nothing has been 
done since the permit to install was approved by the Commission."106 
Simultaneously with the expiration of the final order of deter-
mination, the company filed an application to the court for relief 
from the operation of the order, a tactic authorized by the procedure-
laden Air' Pollution Act.107 The company did not prosecute its ap-
peal, and the odor persisted as the summer of 1971 dragged on. The 
Commission, finally infuriated by this :flagrant demonstration of its 
impotence, referred the case to the Attorney General for prosecution. 
The Attorney General took no action even though it was during the 
hot summer months that th~ odors from the plant were particularly 
noxious. 
During this period, one of the public members108 of the Com-
104. Air Pollution Control Section, Staff Activity Report on Northern Reduction 
Co., Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc., Sept. 11, 1969, at 2. 
105. Kelley v. Tannehill&: DeYoung, Inc., Opinion of Judge Fitzpatrick at 4 (Feb. 
9, 1972). 
106. Conversation between an Air Pollution Staff Investigator and Roger Conner, 
notes on file with authors. 
107. Section 13 of the Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 336.23(2) (1967), permits a 
petition to be filed in the circuit court claiming that the order is "unreasonable or 
prejudicial." The Act also requires de novo review and places "the burden of proving 
the correctness of [the] ••• order" on the Commission. 
108. The member was Roger Conner, a co-author of this article. The Air Pollution 
Act § 3, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 336.13(2) (1967) provides: "Of the 6 citizens so 
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mission began taking steps to file suit himself under the EPA. The 
Attorney General entered the dispute when this member sought to 
obtain a supporting affidavit from Lee Jagar, the chief technical 
official of the Commission's staff; Jagar regretfully declined, report-
ing that the Attorney General's office advised him not to submit an 
affidavit for a private litigant, but to wait and make his affidavit for 
the state in the event that the Attorney General should decide to 
intervene on the side of the plaintiff. 
For lack of an interested local lawyer, the proposed private suit 
was not filed, but the preparations for such a suit, which were known 
to a good many people-including members of the press-made 
apparent the need for the Attorney General to act. Finally, in Oc-
tober 1971 the Attorney General and the local prosecutor filed suit 
alleging a public nuisance and a violation of the EPA. The court 
granted a preliminary injunction on February 9, 1972.100 
Undoubtedly, suit could have been brought in this case without 
the EPA; the law of public nuisance would probably have provided 
a sufficient cause of action, especially since the right to make such a 
claim is expressly preserved in the Air Pollution Act.110 The value 
of the EPA in such a case lies principally in its use as a psychological 
prod. By arming the ordinary citizen with authority to go to court, 
the EPA presses a reluctant public official to take action himself lest 
he be embarrassingly pre-empted. By setting out ari unequivocal 
mandate authorizing judicial action, the EPA eliminates technical 
excuses that might be made to support inaction.111 
Certainly, the EPA should not have been needed in Tannehill ~ 
DeYoung. Had the Commission moved more energetically, it could 
have obtained judicial action under the older Air Pollution Act. 
Likewise, the Attorney General might have filed a nuisance suit in 
the early 1960's. And, at the least, he could have been ready with 
a complaint to be filed on the first of May 1971 when the due date 
under the Commission's order arrived. Unfortunately, we live in a 
world of less than perfect regulatory action. It is for these situations 
that the EPA was enacted, and the Act has already indirectly paid a 
handsome dividend to the public in the form of a preliminary in-
junction against the Northern Reduction Company.112 
appointed by the governor, 2 shall be representatives of industry ••• 2 shall be repre• 
sentatives of local governing bodies ••• 2 shall be representatives of the general public." 
109. See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra. 
110. Air Pollution Act § 24, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 336.34 (1967). 
111. E.g., primary jurisdiction claims. See discussion of Chippewa County and 
Lakeland in text accompanying notes 77-101 supra. 
112. Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc., Decision of Judge Fitzpatrick (Feb. 9, 
1972). 
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V. JUDICIAL R.EsPONSE 
A. Cases Tried on the Merits 
l. Payant v. Department of Natural Resources 
Even the most enthusiastic proponents of the EPA were reluctant 
to claim that the bill was desirable because it would give regulatory 
agencies an opportunity to vindicate controversial or unpopular 
programs in the courtroom. Yet that is precisely what happened in 
Payant v. Department of Natural Resources. 
During legislative hearings on the EPA, the DNR had supported 
the bill, but with some reluctance. The DNR feared the consequences 
to some of its programs if private citizens could initiate suits. For 
example, the DNR had adopted a game management program for 
deer hunting that it believed to be scientifically sound. Yet the pro-
gram was quite unpopular in some areas of the state. The DNR 
feared that a suit brought by private citizens to enjoin the program's 
enforcement would be tried before popularly elected local judges 
who might be responsive to community desires or who might be un-
able to appreciate the scientific evidence upon which the program 
was based. 113 
The only response that could be given the Department was that 
there was, indeed, a risk inherent in the bill; but it was a risk the 
Department ought to be willing to take to obtain the advantages the 
bill offered. Moreover, it was suggested that the DNR might be 
underestimating the professional integrity and competence of the 
judiciary. 
Little did the DNR know how prophetic were its fears. Less than 
a year after the bill's enactment, suit was brought by a state legislator 
to enjoin the Department's deer-management program in Dickinson 
County, where public opinion was strongly opposed to the Depart-
ment's allowance of antlerless-deer-hunting. 
The immediate question raised by the case was whether limited, 
regulated hunting of antlerless deer helped or hindered the restora-
tion of the state's declining deer population. People in the commu-
nity felt that the prohibition of antlerless-deer-hunting until the 
herds were restored in size would be the most appropriate solution 
to this problem. The DNR, on the other hand, declared that the 
source of the problem was not hunters, but severe winters, over-
grazing, and lack of adequate forage; the size of the deer population, 
113. Letter from Ralph A. MacMullen, Director DNR, to Mrs. Donna Halversen, 
July 19, 1971, on file with author: "It is really too early to tell what the true effect of 
the Jaw will be •••• Our earlier and only misgivings were that it could be used as a 
nuisance to curtail good game and fish management programs • • • ." 
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they said, was limited by the carrying capacity of the habitat.114 In 
short, if hunters were not permitted to shoot the "excess" deer, the 
deer would die from starvation. Moreover, the DNR also took the 
position that there was an affirmative reason to allow hunting, for 
if too many deer were left to forage in an inadequate habitat, the 
food supply would be spread too thinly, and the deer population 
might be even further decimated.115 
The underlying issues were in some respects more sophisticated. 
These included the question whether the DNR was properly calcu-
lating the carrying capacity of the habitats and the question whether 
it had been investing enough in habitat management to increase 
carrying capacity.116 
Payant also posed the question whether the judiciary could re-
spond in a timely fashion to a problem in which time was of the 
essence. Suit was filed on July 13, only 100 days before the 1971 
hunting season was scheduled to open. The court promptly disposed 
of several preliminary motions, and the case went to trial on October 
5. After two days the three-judge court issued an opinion that com-
pletely vindicated the DNR; the hunting season, therefore, went 
fonvard on time. 
The unreported opinion merits considerable attention, for it re-
veals the court's attitude toward the importance of scientific evidence 
in environmental cases. In reaching its decision, the court noted: 
The issue before the court is whether the defendant's program 
.•. is likely to impair or destroy the deer herd [under section 3 of 
the Act]. Testimony introduced at the trial makes it clear there has 
been a steady decline of the deer herd ...• 
Assuming that plaintiff made out a prima facie showing that 
defendants' program of taking antlerless deer is likely to impair or 
destroy the herd, the testimony introduced by defendants is over-
whelmingly to the contrary. Such testimony was largely of a scientific 
nature given by trained and experienced personnel and greatly out-
weighs the evidence brought against it. The preponderance of the 
evidence convinces the court that the severity of winters in recent 
years and the lack of suitable food for deer ... are primarily respon-
sible for the decline of the herd. The testimony further establishes 
that large numbers of deer have died in recent years due to the 
harshness of the winters, lack of food and consequent starvation; 
and that not only does the taking of a limited number of antlerless 
deer result in harvesting deer which would die anyway but it also 
114. See Sunday Chronicle (Muskegon, :Mich.), July 18, 1971, at 25, col, 4. 
115. Id. 
116. See Editorial, A. Closer Look at Deer Habitat Program, North Woods Call, 
March 8, 1972, at 6, col. I. 
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is beneficial to the remaining deer in that they have a better chance 
of survival. The testimony of Louis Verme, a game biologist who has 
spent the last 18 years studying nutrition as it relates to the repro-
duction of deer, is particularly convincing.117 
The significance of this opinion lies partly in the effect it should 
have on the confidence of the state regulatory agencies in the EPA: 
An examination of the trial transcript118 should set to rest their fears 
that local opinion, rather than demonstrable evidence, will govern 
the court. Perhaps more important is the fact that Payant clearly 
indicates that courts can handle scientific evidence concerning en-
vironmental matters. 
An environmental trial, like any other well-litigated case, is an 
exercise in reducing great quantities of seemingly unrelated and 
contradictory data to a few critical issues, which will govern the 
court's ultimate decision. Payant demonstrated this point well. The 
plaintiff introduced statistical information about declining herds, the 
location and nature of forage, the causes of deer death, and the 
changing ratios of antlerless deer to bucks. It soon became evident 
that the DNR's program was largely based on claims of inadequate 
browse for the deer. The plaintiff then presented a number of wit-
nesses-mostly local woodsmen-who testified that a great deal of 
browse was available, that the deer ate the browse, and that, indeed, 
there was more food available than was eaten. Several witnesses also 
testified that they had never seen a starved deer and that they had 
never known a fawn to survive when its mother had been shot. 
Moreover, it was noted that com seemed to be an alternative food 
source and that substantial amounts of corn had in fact been fed 
to deer in the area. 
By this point, the plaintiff had highlighted the key issues for the 
court: How could it be said that deer were starving when great 
quantities of browse had been seen by witnesses? Were other sources 
of food, such as com, available? And did the DNR's hunting pro-
gram decimate the herds? The defendant DNR's witnesses, and es-
pecially Louis Verme, who was commended in the court's opinion, 
clearly and decisively put each of these contentions to rest. 
First, Mr. Verme testified that in cold climates, like that of the 
Upper Peninsula, deer must often make a choice between adequate 
117. Payant v. DNR, Opinion of Judges Brown, Munro, Davidson at 3 (Oct. 7, 
1971). 
118. We were unable to obtain a stenographic transcript in time so we listened to 
the court reporter's tape instead [hereinafter Payant Tape]. Summarization of trial 
testimony is based on the tape. 
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food and good shelter. According to Mr. Verme, "Deer instinctively 
seek good shelter at the expense of food supply. In the Upper Pen-
insula deer experience extreme heat loss in travelling. And they need 
a tight canopy for shelter. They also need to hide, for deer are a 
prey species."119 Deer in a severe climate, he added, will rarely 
travel more than a quarter-mile for food. Thus, even when it ap-
pears to a layman that the deer have adequate food nearby, in fact, 
there may be none readily accessible to them. 
In addition, Mr. Verme testified that even if deer are eating, 
they may, nevertheless, be starving. While deer will eat anything, 
the important question to consider is the nutritional value of their 
food. Popple, for example, the browse in greatest abundance ac-
cording to plaintiff's witnesses, is a poor deer food that is very low 
in nutritional content. "Fawns," Mr. Verme said, "who feed solely 
on popple browse for thirty days will die, and adults will experience 
severe damage .... If there's not other food to supplement ... we 
feel starvation conditions are occurring."120 Thus, it is possible that 
"deer starve with their bellies full." 
Mr. Verme also flatly denied the assertions that fawns die when 
their mothers are shot. According to Mr. Verme, fawns are com-
pletely weaned by the hunting season, and-Bambi stories to the 
contrary notwithstanding-they will compete with their mothers for 
food. A hungry adult doe will push her own fawn away to feed her-
self. With respect to the factual issue of com-feeding, Mr. Verme 
totally rejected this method's usefulness. Com is too rich a food for 
hungry deer, he said; it is, in addition, too expensive to make gen-
erally available and makes the deer too dependent, creating what 
Verme called a "barnyard effect."121 
Perhaps the only point that was not neatly tied together by 
Verme's testimony was whether the DNR was doing enough cutting 
of adequate forage to reduce the problem. But even here, the defen-
dant's witnesses were effective, for they noted the problems of re-
strictions on lumbering for forest products, the long time required 
for needed trees to mature, and the DNR's own efforts to improve 
forest management. 
On the whole, no one who witnessed the Payant trial or examined 
the testimony could doubt that the DNR made an effective case 
without sacrificing detail and sophistication in the presentation of 
their testimony. Moreover, Payant serves as an illustration of how 
119. Payant Tape, supra note 118. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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capable courts can be in managing a case within the enlarged ju-
dicial review of agency decisions required by the EPA. The Payant 
court did not uphold the DNR because the plaintiffs were unable 
to prove arbitrariness or caprice, or even because the agency's own 
record, standing alone, constituted substantial evidence to support 
its decision. Rather, the court permitted the plaintiff to make its 
prima facie case, and then put the burden on the agency to rebut 
that case as the EPA requires.122 This the agency was able to do by 
a preponderance of evidence. By accepting this larger burden and 
by meeting the plaintiffs directly on the merits, the agency emerged 
from the case stronger than ever.123 
2. Muskegon County v. Environmental 
Protection Organization 
Muskegon County had been the recipient of a much-praised fed-
eral grant to develop a regional sewage treatment system that used 
spray irrigation of partially treated water. The idea behind the pro-
ject was to use the natural filtering process of land to treat waste 
water. However, fearing that doubters might interminably delay 
this important experiment with a last-minute lawsuit, the county 
sued a local organization that had been critical of the program, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that its plan was not a nuisance.124 
As the plaintiff county predicted, the defendant organization 
counter claimed for an in junction under the EPA, and the issues 
were joined. The original suit was filed on March 15, 1971; there 
was one day of pre-trial hearings; and the case came to trial on May 
4, 1971.125 On May 18, the court rendered a decision in favor of 
122. EPA § 3(1), MICH. CO.MP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). 
123. See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
124. The complaint, filed March 15, 1971, was brought against several named in-
dividuals and a local citizen group "individually and as representative of all persons 
having an interest in the establishment ••• of the Muskegon County Wastewater Man-
agement System." Complaint at I. The idea was to prevent subsequent suits by others 
challenging the program. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on 
March 31, 1971, challenging the propriety of the class action on the grounds that 
there was no question commonly affecting the entire class of defendants, and that 
the named defendants "cannot possibly, represent" the class of defendants sought to 
be bound. Answer of Defendant at 5-6. The citizens abandoned this motion when 
the county conceded that a lawsuit filed after completion of the system on the ground 
that it was malfunctioning would not be barred by a decision in the instant case. See 
Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection Org., Transcript of Hearing on De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-29 (April 20, 1971). 
125. The defendants (and cross-plaintiffs suing under the EPA) objected to ad-
vancement of the trial on the calendar, which had been requested by the plaintiff 
under MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 521.4 (1969). The court offered a fifteen-day, and then a 
thirty-day, continuance, which defendants rejected as insufficient "without giving any 
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Muskegon County. A motion for a new trial was denied on June 3, 
and the court's ruling was not appealed. The termination of the 
case cleared the way for the county's program to begin. 
At the trial, the opponents of the spray-irrigation treatment plan 
built their case principally around three issues.126 They contended: 
that this treatment system operated rather like a large septic tank 
and that this system was discredited because it used infiltration into 
the soil as a waste disposal method; that the ground water level in 
this area was too near the surface for the filtering job to be effective; 
and that the soil in Muskegon, as contrasted with soil in other 
counties in which similar experimental programs had been carried 
out, was unsuitable for this type of project. 
To each of these contentions, Muskegon County witnesses re-
sponded effectively. As for the first, they noted that septic tanks had 
two faults: they were anaerobic (lacking in oxygen during the period 
of decomposition) and they lacked means for controlling water flow 
and movement; but the county's witnesses further testified that nei-
ther problem existed in the county's proposed treatment works. As 
for the other contentions-the undesirable level of ground water 
and the unsuitability of the soil-the county's witnesses responded 
that these factors merely created greater engineering problems. This 
project, illustratively, had an elaborate drainage scheme to compen-
sate for the high water table, and the soil in Muskegon County was 
described as not the best, but quite suitable. 
On a number of other issues, the opponents of the plan were 
also unable to make any substantial headway. For example, while 
the spray-irrigation plan was conceded to be imperfect in handling 
certain nutrients that passed through the system, it was said to be 
considerably better than most other waste treatment systems. On 
such questions as what devices existed for dealing with system break-
down, the county adduced persuasive evidence illustrating that the 
Muskegon County proposal was much more flexible than conven-
tional treatment plants. 
reasonable explanation why such a continuance would not be sufficient." Muskegon 
County v. Environmental Protection Org., Opinion of Judge Piercey at 3 (May 18, 
1971). Subsequently Judge Piercey inquired of the defendants' counsel whether a forty-
five-day continuance would be sufficient and defendants' attorney again gave the court 
no assurance that he would be able to present his additional proofs within such period. 
After due deliberation, the court denied defendants' motion for a continuance, Id, See 
also Opinion of Judge Piercey Gune 3, 1971) (denying motion for a new trial), 
126. Statements concerning trial testimony are the authors' summarization of an 
e.-..::tensive transcript. 
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The transcript demonstrates that the trial brought the essential 
issues out into the open ·with sufficient clarity that the court was 
quite able to handle them intelligently. The Muskegon County treat-
ment plan was shown to be a well-considered and intelligent experi-
ment for dealing with waste water. Although there may well have 
been preferable alternative sites, as the opponents suggested, there 
was no demonstration of any substantial reason to seek one out. A 
decision-making process can hardly be expected to do more than 
protect against significant and demonstrable mistakes. 
3. Crandall v. Biergans 
The Crandall case127 is noteworthy because it arose out of a simple 
common-law nuisance claim, a species of case that the judiciary has 
handled for centuries. The defendant operated a hog-finishing barn. 
The plaintiffs, who were neighbors of the defendant, claimed that 
the odors from the defendant's activities were intense. Other neigh-
bors only seemed to find the problem mildly disturbing, and experts 
from both the Air Pollution Control Commission and the Depart-
ment of Public Health testified that the odors were not severe. 
Even if the plaintiff had prevailed on the odor issue, the case 
would no doubt have been lost, for the defendant demonstrated 
that there was no "feasible and prudent alternative."128 A number 
of experts testified that the defendant's barn was of a very modern 
design that effectively mitigated water pollution, rodent infesta-
tion, and aesthetic problems when compared with most hog-
finishing operations.129 Alternatives suggested by the plaintiff, such 
as lagoons and so-called oxidation wheels, were firmly rejected 
by the defendant's experts. As to odor suppressants, it was shown 
that whenever a new product came on the market, the defendant 
had immediately contacted the manufacturer and had attempted to 
use the product as soon as possible. The alternative of moving the 
defendant's barn was demonstrated to be inadequate because it would 
only bring defendant's activities closer to other neighbors. In short, 
the defendant not only disproved the allegation that his activities 
constituted a nuisance, but established an affirmative defense per-
mitted under the EPA as well. 
127. See text accompanying notes 251-55 infra for excerpts from the court's exten-
sive opinion vindicating the defendants. 
128. EPA§ 3(1), MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). 
129. Crandall v. Biergans, Tape of Trial, on file with author. 
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4. Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources 
Perhaps the most interesting case to come to trial yet under the 
EPA is Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources,180 in which the 
defendant DNR granted a developer a permit to dam Monroe Creek, 
a tributary of Lake Charlevoix, to create a lake around which resi-
dential housing would be built. The plaintiff proved at trial that 
the impoundment would have an adverse effect on trout fisheries. 
Yet, at the same time, it was clear that the development would have 
some compensating recreational benefits. There was little evidence 
that the DNR had compared and evaluated the benefits and losses. 
Thus, not only did this case raise the question of whether the defen-
dant had met the affirmative burden of section 3(1) of the EP A,131 but 
-more importantly-the trial brought into question the DNR's 
land- and water-use policy. More specifically, the plaintiffs were ask-
ing the DNR to demonstrate that they had developed a policy against 
which the propriety of proposals, such as the one involved in this 
case, could be tested. 
Indeed, the testimony of the DNR's Director, Dr. Ralph Mac-
M ullen, suggested that a quite different set of considerations guided 
the Department's decision. MacMullen conceded that he "would 
prefer that the land remain in its wild state . . . [ and] would prefer 
to have preserved the trout stream," but, "the alternative would 
have been uncontrolled development."182 MacMullen said that the 
proposed development was, as he viewed the problem, "the lesser 
of two evils":133 Inasmuch as the developer's land was private prop-
erty, his Department had no control over what would happen to it 
in the absence of a dam,184 and since the land might be sold to "un-
regulated and unpredictable developers, the kind that are ruining 
the north country,"185 the DNR ought to settle for the best environ-
mental plan it can get under the circumstances. 
130. We also have no transcript of Tanton. We did send a law student to attend 
the trial, and our impression of the case is based on his extensive notes [hereinafter 
Tanton Trial Notes]. See generally Charlevoix Courier, March 15, 1972, at 1, col, 1. See 
discussion of Tanton in text accompanying notes 189, 233-36, 281-88 infra. 
131. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). 
132. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130. See also Petoskey News Review, March 7, 
1972, at 1, col. 1; Charlevoix Courier, March 8, 1972, at 1, col. 5. 
133. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130. 
134. Id. See Memorandum of Dr. MacMullen to Natural Resources Commission, 
Oct. 22, 1971, at 9-10, furn. C to Complaint [hereinafter MacMullen Mem.]. Regarding 
the question whether an agency must consider alternatives beyond those that it has 
authority to put into effect, see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, -
F.2d-, 2 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1558, 1561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
135. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130. 
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Dr. MacMullen's testimony indicates that the DNR does not 
condition the granting of its permits on the basis of what is the best 
environmental plan for the area,136 but rather on the basis of what 
the DNR thinks might happen if the permit were denied. This ap-
proach requires the Department to engage in far-reaching specula-
tion. For example, the evidence introduced at the Tanton trial 
indicated that the DNR based its decision not on concrete alterna-
tives for development, but instead, on its estimate of what might 
happen if the land in question got into the hands of "unpredictable 
and unregulated developers."137 Moreover, it became clear under 
questioning by the judge that the DNR had made no study of local 
land use controls that could be used as a basis for an opinion about 
the DNR's authority to regulate other types of development of the 
land in question.13B 
To be sure, some risk is involved in judging a proposal on the 
basis of its current environmental acceptability, for one can never 
guarantee that a rejected plan might not lead to some other less de-
sirable use. But the approach chosen by the DNR is considerably 
less attractive. For example, one could imagine the Public Service 
Commission approving an environmentally questionable pipeline 
route because the landowners over whose property the pipeline 
would run might subsequently decide to use that land for an even 
more destructive purpose, which might not be controllable. 
It is in this setting that the judge in Tant on will have to inter-
pret the EPA. Does the Act permit the DNR to make a "lesser evil" 
environmental decision, or must the Department use its permit-
granting authority to evaluate the environmental impact of the 
particular plan before it?139 In confronting these questions, the 
court will have to take into account the fact that the validity of Dr. 
MacMullen's limited view of his legal authority is questionable.140 
136. In the MacMullen Mem., supra note 134, it is stated that 
If the area to be developed had been in the public trust, my decision would have 
been easy-hold on to it in its present state and do everything to lessen the impact 
of the hordes on it. However it is (for all practical purposes) in private ownership 
and the correct approach now is to control its development in such a way as to 
provide benefits to the public and a fair and just treatment to the present 
owners. 
It should be clearly understood that we do not intend to consider this decision 
to be a precedent for other apparently similar cases. 
137. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130. 
138. Id. 
139. In addition, the Dam Act § 2(b), MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 281.132(b) (Supp. 
1972), provides that a permit may be issued if "the presence of an impoundment will 
not have a significant adverse effect on fish, wildlife or recreational values in the 
watershed or infringe on the public rights in the waters of the state." 
140. Nor is his view of the deference due land developers (see supra note 136) as 
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Dr. MacM ullen appears not to have considered the affirmative au-
thority granted him by the EPA to challenge some other proposed 
use of the land in question should the dam permit be denied; nor 
has he taken into account the availability of the extensive traditional 
powers the Attorney General has in the area of public nuisance, the 
potential of other statutes such as the Water Resources Act,141 or-as 
noted above-local land use controls, as devices to prevent egregious 
alternative land uses. 
In contrast to the DNR's timid view of its legal authority to 
deal with potentially destructive land uses, it should be noted that 
just weeks before Tanton went to trial, the Governor's Special Com-
mission on Land Use issued a report. The following comments ap-
peared in the summary of the report: 
[T]he state should review major land sales to ensure adequate plan-
ning and to protect the natural resources and land areas with unique 
values. Existing departmental rules and regulations should be closely 
examined for use in this area of environmental abuse . •.. 142 
Furthermore, the Report stated: "It is impractical to wait for the 
adoption of a state land development plan as a precondition for 
state regulation, and delay all action pending comprehensive plan 
development. . . .''143 Moreover, after Tanton had been initiated, 
but prior to the trial, the Natural Resources Commission unani-
mously pledged that it would "not in any way abet"144 new water 
a constitutional matter necessarily correct. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Pub-
lic Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). See notes 144, 189 infra, 
141. See note 75 supra. 
142. SUMMARY OF REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE 6 (1972) 
(emphasis added). 
143, REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE 14 (1972), 
144. State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 14, 1972, at B-2, col, I. The Natural Resources 
Commission and the DNR. appear to have taken a much broader view of their au-
thority, in talking to reporters, than the DNR did in testimony in Tanton. It was 
stated in the Detroit Free Press, Jan. 15, 1972, at 3-A, col. 5 that 
[t]he Commission pledged that it and the D.N.R. will withhold approval from all 
private and public developments which are held to have the "potential to cause 
major irreversible damage to the quality of Michigan's environment," 
••• A. Gene Gazley, assistant D.N.R. director ••• said the policy will allow the 
D.N.R. to be "much more effective" in dealing with the problem of cheap, hap• 
hazard development occurring in many northern areas of the state, , •• 
The Commission pledged that in implementing the new policy it would act to 
the limit of its statutory authority. In attempting to discourage projects over which 
it lacked direct authority, the Commission promised that "all other means-per-
suasion, publicity, moral force-will be employed to prevent or at least mitigate 
environmental damage." 
Commission chairman Harry H. Whiteley said "from now on they (the de• 
velopers) are really going to have to sell us" before the Commission or the D.N.R. 
will approve development proposals. 
See also North Woods Call, Jan. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 1, 
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or land uses that could damage the environment. As the State Jour-
nal noted in its story on the Commission's action: 
The interim land use policy was adopted in the wake of a report by 
Gov. Milliken's Special Commission on Land Use urging statewide 
land control. 
Ironically, the approval came a day before an Ingham County 
court test of the Commission's December decision to permit a 440-
acre impoundment of Monroe Creek in Charlevoix County.145 
5. Lakeland Property Owners Association 
v. Township of Northfield 
In Lakeland Property Owners Association v. Township of North-
field, the plaintiffs challenged the present operation and plans for 
enlargement of a local waste water treatment plant.146 The testimony 
in the case was extensive and detailed, but the weight of evidence 
was not as clear-cut as in Payant or Muskegon County. The judge 
appeared also to be affected by the cavalier attitude of both the 
Water Resources Commission and the Department of Health in 
dealing with the plaintiff's complaints. Before and after construction 
of the treatment facility, officials from both agencies made repre-
sentations to members of the plaintiff community that were not 
carried out; indeed, during the trial it was revealed that the letters 
had been consigned to a dead file.147 Moreover, the WRC upgraded 
its Final Order of Determination during the pendency of the liti-
gation, obviously in response to the suit. This course of action is 
hardly likely to inspire confidence in the "scientific" nature of the 
WRC's judgments.14s 
Besides being influenced by the plaintiffs' evidence that the re-
ceiving waters were polluted and that compliance with the WRC 
standards would continue to produce polluted water, the judge was 
obviously concerned about the testimony by defendants' witnesses 
that there were multiple sources of pollution and that tightening 
restrictions on this plant alone would not be sufficient to clean up 
the receiving waters. The court's opinion repeatedly noted, when 
referring to testimony by defendants' expert, that 
[the witness] did not know if stopping all phosphates from de-
145. State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 14, 1972, at B-2, col. 1. Because Judge Reisig 
granted the defendants a change of venue from Ingham to Charlevoix County, the 
case did not go to trial until March 6, 1972. 
146. See text accompanying notes 91-101 supra, 261-66 infra. 
147. Authors' trial notes. 
148. See text accompanying note 97 supra. 
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fendant plant would make any appreciable difference with regard 
to Strawberry Lake .... It was [his] further testimony ... that if the 
defendants herein comply with the amended final order of determi-
nation and damage is still being done to the receiving waters because 
of nutrients, the levels in the order could be ordered "adjusted" or 
the complaint ignored even though the "standards" are being 
abused.149 
The court no doubt concluded that the Water Resources Com-
mission was reluctant to deal with any one polluter in light of the 
fact that effluents discharged by others also contributed to pollution. 
The court was also unimpressed by the defendants' notion that they 
were relieved of responsibility because individual homeowners down-
stream were also polluting. Furthermore, the court determined that 
the defendants had not made out an affirmative defense other than 
by assertion. It noted: 
[D]efendants merely recited, through their witnesses, that there was 
no reasonable and feasible alternative to their actions and did not 
support such recitations ·with facts other than alluding to economic 
considerations. Defendants also admitted ... that present and future 
population below the outfall pipe had not been taken into consider-
ation at the original construction of their waste water treatment 
plant and apparently is being ignored currently upon their request 
to continue operation and expand the volume of their discharge.160 
A judgment was thus entered for the plaintiffs that included more 
restrictive effluent standards, but allowed as alternatives the reduc-
tion in total discharge and the establishment of a less harmful site 
for waste discharge. 
B. Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions 
Preliminary relief has been at issue in about one third of the 
cases filed under the EPA. In nine cases hearings were held on 
plaintiffs' motions for restraining orders or injunctions; the relief 
sought by plaintiffs was granted in four of those cases,m and denied 
in five.152 There are, in addition, four cases in which ex parte tern-
149. Lakeland Decision of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 13-14. 
150. Lakeland Decision of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 22. 
151. Ray v. Raynowsky; MUCC v. Anthony; Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. 
Township of Northfield; Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc. 
152. Surowitz v. City of Detroit; Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit; Blunt 
v. Apfel; Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs. (the court of appeals in Wilcox ordered 
the injunction reinstated pending trial; see note 170 infra); McCloud v. City of Lansing 
(injunction denied but jurisdiction retained to assure defendant's compliance with a 
promise to screen and to place underground a challenged power line in a park; Order 
of Judge Reisig at 2 (May 17, 1971)). 
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porary restraining orders have been issued;153 and in one other case 
the plaintiff has not yet pursued his ex parte motion.154 
Motions for preliminary relief are among the most important · 
tests of judicial competency in handling EPA cases, for it is at this 
stage that the judge's power is greatest: Before all, or even a sub-
stantial amount, of the data in the case is available, the court must 
decide upon whom the practical burden of the litigation is to be 
placed. The cases brought thus far show that judges are not wildly 
issuing injunctions to save the environment, oblivious to the inter-
ests of defendants; preliminary injunctions sought by plaintiffs have 
been denied as often as they have been granted. But this bare sta-
tistic is only the beginning of the story, for the judges before whom 
these motions were argued have acquitted themselves quite well, as 
the cases illustrate.155 
Surowitz v. City of Detroit was probably the least-prepared case 
brought under the EPA. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the City 
of Detroit from using the pesticide methoxychlor, a widely accepted 
substitute for DDT, for the control of Dutch elm disease. The 
plaintiffs sought an ex parte restraining order, but the judge quickly 
scheduled a hearing on a temporary restraining order the day after 
the complaint was filed. At the hearing, the city offered letters from 
both the State and Federal Departments of Agriculture, and from 
academic experts as well, that indicated approval of the use of 
methoxychlor.156 The plaintiffs could produce no hard evidence 
of harm, and they only suggested weakly that the city needed to 
do more research on the insecticides. Indeed, it was even brought 
out at the hearing that one of plaintiffs' own witnesses had recently 
recommended the use of methoxychlor as a substitute for DDT. 
Judge Foley denied plaintiffs' ex parte motion, noting-perhaps 
153. Leelanau County Bd. of Commrs. v. DNR; Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee; 
Tanton v. DNR; Trout Unlimited v. Milliken. In Trout Unlimited v. Milliken the order 
led promptly to negotiations and a consent order disposing of the case. In Leelanau, 
the judge held that the case was not yet ripe because the legislature had not yet au-
thorized the transfer of state park land to the United States. In Gang of Lakes, the 
defendant has not rushed to proceed to a hearing. In Tanton, the defendant developer 
was eager to argue for the dissolution of the order, but he was temporarily delayed 
by his own successful motion for a change of venue from Lansing to Charlevoix, where 
the judge urged that the full case be brought to trial promptly and held the order 
in effect until then. The trial was held in March 1972, three months after the ex: parte 
restraining order was granted and about six weeks after the change of venue was al-
lowed. 
154. WCHD v. National Steel Corp. 
155. See discussion of Blunt v. Apfel, in text accompanying notes 178-80, 307-08 
infra. 
156. Authors' notes taken during hearing. See Surowitz v. City of Detroit, Tran-
script at 2-3 (April 14, 1971). 
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more tolerantly th.an the slapdash presentation of the plaintiffs war-
ranted-that 
[w]e have ... an involved question raised in a new area, dealing with 
ecology, and ... the research is in its infancy .... We have [210,000] 
trees ... dying at the rate of 10,000 a year. If nothing is done this 
will double by next year .... This is the problem that the City was 
faced with. . . . Every indication to this Court at this time is that 
the City is using every precaution to carry out a properly controlled 
program. There is no evidence to the contrary. And I appreciate the 
testimony here today by the experts, because they have pointed up 
that a great deal of work is necessary ... because we just don't 
know .... But I don't have any facts before me upon which I can 
enjoin the City from a program which is almost necessitated, dictated 
by the emergency they are faced with, and I don't have facts which 
indicate that this will cause harm to persons or animals or fish . 
. . . I am going to deny the request for injunctive relief at this 
time, but ... rather than dismiss the case ... the case should be le£ t 
pending. . . . If during this period some conclusion can be arrived 
at which would support the allegation . . . then come in and ask 
for injunctive relief, and I am pretty sure it would be agreed to.11l7 
Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit was a suit to enjoin the 
operation of a municipal incinerator used to bum pathological 
wastes. Plaintiff alleged that the city's incinerator was emitting par-
ticulate matter many times in excess of the Health Department's 
minimum standards. At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, the city argued that the particular wastes fed 
into this incinerator could not be put in a landfill, and that it had 
already closed down three of its four incinerators and was presently 
trying to eliminate or modify this facility.11.i8 
Apparently hoping to put additional pressure on the city to de-
velop a prompt abatement plan, the judge adjourned the hearing 
for sixty days without ruling on the prayer for interim relief. He 
explained to the press that "[i]f the incinerator is absolutely neces-
sary, I don't want to order it closed," but he added that if the city 
could not abate the pollution, he might, at a later time, shut it 
down.159 At the second hearing, the city steadfastly maintained that 
no quick solution was obtainable, and plaintiff's witness testified 
that the emissions were only slightly in excess of the applicable 
limits. The judge, therefore, responded that interim relief was in-
appropriate and ordered the matter set for trial.100 
157. Surowitz Transcript, supra note 156, at 2-4. 
158. Detroit Free Press, October 23, 1971, at 5-A, col. 2. 
159. Id. 
160. Conversation between Kenneth Prather, counsel for plaintiffs and author, Jan. 
17, 1972. No order has yet been signed by the court. 
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Both Bertrand and Surowitz suggest not only that judges use 
common sense in resolving these cases, but that they are willing to 
go beyond their formal responsibilities and to use the leverage of 
their position to induce litigants to take further steps to alleviate 
the problem. For example, the maintenance of jurisdiction, without 
the issuance of a restraining order, would seem to indicate that 
judges are often sensitive to the dynamics of public decision-making 
as well as to their more narrow professional duties. 
In Ray v. Raynowsky, plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin a proposed 
land drainage project. Work was to have begun in early November 
1971 when the case was filed and an ex parte restraining order 
granted; the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the order, and 
the judge brought that motion on for a hearing one week later.161 
Raynowsky raised a pervasive problem in environmental litiga-
tion. The county drain commissioners were proceeding with their 
land drainage project in the established way-proposing a stream 
channelization.162 Plaintiffs urged that there existed a more sensible 
solution-the creation of small ponds-that would be less harmful 
to the water table, to wildlife, and to pollution drainage into the 
rivers. They asked for an opportunity to put their proposal before 
the court for examination and comparison. 
At the hearing on defendants' motion to dissolve the restraining 
order, the judge adopted a position that seems to be commonly taken 
in EPA cases. He was reluctant to "try" the case twice;163 thus he 
both encouraged and promised the parties an early trial on the 
merits.164 As a result, at the dissolution hearing he concerned him-
self with only two questions: Would there likely be irreparable harm 
if the order were dissolved in the interim, and was there any urgent 
need for the defendants to go fonv-ard with their plan? Satisfied that 
the answer to· the first question was yes, and to the second no, he 
allowed the restraining order to stand.165 
Wilcox v. Board of Road Commissioners was one of the few 
disappointing preliminary injunction cases. The plaintiff sought to 
enjoin a county road commission from undertaking a highway-
widening that would require cutting down nearly a thousand old 
oak and maple trees. There was little, if any, indication that the 
Commission had undertaken a study in search of less damaging al-
161. Ray v. Raynowsky, Transcript (Nov. 23, 1971). 
162. Reume v. Henick and Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee challenged similar con-
duct by Drain Commissioners. A restraining order was issued in Gang of Lakes on Jan. 
19, 1972. 
163. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
164. Ray Transcript, supra note 161, at 16. 
165. Id. at 24-26. Trial was held on June 19 &: 20, 1972. 
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ternatives. Accordingly, the case seemed an ideal vehicle for bringing 
the conduct of one of these local-and traditionally environmentally 
insensitive-agencies into the open.166 An ex parte restraining order 
was obtained in mid-1971,167 and the case was not brought on for 
hearing by the defendant for eight months. But on February 18, 
1972, the court held a hearing168 at which it denied plaintiff's pre-
liminary-injunction motion: 
It appears to this Court that although the defendant intends to 
cut down numerous trees, it is necessary to do so if the present plans 
for the improvement of Duck Lake Road are to be carried out. There 
appears to be good reason for making the proposed improvements. 
Defendant has made a good showing that the health, safety and 
welfare of the public should be protected by widening the ..• road . 
. . . On balance, the protection of the health and safety of the travel-
ing public on the highway outweighs the esthetic quality of the 
environmental conditions. 
. . . Over the past three years defendant has experienced an in-
crease in costs of road construction .... The defendant has made a 
showing that it ·will be subjected to material ultimate damage and 
deprivation of rights if the injunction continues. Neither can it be 
said, absolutely, that there will be an unnecessary destruction of 
natural resources if the trees are cut down as planned. 
Balancing the possible benefits to the public to have the trees 
remain standing as against the benefit to the public in having an 
improved highway, it appears to this Court that a preliminary 
injunction should not be issued.169 
Unless the judge found that safety considerations mandated a 
prompt widening of the road, his denial of the injunction seems to 
be contrary to the legislative intent behind the EPA. If the con-
struction went forward, the case would become moot before it could 
ever go to trial on the question whether there were "feasible and 
prudent alternatives," an issue that was ignored in Judge Ryan's 
opinion. Indeed, the only ground he specifically mentioned for de-
nying the injunction pending trial was inflation in the costs of road-
building. It is not surprising, therefore, that the plaintiff immedi-
ately appealed and that the injunction was reinstated by the court 
of appeals pending trial.170 
166. For background on the case, see Jackson Citizen Patriot, Aug. 8, 1971, at 1, 
col. I. 
167. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs., Order of Judge Ryan Gune 16, 1971), 
168. We have not, at this time, been able to obtain a copy of the hearing trnn• 
script. 
169. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs., Finding of Judge Ryan at 4-5 (March 1, 1972). 
170. The court of appeals ordered, pursuant to MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 806.7 (1969), 
that the preliminary injunction be reinstated "pendente lite for the purpose of pre-
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In two other cases, courts granted preliminary injunctions that 
seemed plainly appropriate in light of the existing facts. One was 
issued in Lakeland.171 The court enjoined the expansion of a sewage 
treatment plant and prohibited new customers from tapping on to 
the system until a trial could be held. That case has now been de-
cided in favor of the plaintiffs after a full trial. 
The other injunction was issued in Tannehill & DeYoung, the 
case involving the notorious rendering plant in Traverse City that 
had slipped out of every effort to bring regulatory enforcement into 
play for eight years.172 One could hardly imagine a case in which 
immediate judicial action was more appropriate.173 In issuing the 
preliminary injunction, the court said in part: 
Plaintiffs produced nine witnesses ... whose testimony was that the 
odors emanating from the Defendant's plant ... has [sic] been 
obnoxious, uncomfortable, offensive, disagreeable and nauseating. 
No witnesses were produced by the Defendant to counteract or 
contradict the testimony given by ... the Plaintiffs .... Witnesses 
in managerial positions of two large Traverse City motels testified 
that they had receivea numerous complaints from guests ... 
regarding these odors. 
Lee Jager, ... head of the Air Pollution Control Division of the 
Michigan Department of Health . . . testified that he has received 
over 100 complaints regarding the odors and that he has made more 
than IO visits to the plant, the first being in 1963 . . . . Defendant 
requested and was granted a permit to install odor reduction devices 
known as after-burners .••. 
• . . The Court has purposely delayed rendering a decision in this 
matter to give Defendants every opportunity to completely install 
and have operable their latest proposed control device to demon-
strate claims made for it but to date [the court] has not been in-
formed that the same is in operation. Hence the Court feels that it 
can no longer permit the situation to exist . . . • 
. . . [A] temporary injunction .•. shall be issued which will tern-
serving the status quo pending a determination on the merits at trial." Wilcox v. Board 
of Rd. Commrs., Order of Judges Holbrook, Bums, and Fitzgerald, No. 13835 at l (Ct. 
App. at Grand Rapids, March 31, 1972). 
171. See text accompanying notes 91-101 supra, 261-66 infra. 
172. See text accompanying notes 102-12 supra. 
173. A final absurdity occurred when the defendant's expert lied about his creden-
tials during the preliminary examination hearing. The court held him in contempt, 
fined him $250, and sentenced him to ten days in jail for each lie. Kelley v. Tannehill 
&: DeYoung, Inc., Order of Judge Fitzpatrick (Feb. 7, 1972). The jail sentence was sus-
pended upon payment of the fine. 
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porarily en1om Defendant from conducting rendering or other 
similar operations .••. 174 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, the Indian 
fishing case,175 involved the most extensive hearing on a motion for 
preliminary injunction. The plaintiff presented a fisheries expert 
from the DNR, whose testimony set the stage quite effectively. Be-
ginning with the historic decline in Great Lakes fisheries and the 
difficulties in enforcing regulations, he quickly sketched the prob-
lem's background.176 He then described the nature of present regu-
lations, the way in which the Indians were violating those regulations, 
and the risk their violations presented to the management areas in 
which these Indians were fishing. The witness was temperate and 
cautious. He did not assert that the Indian fishermen were creating 
some imminent risk of destruction of trout throughout the Great 
Lakes. He did, on the other hand, maintain that fisheries were quite 
localized and that in the particular areas where the defendants were 
operating, their activities were consequential. He noted, too, that 
only a few Indians were doing the bulk of large-scale commercial 
fishing so that issuance of an injunction would not have widespread 
effects on a substantial community of persons. 
The defendants produced no witnesses of their own, but instead 
relied upon their cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness. Coun-
sel for the defendants pressed the point that the Indian defendants 
were doing only a modest part of the entire Great Lakes fishing, and 
thus tried to suggest that an injunction against them could hardly 
be a significant factor for fisheries management. But the plaintiff's 
witness re-emphasized that fisheries were quite localized and that 
within those regions where defendants did fish, their impact was 
substantial. 
The hearing did not finally resolve the question whether damage 
to fisheries should be considered on an area-by-area basis or in terms 
of the lakes as a whole, but the plaintiff did accomplish what it had 
set out to do. It had educated the judge about the nature of the 
problem and demonstrated that continued Indian fishing in viola-
tion of state regulations might significantly deplete an important 
resource. As in the other injunction cases, the judge seemed quite 
capable of understanding the environmental problem. Subsequently 
the judge commented to the press, "If I had waited until a trial, it 
174. Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc., Decision of Judge Fitzpatrick at 2-6 
(Feb. 9, 1972). 
175. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra, 290-97 infra. 
176. MUCC v. Anthony, Transcript at 47-52 (Aug. 18, 1971). 
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would be closing the door after the cows were stolen. My idea is to 
preserve the fish for both the Indians and the white man."177 
Another EPA case, Blunt v. Apfel, illustrated how a motion for 
a preliminary injunction may fail to make effective use of the EPA's 
potential. Defendants were planning to build a condominium on 
the shores of Torch Lake in Antrim County, but plaintiffs, who 
were principally concerned about pollution from sewage, sought an 
injunction to prevent the construction.178 
The case was potentially fascinating because the issue of lakeside 
recreational developments is very important in Michigan and has 
been the subject of considerable litigation.179 Blunt was also of in-
terest since, unlike earlier litigation, it involved a lake that was not 
yet overdeveloped. Blunt thus sought to bring some management to 
the lake's development at an early stage-something from which 
many Michigan lakes could have benefited :years ago. 
Unfortunately, Judge Brown's attention seemed riveted to the 
fact that no harm had yet taken place. On a number of occasions 
he referred to the case as being one of "mere apprehension or 
fear.''180 Both lawyers limited themselves to the submission of a 
177. State Journal (Lansing), Sept. 16, 1971, at A-1, col. 7-8. The court of appeals at 
Lansing CTudges Quinn, Bronson and Danhof) denied the defendant's application for 
leave to appeal from the grant of the preliminary injunction, Nos. 1318 & 1319, Jan. 
19, 1972. Trial of the case in the circuit court is scheduled for July 25, 1972. 
178. The case became quite complicated. Plaintiffs filed two amended complaints, 
alleging violation of both riparian rights and a zoning ordinance, which had been en-
acted during the pendency of the suit. Both of these issues were ultimately dismissed by 
the court, but jurisdiction was retained over the original EPA allegations. Blunt v. 
Apfel, Decision and Order of Judge Brown CTune 10, 1971) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims). 
When the developer commenced construction without a permit from the Township 
Zoning Commission, the Township brought a criminal action. Judge Bro-irn, who was 
presiding in Blunt, enjoined the criminal proceeding in an action brought by the 
developer against the To'l\'llship. Ware Real Estate Corp. v. Forest Home Township, 
No. 880, (Cir. Ct., Antrim County). This suit was consolidated with Blunt. Order of 
Consolidation (March 15, 1971). Subsequently, the tmrnship agreed not to enforce 
the zoning law if the developer would agree not to challenge the law's validity in 
court and to pay the $400 required for a permit. The property mrners appealed the 
permit approval to the Board of Zoning Appeals. In any event, Judge Brown in his 
Order of June 10, 1971, held the zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to 
this developer. The developer filed a damage action against the plaintiffs. Apfel v. 
Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct., Antrim County). 
As a collateral matter, the Securities Bureau, refused to grant the developers a permit 
to sell the twenty per cent of the units that have already been built. Presently, it is not 
certain whether, or when, the case will be tried. Settlement negotiations appear to be 
on the horizon. 
179. See, e.g., Thompson v. Enz, 385 Mich. 103, 188 N.W.2d 579 (1971); Pierce v. 
Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122, 192 N.W .2d 366 (1971); Opal Lake Assn. v. Michaywe Ltd. 
Partnership, No. 13599-C (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, Jan. 4, 1972). 
180. Blunt v. Apfel, Decision and Order of Judge Brmrn at 3-4 (Dec. 16, 1970) 
(denying preliminary injunction). 
Counsel for the plaintiffs admit there is no pollution as yet but contends the 
approved plans and requirements are insufficient • • •• Act 127 (the EPA) • • • is 
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single affidavit from an expert, and both affidavits were brief, un-
informative, and conclusory. No ·witnesses were called. The oppor-
tunity to offer evidence on the importance of avoiding irreversible 
harm was lost. 
VI. IMPACT OF THE EPA ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND INDUSTRIAL BEHAVIOR 
To evaluate fully the EP A's contribution to environmental reg-
ulation, it will be necessary to look beyond courtroom proceedings 
and to examine the effects of the statute on the day-to-day operations 
of regulatory agencies and industries in Michigan. Cases actually 
litigated at most can only touch the range of environmental prob-
lems. If the statute is to succeed, it must energize entrepreneurs and 
agencies through the threat of potential litigation into doing their 
jobs more conscientiously. 
While no such inquiry has been undertaken by the authors, 
there is some suggestive, anecdotal evidence that the statute has 
caused agency behavior to change.181 The Air Pollution Control 
extremely broad in scope by granting the right to any person to start an action 
alleging a defendant is likely to pollute • • • • 
The burden of proof is on plaintiffs to at least make a prima fade showing 
and mere apprehension or fear that defendant-, "might" pollute the waters ••• 
a.11d that present standards ••• approved by the Department of Natural Resources 
• • • are inadequate, is, in the opinion of this Court, insufficient to effect such a 
prima fade showing, in view of defendants' evidence to the contrary. 
Equity will. not interfere in advance of the creation of a nuisance, where the 
injury is doubtful and contingent •••• 
See Transcript at 15, 29 (Dec. 10, 1970). Note that in Leelanau, Judge Brown seemed 
to take a more sympathetic view of the EPA's effort to deal with environmental de• 
gradation before it passed the point of no return. In an Order denying Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 CTune 14, 1971), he noted that "[t]he Michigan 
Environmental Control [sic] Act specifically provides action may be started ••• where the 
alleged violation has occurred or is likely to occur •••• " Because the legislature had 
not yet authorized the transfer of the land in question, he adjourned the case tern• 
porarily. His opinion suggests that he intends to adjudicate the n:iatter at the time 
the transfer is authorized, rather than wait until actual degradation takes place, 
Note also that the "likely to pollute" languag'! of § 3(1) of the EPA is similar to 
§ 6 of the Water Resources Commission Act which makes unlawful a discharge that 
"is or may become injurious." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.6 (1967), as amended 
(Supp. 1972). See the Opinion of the Attorney General, No. 4721, June 7, 1971. See 
note 199 infra. 
181. For example, the State Journal (Lansing) carried a story on April 5, 1972, at 
B-5, col. 5, stating that 
[w]ary of a possible lawsuit, members of Livingston County's De1;>artment of Pub• 
lie Works may set up a close monitoring system on water quality at Thompson 
Lake •••• 
• • • DPW members have taken careful note of a recent ruling by the Living• 
ston County Circuit Court [Lakeland] • • • • 
They are reasonably certain the Red Oaks Plant can meet most of the purity 
standards Judge Paul R. Mahinske imposed [in Lakeland] •••• 
If the question of pollution by the Red Oaks plant is ever raised in court ••• 
DPW members want to have statistics which can point the blame at some otl1er 
source. 
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Commission provides one such illustration. 
From its creation in 1965 until 1971, when West Michigan En-
vironmental Action Council v. Betz Foundry, Inc.182 was filed, the 
Air Pollution Control Commission issued final orders of determi-
nation in only two cases, preferring instead to negotiate pollution 
control programs and to grant "variances in the interim."183 The 
weakness of this procedure appeared whenever a violator failed 
to live up to his agreement; the time-consuming process of issuing 
a complaint, holding a hearing, and adopting a final order was 
required before court enforcement could be initiated. 
Betz-the first EPA suit naming the Air Pollution Control Com-
mission as a defendant-apparently caused a departure from that 
practice. Following initiation of the lawsuit, the approval of an ap-
plication from another company seeking a variance was delayed by 
the Commission pending further staff investigation. Previously such 
applications were routinely granted. But Commissioner Stanley 
Quackenbush has since remarked that such applications would be 
scrutinized with greater care lest the Commission be brought into 
court again,184 and soon thereafter, the Commission adopted a new 
procedure under which it increasingly issued complaints and pressed 
for orders, rather than the informal agreements embodied in a 
variance.185 
To be sure, this change cannot be attributed solely to Betz. 
The variance procedure was previously under attack from both the 
public and from some members of the Commission. Tannehill & 
DeYoung, Inc.186 had also contributed to the Commission's embar-
rassment. But at the least, Betz provoked reconsideration of the Com-
mission's procedures. It was often discussed in formal and informal 
Commission consideration of the variance issue,187 and it was clearly 
an important factor in the new procedure that has been adopted. 
A controversial proposal to build a harbor at the mouth of the 
Platte River provides another example of the manner in which agency 
behavior has changed since the EPA was adopted. The project had 
been supported by the DNR, but opposed by conservationists whose 
182. See notes 34 &: 94 supra. 
183. See note 103 supra. 
184. Authors' notes of the Air Pollution Control Commission meeting, March 16, 
1971, and tape of the meeting made by the Commission staff. 
185. Minutes of the meetings of the Air Pollution Control Commission, Feb. 16, 
1971; July 20, 1971; Aug. 17, 1971. 
186. See text accompanying notes 102-12, 172-74 supra. 
187. Roger Conner, a member of the Commission, was a participant in the discus-
sions. 
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objections were strong, but seemed unavailing. The issue reached a 
climax when plans were made to file a suit under the EPA that 
would challenge the project. According to newspaper reports, the 
anticipated suit played an important role in persuading the DNR to 
reconsider, and ultimately abandon, its plan.188 
The DNR's decision on the Platte River project was also affected, 
no doubt, by the highly publicized Tanton case.189 Indeed, there is 
every reason to believe that Tanton was the motivating force in the 
Natural Resource Commission's formulation of its potent, new 
land use policy, and it was this policy that the DNR used when 
making its Platte River decision.190 
A questionnaire we sent to attorneys handling EPA cases191 pro-
duced some interesting responses about the regulatory agencies' 
behavior since the EP A's enactment. The first two comments are 
from plaintiffs' attorneys: 
188. Fulton, Platte Saved-Battle Leaves Bitter Taste, Ann Arbor News, Feb. 27, 
1972, at 35, col. 6; Digest, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Feb. 1972, at 1. 
189. See text accompanying notes 130-45 supra, 233-36, 281-89 infra. Newspaper ac• 
counts include Serrin, State Dilemma: Wilderness v. Homes, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 13, 
1972, at 3A, col. l; Editorial, State's Environmental Act Faces Major Test, Midland 
Daily News, Jan. 18, 1972, § 1, at 8, col. l; Editorial, Only Courts Can Now Save Our 
North Woods, North Woods Call, Dec. 22, 1971, at 4, col. 1. 
The DNR's "environmental reputation" was at stake in Tanton. The State Journal 
(Lansing), Jan. 19, 1972, at A-8, col. 1, carried an editorial entitled D.N.R. Taltes Odd 
Stance in Dispute, which stated in part: 
Growing abuse in land development ••• has been spotlighted recently by recom• 
mendations of a governor's commission. • • • 
While the commission struggles with this approach, the D.N.R. seems, ironi-
cally, to be going in the opposite direction •••• It is somewhat astonishing to find 
the D.N.R. defending itself in such an action [Tanton]. More difficult to under• 
stand is the fact that the D.N.R. approved the dam and lake project in spite of 
the fact that its own staffers in the Charlevoix area opposed it. 
Dr. MacMullen immediately wrote a letter to the Editor, State Journal (Lansing), Jan, 
28, 1972, at A-6, col. 6, in which he responded: 
The editorial unfortunately_exemplifies a worrisome tendency on the :eart of the 
communications media to take positions on matters of principle without full 
knowledge .••• 
Like most issues, this one was not 100 per cent clear-cut; in my judgment it 
was more like 55-45 in favor. Thus it is not surprising that some D.N.R. employ-
ees and two of the five commissioners took a contrary view •••• 
Time and the Courts will tell whether the Monroe Creek decision was right 
or not. I think it was, but I make no claim to infallibility. 
190. See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text; North Woods Call, Jan, 19, 
1972, at 5, col. 2: 
The policy was drafted by the DNR following its approval in December of an 
impoundment and land exchange which would open the door for a 1,300-home 
subdivision on Charlevoix County's Monroe Creek. Commissioner Gus Scholle 
recommended that the department adopt a new, broader policy to regulate and 
limit land development after the Monroe Creek action was taken. 
The complexity of efforts to analyze these problems in terms of cause and effect is 
revealed by the subsequent Escanaba River controversy. See Cooper, State Approves 
UP River Project, Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1972 at 3-B, col. 3. Cf. Foster v. DNR, 
No. 9906-C, Opinion of Judge Reisig (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, May 31, 1972). 
191. See Appendix I infra. Because we promised ·the respondents anonymity, the 
responses are not identified. All responses are in the authors' files. 
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My case involved W.R.C. standards and witnesses .... I think that 
this heightened their concern for their own standards and procedures. 
Having them called into question ... seemed to sting. 
* * * 
Our case involved three administrative agencies ... the Department 
of Natural Resources, the Michigan Department of Health and the 
Securities Bureau. With respect to the former two agencies, I have 
noted during the period of time of the pendency of this action an 
increasing cautiousness on their part to grant permits for projects 
of the type and magnitude proposed by the Defendants in this case. 
It is apparent, however, that these agencies do not feel constrained 
to "put the brakes on" developers to the degree that many of us 
would appreciate. In this regard the recent granting of permit to 
the developer of Monroe Creek [Tanton] is a good case in point. 
Below are two comments from Assistant Attorney Generals, re-
garding EPA cases they have handled: 
The case involves liabilities of a local unit of government and a 
state agency ...• In my view, the pending litigation has materially 
affected their attitudes toward environmental issues. Both of the 
agencies have tightened up their procedures for the handling of 
contaminating wastes. 
Speaking from the agency standpoint, it has made them more careful 
in documenting their positions and more careful re: initial actions 
(what is said in a letter or in a meeting). I see no result in so far as 
D.N.R., Water and Air agencies etc. regarding attitudes on policy 
and purpose. 
The EPA is apparently having an impact in the private sector, 
too.192 Shortly after the defendant pig-farmer won in Crandall v. 
Biergans, the following appeared in an agricultural publication: 
There is a tendency for some farmers to think that agriculture-
especially the animal industries-won a sweeping victory in the 
recent trial. This is a dangerous error ... Bill Biergans and his wife 
received a favorable judgment on their specific, individual opera-
tion. Each livestock producer should evaluate his own operations 
in light of Judge Corkin's opinion to see how he would fare in 
court ..•. It is time agriculture took direct, positive action in the 
area of pollution instead of always being on the defense. We desper-
ately need voluntary guidelines. • . . They would strengthen the 
position of any farmer brought to trial. . . . The time for us to 
start on them is nowl 
One last question: If you found yourself in court tomorrow, 
how would you fare?193 
192. See note 224 infra. 
193. Michigan Farmer, March 4, 1972. In response to our questionnaire an individual 
representing agricultural interests replied: " ••• a greater awareness has been created 
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VII. QUESTIONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. The EPA as a Source of Substantive Law 
I. Introduction 
[Vol. 70:1003 
The EPA is not only a procedural statute expanding the scope of 
standing to sue. It is also, in and of itself, a source of substantive 
law. The right created by the EPA is set forth in section 3(1): It is un-
lawful "to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural 
resources or the public trust therein,"194 unless there is no feasible 
and prudent alternative that is consistent with the promotion of the 
public health, safety, and welfare. 
Most of the cases litigated thus far do not explore the nature of 
the substantive right created by the EPA. Some seek to enforce rights 
created by other statutes, and use the EPA as a source of standing to 
sue195 or as a remedy196 on the theory that the EPA incorporates by 
reference at least those environmental obligations imposed by other 
statutes. 
A number of other cases probably could not have been prose-
cuted without using the EPA as a source of substantive law,107 but 
the question seems not to have been addressed in those cases. For 
example, in Payant198 the defendant DNR was prepared to accept 
the assertion that its deer management program ought to comply 
with the policies of the EPA. It was thus willing to defend its conduct 
on the environmental merits.109 
within the agricultural industry toward upgrading and improving handling and dis• 
posing of livestock waste." And defense attorney Tim Green advised a Michigan Fann 
Bureau audience "Farmers who aren't using good animal husbandry practices arc in 
for trouble .••• You should be a bit more conscious of how you run your operations." 
State Journal (Lansing), Feb. 27, 1972, at G-4, col. l. 
194. MICH. ColllP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). 
195. E.g., WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc.; Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit; 
MUCC v. Anthony. 
196. E.g., the cases initiated by the WCHD and WRC v. Chippewa County. 
197. See Appendix I infra. 
198. See text accompanying notes 58-64, 113-23 supra. 
199. However during preliminary skirmishing DNR lawyers made the usual objec• 
tion that deer management should be left to the discretion of the DNR, barring 
arbitrariness and caprice. See text accompanying note 237 infra. 
In Muskegon County and Lakeland, the defendants conceded that their pro• 
posed sewage treatment facilities ought not pollute, and defended on that ground. 
The courts never reached the question whether or to what extent the EPA set differ• 
ent or higher standards than the Water Resources Commission Act. Likewise, in Cran• 
dall, the "pig odor" case, in which suit was brought both on common-law nuisance 
grounds and under the EPA, it was plain that the defendant had some duty not to 
create noxious odors as a matter of conventional nuisance law. The court, quite reason• 
ably, found that the same evidence which established the absence of nuisance met 
the affirmative defense requirement of § 3(1) of the EPA. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
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2. The Public Service Commission 
The question of the EPA as a source of substantive law arises 
whenever a defendant asserts that he has no obligation to take en-
vironmental considerations into account in the performance of the 
challenged activity,200 and the plaintiff argues to the contrary that 
the EPA, in and of itself, creates such a duty. 
This issue has not yet arisen in pristine form.201 The question 
was, however, addressed, though indirectly, in Michigan Consolidated 
Gas Co.202 There the Gas Company petitioned the Michigan Public 
Service Commission to authorize it to set up a priority scheme for 
rationing natural gas; its proposal put the use of gas for control of 
air pollution problems near the lowest of priorities. Both the Attor-
ney General and the Wayne County Health Department intervened, 
urging that the use of gas for pollution control should be given a 
much higher priority.203 The Attorney General predicated both his 
right to intervene and his demand for a higher priority for pollution 
control explicitly upon the EP A.204 
The Commission never denied that it had authority to consider 
§ 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). In such a case, the addition of a count under EPA probably 
does no more than to shift the burden of justification to the defendant. Compare 
Blunt v. Apfel, Transcript at 31 (Dec. IO, 1970), in which the distinction between equity's 
traditional reluctance to enjoin anticipated harm in nuisance cases, and the "likely 
to pollute" standard of the EPA should have been considered. See note 180 supra and 
accompanying text; text accompanying note 308 infra. 
200. It also arises when the defendant asserts that its obligations are limited by 
the provisions of another statute. Tanton was such a case, involving the Dam Act. 
See text accompanying note 233 infra. Ray presented a similar situation involving 
the Drain Code. See Brief of Defendant in Support of Answer and Motion for an 
Accelerated Judgment of Dismissal (Feb. 18, 1972). When regulatory agencies have 
been defendants, it has been argued that the granting of a permit or license by the 
agency does not violate the EPA since the agency is not causing the pollution. See 
note 283 infra. 
201. See discussion of Roberts in text accompanying notes 65-71 supra, 239-41, 
256-60 infra. 
202. No. U-3802 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1971). 
203. Notice of Intervention of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Jan. 8, 1971; Peti-
tion for Leave to Intervene by the Wayne County Health Department, Jan. 4, 1971. 
204. Intervention is covered in § 5(1), and the substantive claim in § 5(2) of the 
EPA, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1205(1)(2) (Supp. 1972). The Attorney General 
also predicated his intervention on Attorney General Act § 28, MICH. Co?lll'. LAws 
ANN. § 14.28 (1967), which provides that the Attorney General "shall, when requested 
by the governor • . • and may when in his own judgment the interests of the state 
require it, intervene and appear for the people of this state in any other court or 
tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the people of this state 
may be a party or interested." 
The intervention caused a temporary controversy. Case No. U-3802 Transcript at 
16-29 (Jan. 12, 1971) [hereinafter Transcript U-3802]. Intervention was not allowed 
specifically under the EPA, but _objections were withdrawn and intervention was 
allowed without citation of authority. Id. at 29. 
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environmental issues,205 but seemed to be of the opinion that, while 
it could take environmental quality into account, it was not required 
to do so.200 The Attorney General argued that under the EPA the 
Commission was indeed mandated to consider environmental quality 
and had to give environmental protection a high priority.207 As one 
of the Attorney General's representatives phrased the argument, 
"the legislature has ... given to this Commission ... other mandates, 
and one of those mandates is environmental considerations . . . . 
Yes, there is a mandate to do something about pollution . . . . 
Pollution questions or considerations should be given equal con-
sideration with industrial uses for which gas is the only feasible 
fuel."2os 
The Commission did not resolve this question explicitly in its 
order, but it did move pollution control higher on its priority list; 
and, as one member of the Attorney General's staff later noted,200 
the intervention served to educate the Commission and to sensitize 
it to the presence of the EPA as a factor that must be considered 
when it formulates utility regulation policy. 
Subsequent events involving the Public Service Commission seem 
to confirm this observation. Only a few months later the Commission 
had before it a proposal for the construction of nvo separate gas 
transmission lines within the same general area. 210 The Attorney 
General intervened under the EPA on behalf of the DNR,211 and 
objected on environmental grounds to the duplication of pipelines.212 
205. The Commission cited (Transcript U-3802, supra note 204, at 9) Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 
(1966), on appeal from remand, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 19'11), at 354 F,2d at 620 for the 
proposition that as a representative of the public, the Federal Power Commission 
must provide the public with "active and affirmative protection." 
The Public Service Commission is given broad general powers under the Public 
Service Commission Act§ 6, MICH, COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (Supp. 1972): 
It is vested with power and jurisdiction to regulate all rates • • • conditions of 
service and all other matters pertaining to the formation, operation or direction 
of such public utilities . • . to hear and pass upon all matters pertaining to or 
necessary or incident to such regulation of all public utilities •••• 
206. Transcript U-3802, supra note 204, at 991-99. 
207. Id. at 951-99. 
208. Id. at 991-92, 994. 
209. Letters from M. Robert Carr, Assistant Attorney General, to Roger Conner, 
Oct. 4, 1971 &: Oct. 8, 1971, on file with authors. 
210. Michigan Consolidated Gas. Co. (No. U-3933) &: Consumers Power Company, 
(No. U-3935), consolidated, Michigan Public Service Commission, Pipeline Construction 
Order (Oct. 22, 1971) [hereinafter Pipeline Order]. 
211. The Boardman River Advisory Council also intervened. 
212. Pipeline Order, supra note 210 at 4. The Attorney General's Petitions to Inter• 
vene were filed July 15, 1971. 
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Shortly thereafter, the Commission brought about a mutually accep-
table settlement that consolidated the pipelines.213 
These proceedings set a highly important precedent, for they 
represent the first instance in which the Commission relied on the 
EPA,214 rather than using the broad language in the Public Service 
Commission Act216 to find jurisdiction. The Commission's opinion 
stated: 
On its own initiative and in accordance with the mandate of the 
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, the Commission has given 
very careful consideration to the environmental aspects of and alter-
natives to the proposals of the two Applicants, and the subsequent 
compromise settlement. Testimony and evidence on the environ-
mental aspects of the routes ..• were taken. . . . The compromise 
settlement has resulted . . . in a route which is superior from an 
environmental standpoint to that originally proposed.216 
Commissioner William R. Ralls stated that the case was 
an environmental triumph for the people of Michigan. At one time 
the two utilities as well as the two oil companies said it was techni-
cally and economically impossible to develop a single pipeline 
system. 
But when it became clear that approval of duplicate systems 
would be difficult to obtain, the producers and ,utilities got together 
with members of our staff and the Department of Natural Resources 
and decided that a single pipeline system could be developed.211 
Having moved this far, the Commission took two further steps. 
It first asked the legislature for authority to order public hearings 
on the environmental effects of proposed routes for electric power 
lines, and it simultaneously requested a formal opinion from the 
Attorney General on whether the Commission already has such 
authority under the EPA 218 Under present practice, the Commission 
considers only the safety of proposed power lines. Should the Com-
mission be found to have authority to order public hearings-and 
the Attorney General's office has contended that it does under the 
EP A219-the routing of power lines in Michigan would be subjected 
to environmental regulation for the first time. 
213. Pipeline Order, supra note 210 at 11. 
214. Pipeline Order, supra note 210 at 12. 
215. The Public Service Commission Act § 6, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (Supp. 
1972). 
216. Id. at 11. 
217. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 23, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1. 
218. Id., Jan. 21, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1. 
219. Id. 
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Notably, the steps taken by the Commission have been motivated 
not only by the Attorney General's initiative in the two cases dis-
cussed above, but also by another precedent that was initiated under 
the EPA, Beach v. Detroit Edison Co. 
3. Eminent Domain 
Beach arose out of a condemnation petition filed by Detroit 
Edison to acquire land in Washtenaw County for a proposed high-
voltage transmission line.220 The affected landowners responded by 
bringing suit under the EPA to enjoin the condemnation on the 
grounds that the proposed route would be environmentally detri-
mental and that Detroit Edison had not adequately considered 
less harmful alternatives, such as use of existing utility corridors. 
The statute granting utilities the right to eminent domain does 
require a sho-wing of "necessity" by the condemner,221 but that re-
quirement has traditionally been ignored as a practical matter; most 
condemnation cases have involved little more than the question of 
how much money the landowner would receive.222 
Beach was brought in the circuit court to enjoin or control the 
condemnation proceeding in the probate court. It raised for the first 
time the question of how the EP A's enactment affects condemnations 
by utilities. The following excerpt from the circuit court hearing 
provides a partial answer: 
The Court: May I suggest for counsels' consideration a possibility 
and that is that I issue to the Probate Court a mandamus, or a writ 
of superintending control instructing the Probate Court that in 
conducting the hearing on necessity in this action they are to 
establish standards for compliance ·with the Environmental Pro-
tection Act . . . that I retain jurisdiction for the purpose of review-
ing any finding of necessity which might be made in the Probate 
Court and under section 2b of the Environmental Protection Act 
to review the standards, or standard there established, to see whether 
such is or is not efficient . 
. . . The purpose of that is as follows: This allows the Probate Court 
220. Petition of Detroit Edison Co. to Condemn a Right-of-Way, No. 58·068 
(P. Ct., Washtenaw County). 
221. MICH. Co11fi'. LAws ANN. 486.251-.252, -.254 (1967). 
222. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Matuja, 365 Mich. 35, 112 N.W.2d 109 (1961), The situ-
ation is changing, but slowly. See Thompson v. Fugate, 452 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1971); New 
Windsor v. Ronan, 329 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Seadale Indus. v. Florida 
Power &: Light Co., 232 S.2d 46 (Fla. 1971); Texas Eastern Transmission Co. v. Wildlife 
Preserve, 48 N.J 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966), 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967), discussed 
in Sax, The Search for Environmental Quality, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 99 (H. 
Helfrich, Jr., ed. 1970); Foster v. DNR, No. 9906-C (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, May 31, 
1972); Note, Eminent Domain and the Environment, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 651, 659 (1971), 
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to discharge the primary duty of finding project necessity and it 
does not bar it from proceeding to make a determination of site 
necessity so long as the Probate Court has established or found 
satisfactory standards of compliance with the Environmental Pro-
tection Act, yet it reserves to this court the power to review those 
standards in the present action and under that Act, and to over-
turn, if necessary, the standards approved and specified by this 
Court, and if necessary to direct another re-hearing on at least site 
necessity, should that be indicated. That leaves this Court in its 
proper position of reviewing the actions of the Probate Court, yet 
raises clearly the issue of whether or not the Probate Court can 
properly follow this Court's order to comply with the standard 
provisions of the Environmental Protection Act, thus raising a proper 
question of law.22a 
The attorneys were unable to agree on a precise wording for 
the ·writ, and the dispute has since gone forward in the probate 
court.224 
4. Roberts v. Michigan 
Roberts v. Michigan225 indicates the limits of the EPA as a source 
of new duties for administrative agencies. It will be recalled that the 
plaintiff sued the Highway Department and Secretary of State for 
failing to deal with automotive air pollution. While, as we have seen 
in connection with our discussion of the Public Service Commis-
sion, 226 the EPA can be read into a regulatory agency's mandate, the 
question still remains: whether the particular environmental obliga-
tions the plaintiff seeks to impose should be made the responsibility 
of the agency he has sued. 
The Highway Department does not have a general mandate to 
223. Beach v. Detroit Edison Co., Transcript at 2-3 (Sept. 16, 1971). 
224. The three-member probate court commission found the project "necessary,'' 
but found no necessity for the taking of certain parcels of land. Ann Arbor News, April 
27, 1972, at 3, col. 6; id., May 5, 1972, at 11, col. 3; id., May 23, 1972, at 3, col. 4. A 
final decision must await the determination of the probate judge and subsequent pro-
ceedings in the circuit court. Meanwhile: 
The Detroit Edison Co., concerned by public crticism over its condemnation of 
private property, initiated a unique po1icy • • • of holding public hearings on 
routes it selects for electric transmission lines. 
Edison's [d]ecision to hold the hearings came ••• after public attention brought 
by a number of landowners who • • • challenged in court the company's right to 
condemn private property. 
Although lower court decisions in that case [Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.] have so far 
supported Edison, the company has also come under the review of the Public Ser-
vice Commission, which for the first time is considering making an attempt to 
control the location of power lines and power plants. 
Detroit Free Press, May 26, 1972, at 7-C, col. 1. 
225. See text accompanying notes 65-71 supra, 239-41, 256-60 infra. 
226. See text accompanying notes 200-19 supra. 
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regulate traffic on the highway, but is primarily responsible for the 
highways themselves;227 while the Secretary of State is authorized to 
enforce statutory standards governing the condition of vehicles,228 
it is the Air Pollution Control Commission that is responsible for 
"[p]romulgat[ing] rules and regulations for controlling or prohibit-
ing air pollution ... "229-the relief that the plaintiff in Roberts was 
seeking. Even though Roberts could have demonstrated that there 
existed some nexus between the agencies he sued and the relief he 
sought, he would still have had to convince the court that the legis-
lature had not invested some other agency-in this instance the Air 
Pollution Control Commission-with primary authority over the 
subject matter of the suit.230 
5. Relation of the EPA to Other Statutes 
Whenever a plaintiff suing under the EPA challenges a defendant 
who has complied with the provisions of another statute that also 
governs his conduct, two difficult questions arise: Does the EPA 
supplement and amend the other statute? If it does not, and if the 
statutes are viewed as conflicting, which is to prevail? 
Ordinarily, no substantive conflict will arise. The broad anti-
pollution provisions of the Water Resources Act, for example, will 
generally serve as cµnple basis for suits filed under the EP A.231 In 
such cases the courts can, and will view the EPA as an alternate route 
for implementing the State's antipollution policy.232 
In other instances, while the substantive environmental policy 
of another statute may be adequate, it may be necessary to allege 
that the EPA supplements the existing law by making mandatory 
227. State Highway Department Organization Act § 7, MICH, Collfi'. LAws ANN, 
§ 247.801 (1967) as amended (Supp. 1972), General Highway Law ch. 5 § 2b, MICH, 
Collfi'. LAws ANN. § 225.2(b) (1967). 
228. Vehicle Code §§ 204, '107(a), MICH. Collfi'. LAws ANN. §§ 25'1.204, ·,'107(a) (196'1) 
as amended (Supp. 1972). 
229. Air Pollution Act §§ 2(c), 5(a), MICH. COllfi'. LAws ANN. §§ 336.12(c), -.l!i(c) 
(1967) as amended (Supp. 1972). 
230. This is not to say that there will not at times be more than one agency with 
authority over various elements of an environmental problem. See, e.g., Ray v. Ray• 
nowsky, Transcript at 18-19 (Nov. 23, 1971), regarding the relative responsibilities of 
the Drain Commissioners and the WRC. But whenever there is an agency that has an 
obvious relationship to the problem, and which can do the job adequately, there is no 
need to impose responsibility upon another agency whose regular functions arc quite 
unrelated to the issue plaintiff wishes to raise. See Upper Pecos Assn. v. Stans, 452 F,2d 
1233 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 70 supra. 
231. This is not always the case. See discussion of Marble Chain of Lakes v. 'WRC 
in note 71 supra. 
232. See discussion of primary jurisdiction, especially Lakeland and Chippewa 
County, in text accompanying notes 72-101 supra. 
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what would otherwise be discretionary. For example, in Tanton, 
in which the plaintiff challenged the DNR's granting of a permit 
for the construction of a dam, the defendant Department relied upon 
section 2b of the Dam Act, which states: 
A permit may be issued if, in the opinion of the director . . . the 
presence of an impoundment will not have a significant adverse 
effect on fish, ·wildlife or recreational values in the watershed or 
infringe on the public rights in the waters of the state.233 
In cases like Tanton-where the Dam Act amendment became effec-
tive subsequent to the enactment of the EPA-the court must read 
the statutes compatibly if possible. In Tanton, for example, har-
monizing the provisions of the EPA and the Dam Act would seem 
to present no great difficulty. The principal purposes of the EPA 
were to remove free-wheeling administrative discretion and to assure 
that regulatory agency decisions were environmentally defensible on 
their merits.234 There is no· reason to believe that the recent Dam 
Act amendment was intended to amend the EPA, and it is quite 
easy to read the two statutes as conforming with each other. Thus 
the language of the Dam Act emphasized above can be interpreted 
-in conformity to the EPA-to mean that a permit may be issued 
when the director believes there is no threat of harm and when that 
opinion is warranted by the facts of the case. 235 Such interpretations 
233. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 281.132b (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added). 
234. Sax Testimony supra note 47; Press Release of Rep. Thomas Anderson (sponsor 
of H.B. 3055) at I, Jan. 16, 1970, on file with author; Remarks of Sen. Basil Brown 
(debate on H.B. 3055, Michigan Senate), June 25, 1970, transcript on file with author; 
Allbaugh, Public Overwhelmingly Supports Antipollution Bill at Hearing Here, Grand 
Rapids Press, Feb. 27, 1970, at 1-B, col. 3. 
235. This interpretation is supported by two other legal mandates under which the 
DNR operates. The DNR's enabling legislation, MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 299.3 (1967) 
as amended (Supp. 1972), provides: 
The Department of Conservation shall protect and conserve the natural resources 
of the state of Michigan; ••• prevent and guard against the pollution of lakes and 
streams within the state, and enforce all laws provided for that purpose with all 
authority granted by law, and foster and encourage the protecting and propaga-
tion of game and fish. 
See also GOVERNOR'S ExEcUTIVE DIRECTIVE 1971-10, Sept. 30, 1971, which reads in per-
tinent part: 
To: All Department Heads 
From: Governor William G. Milliken 
Subject: Environmental Impact Review 
I believe it is the responsibility of State government to lead the way in all as-
pects of environmental quality protection. Major state activities which affect the 
environment need to be carefully scrutinized, so that the changes brought about in 
land, water or air use are consistent with overall State environmental policy objec-
tives. 
I am directing that each agency of State government review all major activities 
within their jurisdiction to determine their effects on the environment. Such review 
must include the following: 
I. The probable impact of the action on the environment; this includes the 
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have been made of similar language in other environmental cases.236 
A similar question arose in Payant. In a pre-trial motion for 
summary judgment, the Attorney General argued that the court had 
no authority over the Department's game management program other 
than that necessary to correct abuse of discretion, and cited as au-
thority for this proposition a 1925 statute that gave the Conservation 
Commission its "power to regulate the taking ... of all game or fur 
bearing animals . . . whenever in the opinion of said commission 
... it becomes necessary to assist in the increased or better protection 
of such ... animals."237 The court's response, denying the DNR's 
motion, should set a significant precedent for interpreting the EPA: 
[W]e do not believe, especially in the light of the Environmental 
Protection Act, that arbitrary, unfettered discretion and unchallenge-
able power is vested in the Department and Commission. If it can be 
shown that the regulations permitting the taking of antlerless deer 
are likely to impair or destroy a natural resource, the courts may 
intervene. It is conceded that plaintiff has a standing to bring the 
action and the Act clearly authorizes suits against such bodies as 
the Department and Commission.23B 
In addition to the methods adopted in Tanton and in Payant 
for reconciling the provisions of potentially conflicting statutes, there 
is one other interpretive technique courts could use to preserve the 
EP A's vitality. If necessary, provisions in existing statutes could be 
impact on human life or other ecological systems such as wildlife, fish and 
aquatic life; or on air, water or land resources; 
2. Probable adverse environmental effects of the action which cannot be avoided 
(such as air or water pollution, damage to life systems, urban congestion, threats 
to health or other adverse effects on human life); 
3. Evaluation of alternatives to the proposed action that might avoid some or 
all of the environmental effects indicated above. This should include a full ex-
planation of the reasons why the agency decided to pursue the action in its con-
templated form rather than an alternative course of action; 
4. The possible modifications to the project which would eliminate or minimize 
adverse environmental effects, including a discussion of the additional costs in• 
volved in such modifications •••• 
236. For instance, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 
1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court stated that 
[r]espondents ••• argu[e] that the decision to suspend the registration ••• is com-
mitted by statute to unreviewable administrative discretion • • • • That evidence 
cannot be found in the mere fact that a statute is drafted in permissive rather 
than mandatory terms. Although [the statute] provides that the Secretary "may" 
suspend the registration of an economic poison that creates an imminent hazard 
to the public, we conclude that his decision is not thereby placed beyond judicial 
scrutiny. 
See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
237. Conservation-Fish&: Game-Regulatory Powers § 1, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 300.1 (1967). For a similar argument, See Ray Transcript, supra note 161, at 9-11. 
238. Payant v. DNR, Opinion of Judges Brown, Davidson &: Munro at 2-3 (Sept. 4, 
1971) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment), 
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viewed as exemplary rather than exclusive, and no conflict could 
therefore be said to exist between those statutes and the EPA. For 
example, in Roberts, the judge noted that the Vehicle Code requires 
every motor vehicle to "be so equipped and adjusted to prevent 
the escape of excessive fumes and smoke."239 Had the case gone to 
trial, and had the plaintiff proved that other emissions besides ex-
cessive fumes and smoke caused pollution problems, Judge Warren 
could quite comfortably have treated the EPA and the Vehicle Code 
as complementary. Instead, inexplicably, he viewed the prohibition 
of fumes and smoke as the furthest that the legislature had gone in 
regulating automobile air pollution, and suggested that if he were 
to find and remedy pollution from other sources, he would, in effect, 
be repealing a legislative limitation.240 Not only is this interpretation 
of the Vehicle Code forced, but if accepted, it would create a con-
flict between the Vehicle Code and the much broader standards of 
the Air Pollution Act.241 
Thus far no case has involved an explicit conflict between the 
provisions and policies of the EPA and those of any other statute.242 
Indeed, because the EPA is a direct implementation of a constitu-
tional provision,243 it is unlikely that the EPA will, upon examina-
tion, be found in conflict with policies of other statutes; and it was 
certainly the understanding of the legislature that the EPA stated 
the general environmental policy of the state. 
Naturally, it is always open to the legislature to enact an explicit 
exception to the EPA. Just as they have enacted the law, so is it within 
their authority to modify it; but one ought to be cautious in reading 
implied modifications into statutes of general application such as the 
EPA. Moreover, when attempting to determine legislative policy, it 
is important to compare the present status of a 1970 law, like the 
239. Roberts v. Michigan, Opinion of Judge Warren at 3 (May 4, 1971), quoting 
Vehicle Code § 707(b), MICH. Collll'. LAws ANN. § 257.707(b) (1967). 
240. Id. at 3-4. 
241. See note 229 supra. 
242, At present, only one case, Leelanau, which involves a proposed transfer of 
state park lands to the federal government, may raise a specific conflict problem. 
Should the legislature enact a law explicitly authorizing the transfer of the land and 
expressly addressing the environmental issues involved in the transfer, it would be diffi. 
cult to argue that the transfer violated the EPA. 
243. MICH, CoNST, art. IV, § 52 (1963), set out in note 6 supra. To be sure, at 
some point there is a constitutional question concerning the preservation of the public 
trust, which even the legislature cannot violate; see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine 
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH, L. REv. 471, 489-92 
(1970). Moreover, even when an express legislative authorization exists, it must be 
examined closely, for it may well grant authority that is subject to compliance with 
other laws. See, e.g., D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436, 443-44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970). 
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EPA, ·with that of some much older statute that is asserted to under-
cut the EP A's environmental mandate. 
To the extent that judges may in future cases find conflict be-
tween the EPA and explicit, detailed provisions in other germane 
statutes, they must, of course, apply the usual standards of statutory 
construction for bringing diverse legislative pronouncements into 
harmony. When the legislature has incorporated an exacting or 
quantitative standard into a law subsequent to the EPA, the courts 
should ordinarily view that standard as governing. If, for example, 
the legislature has declared explicitly that certain areas shall be road-
less wilderness, certainly one would expect a court to view that deter-
mination as setting the environmental standard, and the EPA would 
have to be read in conformity with this more specific statute. Sim-
ilarly, if the legislature has decided that there shall be so many 
parts per million of dissolved oxygen in a given stream, or that cer-
tain industries shall have a limited number of years to clean up 
pollution, the EPA would have to conform to those explicit man-
dates. It should be noted, however, that the preceding speaks only 
to legislatively set standards, not to those promulgated by adminis-
trative agencies; for if anything is clear about the EPA, it is that the 
law was designed to reduce the range of discretion traditionally given 
to regulatory agencies and to enable citizens to challenge standards 
established by those agencies. 
Surely, difficult borderline cases will arise, and courts may at 
times have to struggle to reconcile statutes that look in different 
directions; but this task is inherent in the very nature of the judi-
ciary's traditional job of statutory construction.244 Thus far the 
courts have not had to face this problem in the litigated cases. 
B. Constitutionality of the EPA 
The only provision of the EPA that has raised a constitutional 
question is section 2, which provides: 
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (I) where there is 
involved a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device 
or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by an instrumentality 
or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court 
may: 
244. Some recent cases under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U,S.C, 
§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970), illustrate the problem, See National Helium Corp. v. 
Morton 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Ely v. Vclde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), 
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(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness 
of the standard. 
(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the 
adoption of a standard approved and specified by the 
court.245 
Although the main purpose of this Article is to provide a description 
of cases litigated under the EPA-not to set out a legal analysis of 
the statute-in light of the controversy that has developed over sec-
tion 2 in the litigated cases, a few general observations are war-
ranted. 
Section 2 seems to have created the impression in some quarters 
that the courts are empowered, because of the EPA, to re-examine 
legislatively set standards and to repeal and replace those found to 
be deficient. Clearly, the section has no such purpose. Section 2 is 
not directed to standards fixed by the legislature, but to those set by 
regulatory agencies and political subdivisions. If the legislature sets 
a specific standard that is inconsistent with the EPA, the courts must 
comply with that standard. The EPA, after all, is not a constitution. 
At the same time, the EPA itself does set an environmental policy; 
and for the courts to implement that policy-against an agency's 
rule or regulation-is not to usurp legislative prerogatives, but to 
enforce them. Although its provisions are phrased in broad terms, 
the EPA is nonetheless a statute, superior to the explicit decisions 
and rules of regulatory agencies and local governments. 
Moreover, there is no constitutional reason why the legislature, 
which granted authority to the courts by enacting the EPA, may not 
limit the ambit of agency discretion and require every agency to 
meet the legal standard of section 3(1), leaving the enforcement of 
that standard to the court. Indeed, the recent decision of the Supreme 
Court in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe246 confirms 
this point. In that case, the Court had to determine the validity of 
a statute in which Congress, using language identical to that in section 
3 of the EPA, 247 had commanded that highways should not be built 
through parklands unless "there is no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive to the use of such land .... "248 The government argued that the 
location of highways had been left to the discretion of the Secretary 
of Transportation and that the court could not interfere with his 
determination of whether there were feasible and prudent alterna-
245. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1972). 
246. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), on remand, 335 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). 
247. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). 
248. The Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). 
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tives. The Court flatly rejected this interpretation, stating, "there 
is law to apply" ;249 that is, the Court was of the opinion that the 
regulatory official's determination must now be tested against his 
compliance with a legal standard relating to alternatives, and, of 
course, the meaning and scope of that legal standard is a question 
for the courts to decide.250 
In light of these preliminary comments, it would be appropriate 
to consider the three cases in which constitutional questions have 
been addressed by the courts: Roberts, Crandall, and Lakeland. 
Crandall is at once the most enlightening and puzzling of cases. 
Although Crandall was originally brought as a common-law nuisance 
action by neighbors of an odorous hog-finishing barn, a claim was 
subsequently added under the EPA. 
After hearing extensive testimony at the trial, the Crandall court 
held that the defendants were carrying on their business "in a careful 
and husbandlik.e manner and us[ing] such odor control products as 
are ... available .... "251 It thus concluded that "on balance the 
equities are in favor of defendants and they are not maintaining a 
nuisance."252 As for the EPA claim, the court stated: 
as the Court interprets Sec. 3 of the Act the legislature is in 
effect saying that some balance has to be maintained between abso-
lutely no pollution and the carrying on of activities necessary to 
human existence. The raising of livestock ... is a lawful and neces-
sary occupation that of necessity will result in ... odor. It would be 
the opinion of the Court that if the livestock operation is carried on 
in an area zoned for that purpose in a generally accepted manner, 
and that the operation is carefully carried on so that waste products 
are handled with reasonable efficiency and dispatch so that the odor 
entering the atmosphere is held to a practical minimum, it could 
very well be said that a defendant has established an affirmative de-
fense "that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's 
conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of 
the public health, safety and weHare."253 
Had the judge said no more than this, it would no doubt be generally 
249. 401 U.S. at 413. 
250. The Overton Park case was governed by the federal Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), which provides a more limited degree of judicial review 
than the EPA. Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that when a legislature limits 
agency discretion and substitutes a legal standard, it is the duty of courts to enforce 
that legal standard by the scope of judicial review that they have been authorized to 
apply. Thus Overton Park addresses questions concerning the judicial function that arc 
similar to the constitutional questions raised under the EPA. 
251. Crandall v. Biergans, Opinion of Judge Corkin at 6 (Feb. 14, 1972), 
252, Id. 
253. Id. at 11-12. 
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agreed that he had responded quite appropriately to the case before 
him. He had heard the testimony, evaluated it, and found that the 
defendants' conduct was in compliance with the mandate of the 
EPA. As the judge quite correctly pointed out, the EPA demands 
that "some balance has to be maintained .... " So long as that bal-
ance gives important weight to environmental quality, and the court 
considers the availability of alternatives and the necessity of defen-
dant's conduct, the policy of the EPA is vindicated. 
However, for reasons that are not clear,254 Judge Corkin seemed 
to believe that the EPA required something more of him, for he 
proceeded to say: 
Here the Court, of necessity, must determine that standards relating 
to the raising and maintaining of livestock are deficient because none 
exist. It is being asked to create standards, direct their adoption and 
proceed to enforcement. The Court would regard this as making 
law and thus an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power so 
far as the raising of livestock is concerned. The Court does not think 
the Environmental Protection Act, as it now stands, can serve as a 
basis for any relief to plaintiffs.255 
The decision, as a whole, and especially that part reprinted above, 
suggests that the court did indeed develop specific standards for the 
case where none previously existed in legislation or administrative 
rules; and that the judge enforced those standards by finding that 
the defendants had complied with the policy of the EPA, a policy 
that is largely coextensive with the law of nuisance as he applied it 
in this case. Thus his own decision seems to obviate the constitu-
tional concerns he expressed. The case may be counted as a successful 
application of the EPA. 
In Roberts, Judge Warren, after observing that the Vehicle Code 
prohibited "excessive smoke and fumes,"256 unwisely read that pro-
vision as indicating that the legislature was unwilling to accept -any 
regulation beyond that of "excessive smoke and fumes." Thus he 
refused to read the EPA as authorizing him to take evidence on, and 
to control, other automobile exhaust pollution problems. With that 
rather peculiar interpretation behind him, he continued: 
Quite clearly the legislature did adopt standards, and quite clearly 
those standards are deficient. 
This gives rise to the first question which is this: "Just who is it 
254. The plaintiff seemed to be urging the judge to write a set of general regula-
tions for agriculture, rather than merely apply appropriate standards to the instant 
case. Crandall v. Biergans, Tape of trial (comments of plaintiff's attorney). 
255, Crandall Opinion, supra note 251, at 13. 
256. See note 228 supra. 
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that this Court will "direct" to adopt adequate standards? Could it 
be any body other than the legislature? ... This Court is disinclined 
to attempt to "direct" the legislative branch of government. Courts 
should resist the temptation to legislate and to substitute themselves 
and their judgment for that of the duly elected representatives of 
the general public. 
"Legislative power" may not be delegated. . . . This Court con-
cludes that it is being called upon to make law .... 
For the foregoing reasons the Court concludes that this Act, so 
far as it pertains to pollution arising from the operation of motor 
vehicles is unconstitutional.207 
What Judge Warren apparently failed to realize is that the legis-
lature is not required to spell out precisely what courts must do. 
Rather, it may enunciate the general policy and leave the details to 
be filled in by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. It would clearly 
be anomalous to find the EPA unconstitutionally vague208 when 
other laws-such as the federal antitrust laws260-which are even 
less detailed than the EPA-have been upheld by the courts for 
years. Furthermore, it would seem odd for the courts, which have 
for centuries evolved and applied common-law rights such as nui-
sance without statutory help, to balk at developing a similar body 
of law for environmental regulation, especially when they are under 
an explicit mandate from the legislature to do so.260 
In Lakeland, the court, after a full trial, found that the effluent 
from defendant's treatment plant was polluting waters below the 
point of discharge and that the effluent from the proposed enlarge-
ment of the plant, even if in conformity with effluent standards set 
by the Water Resources Commission, would constitute pollution.261 
The court held that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case and 
that the affirmative defense raised by the defendants herein of there 
being no feasible and prudent alternative to their conduct [had] not 
been borne out by defendant's proofs. Defendants merely recited, 
through their witnesses, that there was no reasonable and feasible 
257. Roberts Opinion, supra note 239, at 4-5. 
258. See Note, The Constitutional Question: Vagueness and Delegation of Powers, 
4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 397 (1970). See al.so Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 215 (1970). 
259. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). See 
al.so United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960) (vagueness challenge 
to Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899). 
260 See State ex rel. Board of Health v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 63 N.J. Eq. 111, 
115-16 (1902): Air Commn. v. Coated Materials, 1 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1444, 1447 (Ct. 
C.P., Dauphin County, Pa. 1970). · 
261. Lakeland Opinion of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 180. 
May 1972] Michigan's Environmental Protection Act 1069 
alternative to their actions and did not support such recitations ·with 
facts other than alluding to economic considerations.262 
Judge Mahinske then noted that this suit was not brought to 
review the standards set by the Water Resources Commission, but 
was instead an original EPA action against the defendants for pollu-
tion in which the defense was largely predicated on compliance with 
those standards.263 Under the EPA, his opinion quite properly indi-
cated, mere compliance with such standards is not a defense; plain-
tiffs may challenge administratively set standards as inadequate to 
prevent pollution prohibited by the EP A.264 In this respect, he also 
found that defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and violated 
the plaintiffs' riparian rights.265 
Having found that the defendant's conduct violated the EPA 
and that the WRC's administrative standards, which defendant had 
relied on, were insufficient to meet the demands of the EPA, Judge 
Mahinske next dealt with the defendant's contention that the EPA 
was unconstitutional: 
Defendant, in its Brief, relies heavily on the opinion of Judge 
Warren, ... in the matter of Roberts v. State of Michigan .... 
This Court is of the opinion that it is not controlled by the opinion 
set out in Roberts by the learned Ingham County Circuit Court 
Judge and further finds that any dispute between circuits must be 
resolved by a higher tribunal. 
This Court does not believe [the EPA] is unconstitutional by 
virtue of it having contained therein a prohibited delegation of 
powers. Said Act simply states that when a Court finds a standard 
to be unreasonable or deficient the Court may set an acceptable 
standard which the Court may enforce directly or order the agency 
involved to enforce such standard.266 
C. Intervention in EPA Cases 
The EPA provision on intervention is not as clear as it might be. 
The statute provides: 
Whenever administrative licensing or other proceedings, and judicial 
review thereof are available by law, the agency or the court may 
permit ... any person ... to intervene as a party plaintiff ... . 261 
262. Id. at 18. 
263. Id. at 19. 
264. Id. at 21-23. 
265. The Water Resources Commission Act, §§ 6(c) 12, 12(a), itself preserves other 
remedies. MtcH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 323.6(c) (Supp. 1972), 323.12, -.12(a) (1967). 
266. Lalieland Opinion of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 19-20. 
267. EPA § 5(1), MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1205 (Supp. 1972). For a discussion 
of the Attorney General's intervention in Public Service Commission Proceedings, see 
text accompanying notes 200-24 supra. 
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Plainly, the draftsmen of this provision did not have in mind inter-
ventions in suits originally filed under the EPA. The purpose of the 
provision was to "equalize" the law by permitting anyone who could 
have filed an original suit under the EPA to intervene in a proceed-
ing in which the same type of issues might arise-that is, in an 
administrative proceeding or in a court case brought to review 
an administrative decision. 
It was not thought necessary to specify a right to intervene di-
rectly in a suit filed under the EPA for the simple reason that anyone 
who might wish to intervene could file an original suit himself under 
the broad standing provision of the EPA. Indeed, when the question 
of intervention by an environmental group arose in Tanton, the judge 
responded to the defendant's opposition by saying "You want them 
to file a separate action? I'll just consolidate them."268 He then 
granted the motion to intervene, under the rules governing permis-
sive intervention.209 
While it seems wasteful to deny intervention to an applicant who 
can simply file a new complaint on his own and then seek consolida-
tion, at least one court has nevertheless held that the right to inter-
vene is permissive.270 In Wayne County Health Department v. 
268. Hearing on Motion To Intervene and for a Change of Venue, Jan. 14, 
1971 (from authors' notes taken at pre-hearing conference in Judge Reisig's chambers), 
The question arose again in Charlevoix when EMEAC petitioned to intervene. The 
motion was granted (authors' trial notes). 
269. MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 209.2(2) (1969): "Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action ••• when an applicant's claim or defense and the 
main action have a question of law or fact in common." 
270. See MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 209.1(1) (1969). The legislative history of the interven• 
tion provision provides a fascinating sidelight on the dangers of divining legislative 
intent. The original bill, introduced April 1, 1969, exactly as drafted by Joseph L. Sax, 
provided: 
Sec. 5(1) In such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and in a judicial 
review thereof made available by law, the attorney general ••• or a citizen may 
intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceed• 
ing or action for judicial review involves conduct • • • which may have the effect 
of impairing, polluting .••• 
This provision, permitting intervention as a right, was not challenged. The Governor's 
legal adviser objected to numerous provisions of the bill but approved of the inter-
vention provision. See Memo from the Governor's legal adviser to Governor Milliken, 
Jan. 26, 1970. 
On March 25, 1970, the House Committee reported out a substitute bill whiclt 
continued to include the language on intervention of section 5(1) cited above, and in• 
eluded in the proposed section 6 additional intervention-as-of-right language recom• 
mended by the Governor's legal adviser, 
It was not until the second substitute version of the bill, passed by the House of 
Representatives on April 21, 1970, that the language "the agency or the court may 
permit" intervention first appeared. The only known source for this change is a 
pencilled modification adding this language on a copy marked up by Joseph L. Sax, 
which was prepared with a number of suggestions sent by Sax to the sponsor of the 
bill (Rep. Thomas Anderson) to be added to the second substitute bill. Sax has no 
recollection of why the change was made or what provoked it, nor does he recall having 
May 1972] Michigan's Environmental Protection Act 1071 
Chrysler Corp., a case involving air pollution at a Chrysler foundry, 
intervention was sought by both the Attorney General and a group 
of several hundred_ residents of the neighborhood.271 No objection 
was interposed to the Attorney General's motion,272 but Chrysler 
opposed the private intervention, noting that the EPA gave no un-
conditional278 right to intervene. Chrysler also contended that the 
parties seeking intervention were splitting their cause of action be-
cause they had a nuisance case for damages pending against Chrysler; 
they were already adequately represented by the WCHD; and the 
suit would be unduly delayed because complex negotiations between 
Chrysler and the WCHD had been in progress for several months.274 
At first, the judge granted the citizens permissive intervention,275 
and disposed of fears of delay by emphasizing that his strong manage-
ment of the case would preclude any such problems. He added: 
[t]his whole problem of pollution-environmental problems, we now 
learn is affecting health, homes, property .... Who else has a greater 
right, as a class, ... to be represented? ... One of the great sins of 
our time, I think, is that there is a breakdown of communication 
between people in public life and people in quasi-public life, as I 
would refer to the Chrysler Corporation. . . . This constant com-
munication and understanding and exchange is most important, and 
if it has to be done in the media of a court, then I shall be the first 
to see that it is done.276 
Five months later, however, Chrysler, Wayne County, and the 
Attorney General were all in agreement on a proposed order that 
set out responsibilities for Chrysler and continued the court's juris-
diction to assure compliance with the order. But the intervening 
citizens would not agree to the order. They wanted the judge to hear 
testimony and Chrysler to admit that it had been polluting.277 The 
any intention of making intervention more difficult. In any event the new permissive 
language, replacing the previous intervention provision, stayed in the bill. 
A detailed scrutiny of all the voluminous correspondence, drafts, reports and news-
paper articles on the bill, gathered from the files of all those who were active in the 
bill's enactment, including legislators, reveals that there was never any discussion or 
consideration whatsoever of this language. 
271. Motion of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, to Intervene as a Party Plaintiff, 
May 11, 1971; Motion of Rev. Joseph C. Nosal and 327 Others To Intervene as Parties 
Plaintiff, March 23, 1971. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra. 
272. See note 204 supra. 
273. Memorandum of Law of Defendant in Opposition to Motion To Intervene at 
6, WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. See Transcript at 6 (April 2, 1971); Transcript at 45, 
58-64 (Sept. 16, 1971). 
274. Memorandum supra note 273, at 1-5. 
275. Chrysler Transcript of April 2, 1971, supra note 273, at 8. 
276. Id. at 5. 
277. Chrysler Transcript of Sept. 16, 1971, supra note 273, at 56. 
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intervening plaintiffs had a special interest in using this suit to 
advance their interest in the separate, pending damage action. 
The situation created a dilemma for the judge. He wanted to 
settle the case, and he was obviously proud of the consent order he 
had obtained from three of the parties, but he doubted the legality 
of his signing the order without the consent of all of the parties.278 
The solution the judge found was to dissolve the order granting 
intervention. But to do this, he had to be satisfied that the private 
parties were permissive intervenors and not intervenors of right. 
The judge thereupon ruled that the EPA did not give a right of 
intervention, that the intervention was creating delay, and that the 
intervenors' rights would be adequately protected in their damage 
action. He then set aside the order permitting intervention and 
granted the private parties the status of amid curiae.270 
D. Jurisdiction and Venue 
In addressing the issues of jurisdiction and venue, section 2(1) 
of the statute simply provides that a plaintiff "may maintain an action 
in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation 
occurred or is likely to occur."280 
In Tanton,281 suit was brought against both a developer and 
against the DNR, which had issued the permit authorizing the 
dam. Although the proposed project itself was in Charlevoix County, 
the plaintiff decided to sue in Ingham County, where the DNR was 
located and where the permit had been issued. Thus three issues 
278. The judge noted, id. at 57: 
I am still fearful that if this case goes to trial now (you will not go to trial for 
some time) and in the meantime nothing is being done, and the people out there 
wait ••• the possibility is imminent and great that if I enter an orcfer it may be 
appealed and that is going to take years. 
What I am trying to do is get some Court order controlling the Chrysler Coryo• 
ration with respect to these :problems that not only has some finality, but still gives 
this Court a continuing junsdiction over the project. • • • It requires Chrysler to 
do certain things and if they don't comply, on forty-eight hours notice they are 
back in court for contempt of the Court's judgment. 
279. Id. at 44-46, 59-64. The judicial order disallowing the intervention of the 
private plaintiffs has been appealed, WCHD v. Chrysler Corp., appeal docketed No. 1219 
Mich. Ct. App. In Lakeland, a local community intervened as a defendant, In Payant, 
the MUCC intervened, without protest, as an amicus curiae. In Betz Foundry, the 
plaintiff was denied the right to intervene in pending administrative proceedings 
and has appealed that denial (see note 94 supra); and in Chippewa County, the State 
Highway Department was joined as a third party defendant. 
280. MrCH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 (Supp. 1972). The issue of removal from 
state to federal courts is not discussed in the text. WCHD v. National Steel Corp, 
was removed to the federal court. Judge DeMascio remanded to the Wayne County 
circuit court. WCHD v. National Steel Corp., Order of Remand (Nov. 11, 1971), See 
McPhail v. Corps of Engineers, note 13 supra. 
281. See text accompanying notes 130-145, 233-36 supra. 
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had to be decided by the Tanton court. First, was the issuance of 
the permit (which does not itself create pollution) a "violation" of 
the Act? Even if it ·was, does the EPA lay venue in the place where 
the violation of the Act-the issuance of the permit-occurs, as well 
as where the injury to the environment occurs? Finally, should the 
case be transferred from Lansing to Charlevoix on forum non 
conveniens grounds? 
As to the first question, the Act rather inartfully refers in section 
3(1) to "conduct of the defendant" that "is likely to pollute."282 
While the granting of a permit does not comfortably fit within this 
language as conduct that itself is likely to pollute, it is clear that the 
legislature intended that plaintiffs be able to enjoin the granting of 
permits by government agencies when the use of those permits will 
create pollution.283 Moreover, section 5(2) of the Act imposes sub-
stantive duties on regulatory agencies that confirm this point. This 
section of the Act states that in any "administrative, licensing or 
other proceedings . . . no conduct shall be authorized or approved 
which does, or is likely to ... " pollute.284 
282. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). 
283. This issue has been raised in only one case, Beaman v. Township of Summit. 
The plaintiff, a township resident, claimed that failure of the township to prosecute 
individual polluters itself constituted "conduct • • • polluting • • • the water" within 
the meaning of§ 3(1) of the EPA. The case was unusual since the relief sought was an 
injunction against the township prohibiting it from building sewers for pollution 
treatment (as required by the Water Resources Commission). Apparently plaintiff's 
theory was that as a township taxpayer, he should not have to pay for the conse• 
quences of the township's failure to deal with individual polluters. The court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that no cause of action upon which 
relief could be granted had been stated. The court stated at 2 of its Opinion on De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that 
[i]n interpreting a statute, it must be strictly construed, especially when it has not 
been construed by higher courts • • • • I agree with the defendant that inter-
preting the statute strictly, that the defendant would have to be alleged to be 
guilty of polluting. In reading ••• [the EPA] it refers to the plaintiff showing 
that the defendant "has polluted or is likely to pollute." ••• The complaint does 
not claim the defendant is guilty of polluting or is doing anything that is apt to 
result in pollution. The plaintiff's action under the "Environmental Act" should 
be brought against the individuals who are polluting and not against the de-
fendant township. 
The legislative history of the EPA is clear that the Act was explicitly intended to 
allow suits by private citizens against regulatory agencies to require them to fulfill their 
legal obligations to prosecute polluters, and to treat their failure to do so as a violation 
of section 3 of the Act. See note 234 supra and accompanying text. The plaintiff's 
problem in Beaman was that he sought the wrong relief, not that he failed to state 
a cause of action under the EPA. 
Thus, Betz Foundry (see text accompanying notes 182-85 supra) was precisely the 
type of suit the legislature contemplated. This is not to say that the EPA compels 
mandatory enforcement of every violation, but at the least it requires a challenged 
nonenforcing agency to persuade the court that its restraint is consistent with the 
policy of the Act and art. IV, § 52, of the Michigan Constitution. It might meet this 
burden by showing that the problem is trivial or that conciliatory tactics are more 
likely to be effective than rigorous enforcement. 
284. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 691.1205 (Supp. 1972). 
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As to the question where did the legislature intend venue to lie, 
the statute does not explicitly refer either to the place where a 
violation of the Act occurs or to the place where damage to the 
environment occurs. But it would seem natural to read the EPA 
as referring to a violation of the law rather than to the more poetic 
"violation of the environment." There is no documentary evidence 
on this last point, but those involved in drafting the statute did have 
a specific restriction in mind. They feared that some environmental 
problems were so pervasive that a plaintiff in the Upper Peninsula 
might sue there for air pollution that occurred in Detroit.280 Thus, 
to protect defendants, rather than speaking of the place where the 
injury occurred, the Act limits suit to the place or places where the 
defendant has acted; that is, to a place where the conduct that alleg-
edly violated the law has occurred. 
It was understood that-in cases like Tanton-this would permit 
suits either in Lansing or at the site of the alleged physical conduct, 
and thus would be consistent with the general venue provision that 
states: "if the cause of action arose in the county of the principal 
office of [a] governmental unit [that] county is the proper county 
in which to commence and try actions against such governmental 
units."286 
Finally, in resolving the most-convenient-forum issue, the Tanton 
court, accepting the fact that venue was properly laid in Ingham 
County,287 nevertheless granted a permissive change of venue "for 
285. Debate in the Michigan Senate, June 26, 1970 (colloquy between Senator 
Joseph Mack and Senator Basil Brown) (transcript on file with author). 
286. Revised Judicature Act § 1651, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.1615 (Supp. 1972). 
The venue issue arose from a suggestion of the Michigan chamber of commerce. In a 
memo to the legislature dated March 4-, 1970, the chamber's Special Legal Subcommittee 
suggested an amendment providing that 
All actions ••• shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which 
the defendant resides or has its principal place of business, or in the circuit court 
for the county in which the conduct ••• occurs, and if such occurs in more than 
one county, an action may be commenced in any of said counties and the circuit 
court for the county in which the action is first initiated shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction. Actions against the State of Michigan or any agency thereof shall be 
commenced only in Ingham County. 
The provision ultimately adopted, proposed by Senator Mack, was applauded by the 
chamber of commerce. See Michigan State Chamber of Commerce State Legislation 
Report, July 29, 1970, at 4-; 95 Mich. S. J. 1628. 
In Lakeland the defendant township was a municipal corporation in Washtenaw 
County, but the sewage treatment facility at issue in the case was located in Livingston 
County. Thus, the defendant argued, since the general venue provision provides that 
proper venue in a suit against a government unit is the county in which it exercises 
governmental authority, venue must be laid in Washtenaw County. Motion of Defendant 
for a Change of Venue, Sept. 15, 1970. The court denied the motion. Lakeland Prop-
erty Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, Order of Judge Mahinske (Oct. 7, 
1970). 
287. Tanton v. DNR, Order of Judge Reisig Oan, 21, 1972). 
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the convenience of parties and witnesses,''288 noting that many issues 
in the case involved the Charlevoix area and that the Ingham County 
courts were very busy.289 
A somewhat more complicated problem was presented by Michi-
gan United Conservation Club v. Anthony, a case brought against 
a defendant-class that included "all other persons who claim by 
virtue of Indian treaty rights with the United States ... the right to 
fish in the waters of the State of Michigan without compliance with 
the provisions of the fish and game laws . . . of the State of Michi-
gan. "290 The first problem here was that Indians were fishing in 
Great Lakes waters that were offshore of many different counties. 
The question, therefore, was whether a suit filed in one circuit court 
would be sufficient.291 More specifically, was section 2(1) of the EPA 
jurisdictional,292 or did it only set venue? If it was jurisdictional, 
the court would have no authority over Indians who were fishing 
outside of the waters off Ottawa County. Relying on the Practice 
Commentary's provisions that relate to circuit court jurisdictions,293 
the plaintiff asserted, and the court agreed,294 that section 2(1) of 
the EPA is not a jurisdictional limitation; it is simply a statement 
of venue. 
Thus the remaining question was how to handle the specific 
venue provision of section 2(1) in a case in which the defendant 
class members were engaging in conduct all over the state. Since the 
288, Id. See MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 403 (1969). 
289. Author's notes taken at hearing in circuit court, Jan. 14, 1972. 
290. MUCC v. Anthony, Complaint at 1. The essence of the claim was that the 
Indians were subject to Michigan conservation laws and that the violation thereof 
constituted a violation of the EPA. See text accompanying notes 49-56, 175-77 supra. 
291. The defendant conceded that suit was properly brought in Ottawa County 
to challenge fishing off the shores of that county in Lake Michigan. MUCC v. An-
thony, Transcript at 27 (Aug. 18, 1971). 
292. EPA§ 2(1), MICH, CoMP, LAws .ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1972), provides that 
the plaintiff "may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where 
the alleged violation occurred." In Payant, the defendant argued that the preliminary 
injunction sought was in essence a petition for a writ of mandamus against a state 
officer, as to which the courts of appeals and the supreme court have exclusive juris-
diction. Revised Judicature Act § 4401, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.4401; MICH. CT. 
(GEN.) R. § 714.1(1) (1969), Brief of Defendants Supporting a Motion To Dismiss 
at 1, Payant v. DNR. See Minarik v. Ziegler, 336 Mich. 209, 57 N.W.2d 501 (1953). The 
court implicitly rejected this claim. Payant v. DNR, Per Curiam Opinion (Sept. 4, 
1971). 
293. The commentary to the Revised Judicature Act § 601, MICH, CoMP. LAws 
.ANN. § 600.601 (1968), provides that 
• • • the organic law of Michigan confers jurisdiction upon the circuit courts in 
broad affirmative terms •••• Therefore, the basic approach to jurisdictional prob-
lems in Michigan is not a search for specific jurisdictional grants, but rather an 
assumption that the circuit courts have jurisdiction unless the matter in question 
is specifically excluded by law. 
294. MUCC v. Anthony, Opinion of Judge Smith at 1 (Sept. 15, 1971). 
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EPA does not speak to this precise question, the general court rules 
governing venue are controlling.205 On this point, the Practice 
Commentary states that "if the action joins defendants who are 
established in different counties, venue is proper in the county in 
which any defendant is established."296 Applying this principle to 
the EPA, it would seem appropriate, if the "violation occurred" in 
different counties, to lay venue in any county in which any violation 
occurred. This is the result the court ordered. 297 
E. Security Bonds 
Section 2(a) of the EP A208 reflects the legislature's effort to ac-
commodate preliminary injunction practices with the Act's innova-
tive grant of standing-to-sue to private citizens and organizations that 
initiate litigation in the public interest. The problem here is that 
the general court rules governing preliminary injunctions anticipate 
that the plaintiff will be required to post security sufficient to cover 
the damages incurred by a defendant during the pendency of any 
injunction wrongfully granted.299 
This rule usually presents no great problem since the magnitude 
of litigation in which private plaintiffs ordinarily become involved is 
closely related to their own economic standing.300 This ordinary 
equality of economic standing among the parties to a controversy, 
however, does not apply to the kind of cases contemplated by the 
EPA, for an EPA plaintiff is not, in most circumstances, suing to 
295. Revised Judicature Act § 1621, MICH, Col\IP, LAWS ANN. § 600.1621 (Supp, 
1972). 
296. Commentary to Revised Judicature Act § 1621, MICH, Col\IP, LAws ANN. 
§ 600.1621 (Supp. 1972). 
297. Anthony Opinion, supra note 294, at 1: "The nature of the subject matter of 
these actions indicates that Ottawa County as well as many other counties may be 
affected by the alleged activities of the defendants. Accordingly, it is the opinion of 
this court that jurisdiction lies in the Ottawa Circuit Court.'' 
298. MICH. Col\IP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1972). 
299. MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 718.3 (1969) provides: 
The court may require the giving of security by the applicant in the sum the court 
deems proper, for the payment of costs and damages that may be incurred or 
suffered by any party who is found to have been wron~lly enjoined or restrained, 
before granting a preliminary injunction or restrairung order. If security is not 
required, the order shall specifically state why security is unnecessary. 
MICH. Or. (GEN.) R. 718.11 (1969) provides: "This rule shall not apply to special 
statutory actions to obtain an injunction, if the statute prescribes special procedures 
to be followed •••• " 
300. This is not always the case, and courts exercise discretion to protect the right 
of plaintiffs to sue effectively by waiving security or setting it very low. E.g., Powelton 
Civic Home Owner's Assn. v. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1968); 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971); Denny 
v. Health & Social Services Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526, 527 (1968). 
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protect his private interests, except to a very minor degree; he sues 
as a "private attorney general,"301 to protect public resources. 
Even a brief recollection of the cases discussed above makes this 
clear. 
Having included a broad standing-to-sue provision in the EPA, 
the legislature recognized that to apply the usual bond requirements 
governing preliminary injunction practice to such cases would undo 
·with one hand what the legislature had just done with the other. 
Obviously, to expect individuals to sue to protect large tracts of 
public lands, or to see that fishery conservation regulations are en-
forced state-wide, means that they cannot be expected to bear the 
losses wrong£ully sustained by defendants during the pendency of 
litigation. At the same time, to deny such plaintiffs the opportunity 
to obtain preliminary injunctive relief is frequently to deny them 
any meaningful right to sue at all, for environmental cases are typi-
cally those in which failure to "stop the bulldozer" is to permit the 
irreversible activity that is ultimately in controversy. 
The equities are not all on the side of the plaintiffs, however, 
for the damage incurred by a defendant under a preliminary injunc-
tion ought also to be a serious concern. A law that discourages plain-
tiffs from casually seeking such relief is highly desirable, too.302 Since 
there is no perfect accommodation of these competing interests, the 
EPA has tried to resolve the problem through compromise. Some 
protection is given to defendants, but that is accomplished without 
significantly restricting the plaintiff's right to sue. 
Section 2(a) thus provides: 
If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or judgment which 
might be rendered against him in an action brought under this act 
SOI. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 4-00, 402 (1968); Asso-
ciated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 
U.S. 707 (1943). 
302. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the good sense and restraint of judges 
has not been generally accepted as sufficient protection for the defendants. Notably, 
the Michigan law follows the general pattern in stating specifically that no security 
may be required of the state, a county, municipal corporation, or any officer or agency 
thereof, in granting preliminary relief to such a public plaintiff. MICH. Cr. (GEN.) R. 
718.3(2) (1969). It is not clear whether this provision merely exempts them from having 
to post security, or whether it also exempts them from potential damage claims arising 
out of a preliminary injunction found to have been wrongfully granted. We have 
found no case in which a governmental plaintiff has had to pay such damages. If 
immunity from payment of damages is the law, it reflects interestingly on the limited 
responsibility put on private attorney general plaintiffs under the EPA. See note 301 
supra. But see Attorney General ex rel. State Banking Commr. v. Hyde, 265 Mich. 
363, 368, 251 N.W. 570, 571 (19llll). 
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the court may order the plaintiff to post a surety bond or cash not 
to exceed $500.0o.sos 
The provision is not felicitously drafted. It was inserted at a late 
stage when a number of provisions were simultaneously being revised 
under considerable time pressure. Nonetheless, the provision's in-
tent ·was never in doubt, as the background to its enactment indi-
cates. 
The first decision made by the legislature was to limit the amount 
of security that could be required when a preliminary injunction is 
issued.304 This amount was originally set at $300, but raised to $500 
in response to requests that it be made as high as $3,000.300 There 
was some concern that even a modest security that had to be supplied 
during litigation would be undesirable for a publicly concerned 
plaintiff who might have very limited resources at hand. However, 
the legislature was persuaded that some disincentive should be im-
posed on a plaintiff ·with no resources who might be called upon to 
pay for damages resulting from an injunction wrongfully issued. 
As a result of the discussions, a distinction between insolvent 
plaintiffs and those who were not judgment-proof was drawn. It was 
thought that subjecting a solvent plaintiff's assets to risk would be 
in itself a sufficient deterrent so that these plaintiffs should not be 
placed under the additional burden of putting up even 500 extra 
dollars to support their litigation. As to plaintiffs who might have 
no such self-restraint because they were essentially without assets, 
it was decided to protect defendants by requiring these plaintiffs to 
post security, if the judge thought it desirable. The purpose, then, 
of section 2(a) is to provide that (1) Solvent plaintiffs need not post 
any security to obtain a preliminary injunction; (2) Plaintiffs whose 
solvency the court has reasons to doubt may be required to post 
security to obtain a preliminary injunction, but not more than $500; 
(3) The liability of all plaintiffs, solvent and insolvent alike, is lim-
ited to a maximum of $500 for losses incurred if the preliminary 
injunction is determined to have been wrongfully granted.300 
303. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1972). 
304. The provisions of section 2(a) of the EPA are intended to apply only to pre• 
liminary injunctions, the problem dealt with in MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 718,3 (1969). 
305. Michigan Manufacturers Association Newsletter, May 13, 1970, at 3 (statement 
on H.B. 3055). 
306. There was no bond provision in the original bill. This issue was first raised 
by the state chamber of commerce in its State Legislation Report, Feb. 27, 1970, at 3. 
On March 4, 1970, the chamber's Special Legal Subcommittee, in a memo prepared for 
the legislature, suggested the following amendment, at 2: 
The court may require the giving of security in the sum the court deems proper 
for the payment of costs and damages that may be incurred or suffered by any 
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Thus far the bond issue has arisen in controversial fashion in 
only one case, Blunt v. Apfel.307 The suit involved an attempt to 
enjoin a proposed condominium development. According to the 
plaintiff, the arrangements for disposing of the development's sewage 
would pollute the lake on which the development was to be located. 
The judge found no present danger in the project and refused to 
grant a preliminary injunction, but he retained jurisdiction in the 
event that damage could be shown after the project commenced. The 
court's comments on the bond issue are all by way of dictum, but 
they are nonetheless significant for their rather exotic interpretation 
of section 2(a): 
Such a provision could well allow any person on the welfare rolls to 
start an action to delay an honest building project of millions of 
dollars and is therefore, in the opinion of this Court, an invasion by 
the legislative branch of the Government of the right of the judicial 
branch of the Government to exercise judicial discretion as to the 
amount of indemnity to be required of a party starting suit before 
restraining work on such project. 
This Court does hereby specifically find that defendants [sic] are 
not insolvent and in the event any further proceedings to restrain 
this condominium project of over Two Million Dollars are sought, 
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. If security is 
not required, the order shall specifically state why security is unnecessary. 
On April 20, 1970, Rep. Rohlfs proposed an amendment to the bill allowing bond to 
be required without any limit. This proposal was rejected. 56 Mich. H.J. at 1273 
(1970). The next day he amended his proposal to provide that "the court may order 
the plaintiff to post a bond or cash not to exceed $300.00." This was accepted. 57 
Mich. H.J. at 1296 (1970). The amount was ultimately raised to $500.00 by the Senate. 
95 Mich. S.J. 1267 (1970). 
Each of the proposals above contained the "s'olvency" language that now appears 
in the bill. We have not been able to find any formal record of discussion on this 
matter. Following the adoption of the Senate provision, the UPI story on the bill 
reported: 
One of the amendments adopted raises from $300 to $500 the amount of bond a 
complainant would have to post if the court had "reasonable ground" to suspect 
he did not have the money to pay any costs that might be rendered against him. 
Sponsors of the change said the money increase would prevent frivolous lawsuits. 
Ann Arbor News, June 27, 1970, at 9, col. 1. 
307. Blunt Decision, supra note 180. See also Blunt v. Apfel, Transcript at 29 (Dec. 
10, 1970), where the judge noted: "Well, I will say this: I am not in agreement with 
only a $500 bond, as required. I don't think that is anywhere near adequate." In 
Tanton, Judge Reisig's Order of Dec. 16, 1971, granting a temporary restraining order, 
declared that "Since the Court has no reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the 
Plaintiff ••• no bond is required." In both Gang of Lakes and Wilcox, the ex parte 
restraining order carried the notation: ''No bond is required because a public question 
is involved and no economic interest of the Defendant is attacked or threatened." In 
Leelanau, the order stated: "It is further ordered that no security be required of the 
Plaintiffs." The order in Ray simply said "No bond shall be required." Bond was 
waived by the County in Muskegon County (cross complaint). 
1080 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1003 
will require plaintiff to furnish an Indemnity Bond of between 
Fifty and One Hundred Thousand Dollars.308 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the first sixteen months following enactment of the EPA, sev-
eral dozen cases moved steadily through Michigan's courtrooms 
demonstrating that citizen participation is not an empty slogan. 
The Act, though still very young, has strikingly emphasized several 
important points. 
(I) Government and industry are highly inertial, but when 
prodded from without, they are quite capable of responding 
to pressures for reform. 
(2) Regulatory agencies are more often victims than villains, and 
well-placed lawsuits naming them as defendants can liberate 
them from unwarranted political pressures. 
(3) Experts, however well intentioned, do not have all the an-
swers. Far more than is generally believed, the application of 
well-informed common sense is the vital ingredient in resolv-
ing environmental controversies. 
It is not necessary here to reiterate the specific findings detailed 
in this Article. Suffice it to say that enough cases have been resolved 
speedily and intelligently to mark the Act as a success. This is not to 
suggest that every case has come to a commendable conclusion. We 
have seen ill-considered and ill-prepared suits that fell of their own 
weight. We have judges who failed to face the responsibilities that 
the Act imposed upon them; and we have seen attorneys who inter-
posed unnecessary and undesirable technical objections. We have 
seen, too, that money is an issue. The inability of plaintiffs to recruit 
expert ·witnesses or to launch expensive, full-scale litigation has 
certainly undermined the potential usefulness of some cases, and 
has prevented others even from being filed.300 
The true success of the EPA, however, cannot be measured either 
in the cold statistics of cases or in a closely reasoned analysis of the 
statute's provisions. More than anything else, the Act has instilled in 
ordinary citizens a confidence that it is possible for them to have their 
day in court-in the fullest meaning of that phrase. Too often stu-
308. Blunt Order, supra note 180, at 3-5. 
309. For example, plans to file an EPA suit in Ann Arbor to challenge a proposed 
condominium development adjacent to Bird Hills Park was abandoned because: 
We were told that to start a suit would cost $4,000 to $6,000, and it was open 
ended from there. Depending on the need for experts and how far it was neces-
sary to carry the case, it could cost as much as $30,000 to $60,000. People were 
willing to commit themselves to some extent, but not to that level. • •• They 
were willing to put up hundreds, but not thousands. 
Author's interview with Mrs. M. Sahlins, March 15, 1972. 
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dents of the administrative process forget that behind the formal 
cases are always human problems. To some official, a new highway 
may be another link in a grandiose transportation network; to the 
individual in its path, it is a swath dividing the neighborhood in 
which he has chosen to live and to raise his children. A small trout 
stream or scenic woodland that is only an impediment to large-scale 
planners is often a special source of joy and refreshment to those 
who come back to it season after season seeking repose. 
These values, unpretentious as they are, lie deep in the hearts of 
many of our citizens, people who are unable to support representa-
tives in the capital or to buy slick advertising in the mass media. 
These are the people to whom the EPA speaks. And, as we have seen, 
it is they who have most often used the Act. They have not always 
prevailed, but they have had ample opportunity to be heard; and 
in almost every instance, they have received fair and intelligent 
treatment by the courts. 
As noted earlier, the Act has been used affirmatively by public 
officials more often than we expected. To us, this development has 
been a happy bonus of the EPA for it indicates an unexpected pub-
lic willingness to remedy environmental problems that only needed 
the encouragement of a strongly worded legislative mandate. How-
ever, court cases alone cannot significantly ameliorate environmental 
problems. In this regard, the evidence cited above of modified pro-
cedures by the Air Pollution Control Commission, of enlarged per-
spectives by the Public Service Commission, and of the whole 
panoply of new initiatives in land use control by the Natural Re-
sources Commission, is hopeful. 
Whether the Act will fulfill its larger promise remains to be seen. 
The ultimate issue is whether a fast-moving and complex society 
can still afford to pause and permit an ordinary citizen to play a 
role in the formulation of public policy. The EPA is a small but 
significant affirmation of confidence in the citizen. Thus far the evi-
dence is encouraging that the legislature's trust has not been mis-
placed. 
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APPENDIX A 
TITLE, DATE, AND PLACE OF CASES FILED• 
Title of Case File No. Date Filed County 
I. Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. 191-622 10/12/71 Wayne 
v. City of Detroit 
2. Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.1 5993 9/9/71 Washtenaw 
3. Beaman v. Township of Cll-212 9/10/71 Jackson 
Summit 
4. Bise v. Detroit Edison Co. 181665-S 5/24/71 Wayne 
5. Blunt v. Apfel2 849 ll/4/70 Antrim 
(amended 
complaint) 
6. Brown v. Lever 161228 2/15/71 Wayne 
Bros. Co. (3d 
amended 
complaint) 
7. Busard v. Muskegon 5291 10/27/70 Muskegon 
Heights 
8. Crandall v. Biergans 844 6/11/69 Clinton 
(amended 
complaint) 
9/3/71 
9. Davis v. Dept. of 482 10/1/70 Otsego 
Natural Resources (DNR) 
IO. Gang of Lakes Env. Org. 7 1/19/72 Calhoun 
v. Gee 
11. Hadley Township v. 3454-B 10/14/71 Lapeer 
Dept. of Natural 
Resources (DNR) 
12. Kelley v. Tannehill 2626 ll/4/71 Grand 
& DeYoung, Inc. Traverse 
13. Lakeland Property Owners 1453 8/27/70 Livingston 
Assn. v. Township of 
Northfield 
14. Leelanau County Bd. of 510 3/1/71 Leelanau 
Commrs. v. Dept. of Natural 
Resources (DNR)3 
15. Marble Chain of Lakes 235-70 12/14/70 Branch 
v. Water Resources Commn. 
(WRC) 
16. McCloud v. City of 13057-C 4/23/71 Ingham 
Lansing 
17. Michigan Consolidated U-3802 1/11/71 Public 
Gas Co. Serv. 
Commn. 
18. Michigan Consolidated Gas U-3933 7/15/71 Public 
Co. & Consumers Power Co. U-3935 (notice of Serv. 
interven- Commn. 
tion) 
19. Michigan United 2331 8/2/71 Ottawa 
Conservation Clubs 
(MUCC) v. Anthony 
20. Muskegon County v. En- C-5585 3/15/71 Muskegon 
vironmental Protection Org. 
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APPENDIX A (Continued') 
Title of Case File No. Date Filed - County 
21. Owens v. Water Resources 5708 5/14/71 Washtenaw 
Commn. (WRC) 
22. Payant v. Dept. of 1100 7/13/71 Dickinson 
Natural Resources (DNR) 
23. Ray v. Raynowsky 2-760 11/17/71 Mason 
24. Reume v. Herrick 180998R 5/21/71 Wayne 
25. Roberts v. Michigan 12428-C 10/23/70 Ingham 
26. Surowitz v. City of 178,640 4/12/71 Wayne 
Detroit 
27. Tanton v. Dept. of 13859-C 12/8/71 Ingham 
Natural Resources (DNR)4 
28. Trout Unlimited v. 13243-C 6/18/71 Ingham 
Milliken 
29. Water Resources Commn. 1255 2/10/71 Chippewa 
(WRC) v. Chippewa County 
30. Wayne County Health Dept. 194927-R 11/29/71 Wayne 
(WCHD) v. American 
Cement Co. 
31. Wayne County Health Dept. 166-224 10/1/70 Wayne 
(WCHD) v. Edw. Levy Co. 
32. Wayne County Health Dept. 166-223 10/1/70 Wayne 
(WCHD) v. Chrysler Corp. 
33. Wayne County Health Dept. 187 905-R 8/20/71 Wayne 
(WCHD) v. National Steel 
Corp.IS 
34. Wayne County Health Dept. 166,222 10/1/70 Wayne 
(WCHD) v. McLouth Steel 
Corp. 
35. West Michigan Env. Action 11409 3/12/71 Kent 
Council (WMEAC) v. Betz 
Foundry, Inc. 
36. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs. 7-237 6/16/71 Calhoun 
I. Collateral case In re Detroit Edison Co., No. 580068 (P. Ct., Washtenaw County) 
(condemnation proceedings). 
2. Consolidated with Ware Real Estate Corp. v. Forest Home Township, No. 880 
(Cir. Ct., Antrim County). Collateral case Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct., Antrim 
County) (suit by developers against plaintiffs for damages). 
3. Collateral case Fisher v. Morton, No. G302-71 C.A. (W .D. Mich.) (to enjoin 
United States Park Service from proceeding with development of park). 
4. Change of Venue to Charlevoix County granted. 
5. Collateral case WCHD v. National Steel Corp., C.A. No. 37111 (E.D. Mich. filed 
Sept. 16, 1971) (removed) (order of remand Nov. 11, 1971). 
• See note 13 supra for a list of cases filed subsequent to the closing date of this 
study. 
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Title of Case Plaintiffs Defendants Class 
Private Public Private Public Actions - -
Local 
lndi- Env. Govern- State lndi- Corpo- Env. Local State Class Class 
viduals Org.• ment Agency viduals rations Org.• Govt. Agency Plaintiff Defendant 
I. Alvin E. Bertrand, ~ Inc. v. City of Detroit X X .... 
2. Beach v. Detroit ~ 
Edison Co. X X X ~-
~ 
3. Beaman v. Township ~ 
of Summit X X t"-i 
4. Bise v. Detroit ~ 
Edison Co. X X X e 
5. Blunt v. Apfel X X X ~ C1> 
6. Brown v. Lever ~ .... 
Bros. Co. X X X C1> e 
7. Busard v. Muskegon 
Heights X X X 
8. Crandall v. 
Biergans X X 
9. Davis v. DNR X X 
10. Gang of Lakes 
1 Env. Org. v. Gee X X X 
11. Hadley Township :-' 
~ v. DNR X X 0 ;.:. 
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:f Title of Case Plaintiffs Defendants Class 
Private Public Actions 
.... 
Public Private <O ~ 
~ 
Local 
Indi- Env. Govern- State Indi- Corpo- Env. Local State Class Class 
~ viduals Org.• ment Agency viduals rations Org.• Govt. Agency Plaintiff Defendant .... 
12. Kelley v. Tannehill £.. 
& DeYoung, Inc. X X X X ~-~ 
13. Lakeland Property :;:! 
Owners Assn. v, Town-
c.," 
ship of Northfield X X X ~ 
14. Leelanau County Bd. ~ 
of Commrs, v. DNR X X X ~-
15. Marble Chain of :;:! 
Lakes v. WRC X X X ~ 
Cl> 
16. McCloud v. City of :;:! .... 
Lansing X X X X X ~ ~ 17, Michigan Consol, 
~ Gas Co. X X X X 
C 
18. Michigan Consol. .... Cl> 
Gas Co. & Consumers C"') .... 
Power Co. X X X X 
.... 
C 
19. MUCC v. Anthony X X 
:;:! 
X X 
::i:.. amicus C"') 
20. Muskegon County v. En- .... 
vironmental Protection 
Org. (counterclaim) X X X 
21, Owens 
v.-WRC X X .... 
22, Payant v. DNR X X X 0 00 
amicus (,;'( 
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Title of Case Plaintiffs 
Private Public Private 
Local 
Indi- Env. Govern• State Indi- Corpo• 
viduals Org.• ment Agency viduals rations 
23. Ray v. Raynowsky X 
24, Reume v. Herrick X 
25, Roberts v. Michigan X 
26, Surowitz v. 
City of Detroit X 
27. Tanton v. DNR X X X 
28. Trout Unlimited 
v. Milliken X X X 
29. WRC v. Chippewa 
County X 
30. WCHD v. American 
Cement Co. X X 
81. WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co. X X 
82. WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. X X X X 
83. WCHD v. National 
Steel Corp. X X 
34. WCHD v. McLouth 
Steel Corp. X X 
35. '\VMEAC v. Betz 
Foundry, Inc. X X 
36. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. 
CoIDJDIS. X 
• Includes only permanent organizations with more than local a>ncerns. 
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Public 
Env. Local State 
Org.• Govt. Agency 
X 
X 
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APPENDIX. C 
Ptrauc AGENCIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN 
CAsFs Fil.ED UNDER THE EPA 
PUBUC AGENCIES 
Name or Type Number Plaintiff or Amicus 
of Agency of Cases Intervenor Defendant Curiae 
Air Pollution Control 
Commission 1 1 
Agriculture, Dept. of 1 1 
Attorney General 5 4 1 
County Govt. or Boards 
of Commrs. 10 3 7 
Detroit, City of 3 1 2 
Drain Office 1 1 
Governor 1 I 
Local Govts. except Detroit 9 3 6 
Michigan, State of 2 2 
Natural Resources, Dept. of; 
Natural Resources Commn. 8 8 
Secretary of State 1 I 
State Hwy. Dept.; 
State Hwy. Commn. 2 2 
Water Resources Commn. 4 1 3 
Wayne County Health Dept. 
(Air Poll. Control Div.) 6 6 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS• 
Name of Number Plaintiff or Amicus 
Organization of Cases Intervenor Defendant Curiae 
East Michigan Environmental 
Action Council 1 1 
Michigan United 
Conservation Clubs 3 1 2 
Trout Unlimited 2 2 
West Michigan Environmental 
Action Council 1 1 
• Includes only permanent organizations with more than local concerns. 
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APPENDIX D 
TITLES OF CAsEs IN ·wmcH Punuc AGENCIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS WERE lNvOLVED 
Punuc AGENCIES 
Air Pollution Control 
Commission 
Agriculture, Dept. of 
Attorney General 
County Governments or 
Boards of Commrs. 
Detroit, City of 
Drain Office 
Governor 
Local Governments 
except Detroit 
Michigan, State of 
Natural Resources, Dept. of; 
Natural Resources Commn. 
Secretary of State 
Tln.Es OF CASES 
(P=Plaintiff; D=Defendant; 
A=Amicus Curiae: !=Intervenor) 
WMEAC v. Detz Foundry, Inc. (D) 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D) 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. &: 
Consumers Power Co. (I) 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. (I) 
Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc. (I) 
MUCC v. Anthony (A) 
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. (P) 
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (P &: D) 
Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc. {P) 
Leelanau County 13d. of Colll1I1rs. v. DNR (P) 
Ray v. Raynowsky (D) 
Muskegon County v. Environmental 
Protection Org. (D) 
Reume v. Herrick (D) 
WRC v. Chippewa County (D) 
Wilcox v. l3oard of Rd. Commrs. (D) 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D) 
WCHD v. American Cement Co. (P) 
Surowitz v. City of Detroit (D) 
Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit (D) 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D) 
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (D) 
Leelanau County 13d. of Commrs. v. DNR (P) 
Hadley Township v. DNR (P) 
Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. 
Township of Northfield (P&:D) 
Muskegon County v. Environmental 
Protection Org. (D) 
Beaman v. Township of Summit (D) 
l3ise v. Detroit Edison Co. (D) 
Busard v. Muskegon Heights (D) 
McCloud v. City of Lansing (D) 
Roberts v. Michigan (D) 
Leelanau County 13d, of Commrs. v. DNR (D) 
Hadley Township v. DNR (D) 
Leelanau County 13d. of Commrs. v. DNR (D) 
Marble Chain of Lakes v. WRC (D) 
Payant v. DNR (D) 
Tanton v. DNR (D) 
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (D) 
Davis v. DNR (D) 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D) 
Roberts v. Michigan (D) 
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State Highway Dept.; 
State Highway Commn. 
Water Resources Commn. 
Wayne County Health Dept. 
(Air Poll. Control Div.) 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
East Michigan Environmental 
Action Council 
Michigan United Conservation 
Clubs 
Trout Unlimited 
West Michigan Environmental 
Action Council 
Roberts v. Michigan (D) 
WRC v. Chippewa County (D) 
WRC v. Chippewa County (P) 
Marble Chain of Lakes v. WRC (D) 
Owens v. WRC (D) 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D) 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. (I) 
WCHD v. American Cement Co. (P) 
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. (P) 
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co. (P) 
WCHD v. McLouth Steel Corp. (P) 
WCHD v. National Steel Corp. (P) 
Tanton v. DNR (P) 
MUCC v. Anthony (P) 
Payant v. DNR (A) 
Tanton v. DNR (A) 
Tanton v. DNR (P) 
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (P) 
WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc. (P) 
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TYPES OF CAsES FILED UNDER THE EPA, BY SUBJECl' MATIER 
Type of Case 
Pesticides 
Municipal Spray Program 
Land Use 
Land Drainage 
Pipeline Location 
Dam &: Homesite Development 
Road Widening-Tree Cutting 
Park Management 
Oil and Gas Leasing 
Condemnation by Utilities 
Solid Waste Disposal 
Air Pollution 
Industrial 
Automobiles 
Natural Gas Allocation 
Municipal Incineration 
Water Pollution 
Phosphate Detergents 
Ground Water Contamination 
Municipal and Private 
Treatment Systems 
Water Management 
Lake Level Maintenance 
and Drainage 
Fish and Game Management 
Deer Hunting 
Indian Fishing Rights 
No. of 
Cases 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
I 
9 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
8 
I 
I 
I 
Short Title of Cases 
Surowitz v. City of Detroit 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee; 
Ray v. Raynowsky 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. &: Con• 
sumers Power Co • 
Tanton v. DNR 
Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs. 
Leelanau County Bd. of Commrs. 
v.DNR 
McCloud v. City of Lansing 
Davis v. DNR 
Beach v. Detroit Edison Co. 
Hadley Township v. DNR 
WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc,; 
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp.; 
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co.; WCHD 
v. McLouth Steel Corp.; WCHD v. 
Great Lakes Steel Corp.; WCHD 
v. American Cement Co.; 
Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, 
Inc.; Crandall v. Biergans; 
Bise v. Detroit Edison Co. 
Roberts v. Michigan 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. 
Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. 
v. City of Detroit 
Brown v. Lever Bros. Co. 
WRC v. Chippewa County 
Reume v. Herrick; Owens v. 
WRC; Muskegon County v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Org.; Lake-
land Property Owners Assn. v. 
Township of Northfield; Busard 
v. Muskegon Heights; Blunt v. 
Apfel; Beaman v. Township of 
Summit; Marble Chain of Lakes 
v. WRC 
Trout Unlimited v. 
Crawford County 
Payant v. DNR 
MUCC v. Anthony 
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WoN-LoST REcoRD OF CAsEs Fil.ED UNDER THE EPA 
Cases in Which Plaintiffs (or Intervenors} 
Succeeded 
Busard v. Muskegon Heights (informal} 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. &: Consumers 
Power Co. 
Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. 
Township of Northfield! 
Trout Unlimited v. Crawford County 
(formal settlement} 
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. 
(formal settlement} 
WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc. 
(informal) 
WCHD v. American Cement Co. 
(formal settlement) 
Cases in Which Plaintiffs Failed 
Crandall v. Biergensl 
Surowitz v. City of Detroit 
Muskegon County v. Environmental 
Protection Org. (counterclaim) 
Payant v. DNR 
McCloud v. City of Lansing 
I. Case may be appealed. 
Cases 'Still Pending 
Alvin E Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit 
Beach v. Detroit Edison Co. 
Beaman v. Township of Summit2 
Bise v. Detroit Edison Co. 
Blunt v. Apfe13 
Hadley Township v. DNR 
Kelley v. Tannehill&: DeYoung, Inc. 
Leelanau County Bd. of Commrs. v. 
DNR 
MUCC v. Anthony 
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee 
Ray v. Raynowsky 
Roberts v. Michigan2 
Tanton v. DNR 
WRC v. Chippewa County 
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co. 
WCHD v. Great Lakes Steel Co. 
WCHD v. McLouth Steel Co. 
Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs.4 
Cases That Are Dying or Have Not Been 
Pursued 
Brown v. Lever Bros. Co. 
Davis v. DNR 
Marble Chain of Lakes v. DNR 
Reume v. Herrick 
Owens v. WRC 
2. Case on appeal, plaintiff lost in circuit court. 
3. Status uncertain; Defendant won partial summary judgment. Case may go to 
trial. 
4. The court of appeals reinstated preliminary injunction pending trial on the 
merits. 
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DURATION OF CASFS 
Cases Completed 
From Initiation to Termination 
Months 
[Vol. 70:1003 
Title of Cases I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Busard v. Muskegon 
Heights (voluntary 
dismissal-settled) 
Crandall v. Biergans 
(judgment for defendant 
after full trial)l 
Lakeland Property Owners 
Assn. v. Township of 
Northfield (judgment 
--• 
for plaintiffs after full trial) • 
McCloud v. City of Lansing 
(preliminary injunction 
denied) --• 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. 
(order issued granting 
relief sought) -• 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. 
&: Consumers Power Co. 
(order issued granting 
relief sought) -• 
Muskegon County v. Environ-
mental Protection Org. 
(judgment for original 
plaintiff, EPA defendant, 
after full trial) 
Payant v. DNR (judgment 
for defendant after full trial) ---
Surowitz v. City of Detroit 
(plaintiffs' application 
for T.R.O. denied) -o 
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken 
(consent order issued) --• 
WCHD v. American Cement 
Co. (consent judgment) -• 
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. 
(consent judgment) • 
WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc. 
(informally concluded)2 ------------• 
I. Case filed as nuisance action before EPA became effective. 
2. Equipment purchased but not yet installed; appeal pending on collateral issue, 
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APPENDIX H 
THOMAS ] . .ANDERSON, GORDON ROCKWELL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION Acr oF 1970 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1972). 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
1095 
Sec. 1. This act, shall be known and may be cited as the "Thomas J. 
Anderson, Gordon Rockwell environmental protection act of 1970." 
Sec. 2. (I) The attorney general, any political subdivision of the 
state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political sub-
division thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, or-
ganization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit 
court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely 
to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any politi-
cal subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of 
a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, as-
sociation, organization or other legal entity for the protection of the air, 
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from 
pollution, impairment or destruction. 
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1) where there is in-
volved a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or pro-
cedure, fixed by rule or othenvise, by an instrumentality or agency of 
the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court may: 
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the 
standard. 
(b) 'When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption 
of a standard approved and specified by the court. 
Sec. 2a. If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of 
the plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or judgment which 
might be rendered against him in an action brought under this act the 
court may order the plaintiff to post a surety bond or cash not to exceed 
$500.00. 
Sec. 3. (1) 'When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie 
shmving that the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute, 
impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public 
trust therein, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the 
submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, 
by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent 
alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent 
1vith the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of 
the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources 
from pollution, impairment or destruction. Except as to the affirmative 
defense, the principles of burden of proof and weight of the evidence 
generally applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts shall apply to 
actions brought under this act. 
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(2) The court may appoint a master or referee, who shall be a dis• 
interested person and technically qualified, to take testimony and make 
a record and a report of his findings to the court in the action. 
(3) Costs may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of justice 
require. 
Sec. 4. (I) The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable 
relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are required to 
protect the air, water and other natural resources or the public trust 
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction. 
(2) If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required or 
available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court 
may remit the parties to such proceedings, which proceedings shall be 
conducted in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Act No. 
306 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 24.201 to 24.313 of the 
Compiled Laws of 1948. In so remitting the court may grant temporary 
equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the air, water and 
other natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, im-
pairment or destruction. In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdic-
tion of the action pending completion thereof for the purpose of deter-
mining whether adequate protection from pollution, impairment or 
destruction has been afforded. 
(3) Upon completion of such proceedings, the court shall adjudicate 
the impact of the defendant's conduct on the air, water or other natural 
resources and on the public trust therein in accordance with this act. 
In such adjudication the court may order that additional evidence be 
taken to the extent necessary to protect the rights recognized in this act. 
(4) Where, as to any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, 
judicial review thereof is available, notwithstanding the provisions to 
the contrary of Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, pertaining to 
judicial review, the court originally taking jurisdiction shall maintain 
jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review. 
Sec. 5. (I) Whenever administrative, licensing or other proceedings, 
and judicial review thereof are available by law, the agency or the court 
may permit the attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, 
any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision 
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization 
or other legal entity to intervene as a party on the filing of a pleading 
asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves con-
duct which has, or which is likely to have, the effect of polluting, im-
pairing or destroying the air, water or other natural resources or the 
public trust therein. 
(2) In any such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and 
in any judicial review thereof, any alleged pollution, impairment or 
destruction of the air, water or other natural resources or the public 
trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct shall be authorized 
or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as there 
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is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable re-
quirements of the public health, safety and welfare. 
(3) The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata may be 
applied by the court to prevent multiplicity of suits. 
Sec. 6. This act shall be supplementary to existing administrative 
and regulatory procedures provided by law. 
Sec. 7. This act shall take effect October I, 1970. 
This act is ordered to take immediate effect. 
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APPENDIX I 
[Vol. 70:1003 
In February 1972 we sent questionnaires to all of the lawyers 
involved in EPA cases. We received thirty-three responses covering 
twenty-eight cases. The questions are reprinted in this Appendix 
along with a summary of the responses. 
I. Were you able to obtain the kind of experts you needed to sup-
port client's case? If not (or if the difficulty was great) was the 
problem one of finding knowledgeable people? Too expensive? 
Unwilling to testify for your side of the case? 
The following are excerpts from plaintiffs' replies: 
The problem is that most of the experts in the field . . . are 
employed by the defendant, and any other experts would have been 
too expensive. 
We were unable to obtain a sanitary engineer willing to testify 
against other sanitary engineers-their livelihood depends on the 
favor of [defendants and others like him]. 
I have not had a great deal of trouble. . . . These people are, 
however, quite expensive. Many of the people who are in the air 
pollution consulting field with respect to engineering and control 
derive most of their income from consulting with polluters and are 
unwilling to testify. The only way I have been successful is by find-
ing out who their principal employers are and using them to testify 
against other polluters and even then they are sometimes reluctant. 
We had no difficulty whatsoever in securing expert testimony 
since we in effect were representing ... the interest of [a state 
agency]. Since [the agency] employs most of the experts with regard 
to the [problem area] in this stage, ... we were able to secure expert 
testimony without cost simply by subpoenaing those persons whom 
we knew had knowledge in the field. 
We were able to obtain two expert witnesses who were willing to 
testify in our case without fee but only by deposition .... We did 
have considerable reluctance on the part of ... professors at [the 
universities] to get involved because they work so closely with the 
[agency involved]. 
The following are excerpts from defendants' replies: 
We were able to obtain any experts we needed at modest cost. 
I am primarily engaged as counsel to the manufacturer and do 
not have any problems finding expert witnesses. The cost of such 
experts is high, i.e., $75.00 per hour. 
My client is an Intercounty Drainage Board. It is very difficult to 
find knowledgeable experts who are willing to testify on matters of 
this type either for the plaintiff or the defendant ... there is such 
a wide variety of what the experts agree and disagree upon, it is 
difficult to tell who to believe. 
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2. I£ your client was an industry or government agency, did you 
find the lawsuit a serious impediment to your client's activities? 
Was there great delay? Did the court handle the case expedi-
tiously? Did you view the case as an opportunity to vindicate a 
controversial program in the courtroom? How much delay (in 
months) did the case involve for your client? 
Two thirds of the defendant attorneys who responded reported 
no significant delay in the handling of their cases and several specif-
ically praised the courts' expeditious handling of the suits. Only one 
lawyer-of a dozen respondents-criticized a court's failure to sched-
ule a trial promptly. One other lawyer noted that the trial court had 
acted promptly, but that a subsequent appeal had led to a delay of 
between six months and a year in resolving the controversy. 
Several respondents, however, noted collateral delays arising out 
of the suits. One said: "The mere fact that there is litigation and 
an injunction will increase [contractors'] bids by at least twenty 
percent, as contractors are very leery of bidding on matters ... when 
there is litigation involved." Another noted that the litigation had 
delayed ongoing negotiations between his client and the regulatory 
agency with which the client was dealing, commenting that "the 
moment that a suit is commenced the typical corporate reaction is 
to cease negotiations and fight the lawsuit." Interestingly, in this 
particular case, the regulatory agency with whom the client had 
been negotiating was itself the plaintiff. 
Only one defendant's Ia-wyer responded positively to the second 
question: "The suit was an excellent vehicle to resolve a very con-
troversial issue-its final [decision] had a very settling effect on the 
affected persons." 
3. In round numbers, how much did the case cost the client? $1,000; 
$5,000; $10,000; $25,000; more? 
Generally, how were these costs allocated, as between: 
1) costs of obtaining expert opinion and studies? 
2) depositions, travel and other out-of-pocket expenses? 
3) attorney costs? 
Give rough percentages. 
The economics of EPA cases seem to break down into three gen-
eral categories: 
I. About ten per cent of the cases involve costs which are not 
directly measurable. These include a few cases in which an attorney 
sues as plaintiff pro se, and absorbs the costs in his general office 
expenses; cases in which public agencies are parties and do not cal-
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culate attorneys fees or out-of-pocket expenses separately, and in 
which there is often access to expert witnesses who work on salary 
for the public agency. In one case the attorney's fee is contingent on 
success in a companion damage case. 
2. About a third of the cases have either been settled at an early 
stage or have not progressed beyond preliminary hearings and pre-
trial activities. Of the ten such cases on which we received responses, 
expenses in half were estimated to have run between $2,000 and 
$2,500. In the other half, expenses were estimated at between $4,000 
and $5,000. The more expensive estimates generally represent cases 
that have involved a number of preliminary motions, a hearing on 
a preliminary injunction and some pre-trial discovery and confer-
ences. 
It seems a fair conclusion that a case that is settled fairly quickly 
without much courtroom action will probably not exceed $2,500 in 
cost, assuming there is not a great deal of preliminary legal motion 
practice involved. A case that involves a preliminary injunction and 
other preparatory work short of a trial seems to average about $5,000. 
One exception to this observation inheres in the fact that most 
cases thus far have not been handled by "Wall Street" type law firms. 
We have only one response from such a firm, involving a case that 
has not gone to trial, but has involved somewhat more in the way 
of preliminary hearings and motions than the average such case just 
mentioned. The lawyer handling the case reported that his billings 
thus far were $15,000 and that this fee was calculated at only half 
his regular billing rate. 
3. In the third category are cases that have gone to full trial. The 
costs in such cases average about $10,000, with a minimum cost of 
$5,000 and a maximum of $12,500. 
The allocation of costs as between attorneys' fees, expert witnesses 
and other out-of-pocket expenses is directly related to the degree to 
which scientific issues are brought into the case. In the quick-settle-
ment type of case referred to above-the $2,000 cases-attorneys' ,, 
fees amount to about ninety per cent of the costs. 
Many of the cases that have gone to preliminary-injunction hear-
ings and through some discovery-the $5,000 cases-have involved 
very little use of experts. Thus the increased cost is attributed by 
lawyers largely to increased attorneys' time and to greater out-of-
pocket expenses for transcripts and travel. A typical $5,000 case 
would involve $3,000 in lawyers' fees, $1,500 in out-of-pocket costs, 
and $500 for experts. 
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As the cases go to trial, all costs increase of course, but the pro-
portion devoted to expert costs increases most sharply. The average 
such case (in the $10,000 range) ·will involve $5,000 in lawyers' fees, 
$3,000 in expert witness fees, and $2,000 in out-of-pocket expenses. 
The range is from seventy per cent of costs for lawyers, nventy per 
cent for experts, and ten per cent for out-of-pocket costs, to thirty per 
cent of costs for lawyers, fifty per cent for experts, and twenty per cent 
in out-of-pocket expenses. 
It seems clear that most private litigants thus far have under-used 
experts in terms of the objective requirements of the case; and a 
number of responding attorneys have noted the high cost of expert 
witnesses. Thus it might be concluded that the costs of litigation 
noted above would probably be doubled if the lawyers used as much 
expert help as they truly needed. An average case prior to trial would 
jump in cost from about $5,000 to $10,000; and a case taken to full 
trial would cost about $20,000 rather than $10,000. Litigants using 
big-city, large corporate firms (unless they get a bargain) can expect 
their costs to be more than twice this much; that is, a full trial, 
properly conducted, involving extensive expert testimony, can be 
expected to run from $40,000 to $50,000. 
4. Was the judge able to understand and handle the environmental, 
scientific and technical issues? Greater, less or about the same 
problems of comprehension as in accident, commercial, corporate 
cases? 
Sixty per cent of the respondents reported that the judge under-
stood the scientific, technical and environmental issues. Only ten 
per cent said the judge had more problems of understanding than in 
the ordinary case, and the rest found that the judge had "a little 
problem" of understanding, but no greater than in the ordinary case. 
Excerpts from some of the responses follow: 
The Court has shown unusual ability to understand and handle the 
legal, scientific, and technical issues involved. (Agency lawyer) 
I doubt that the judge was able to handle the principal [legal] 
issue involved. In my judgment it was a very simple issue, ... and 
... the opinion denying plaintiff's motion made no sense in terms of 
the briefs ... presented. (Plaintiff's counsel) 
The problem with 127 [the EPA] is the need in each case to edu-
cate the judge on often highly technical matters. (Agency lawyer) 
Judge probably has as good a grasp on issues as in other cases. 
(Defendant's counsel) 
I think the judge was able to understand the issues. (Defendant's 
counsel) 
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(The following two responses are from a winning plaintiff and a 
losing defendant, respectively, in the same case.) 
I have seen judges show less comprehension of [ordinary] personal 
injury cases. [The judge] showed a comprehension borne of attentive-
ness devoutly to be ·wished for in other cases. 
I believe that the trial judge was not as familiar with the scientific 
and technical aspects as he would be in the case of accident . . . 
cases. 
5. If your case involved an industry or an administrative or regula-
tory agency, do you think the case has affected their general way 
of doing business, or their attitude toward environmental issues, 
in any significant way? Please be as specific as possible. (E.g., the 
agency has tightened up its procedures for giving variances; it 
has hired some new staff with environmental expertise). 
A bare majority of the respondents felt a defendant public agen-
cy's behavior had been affected by the suit. In one case industry be-
havior was said to be affected by the litigation. Several respondents 
wrote that it was too early to say. Comments include the following: 
[The agency] won't do this again on ad hoc information from the 
government-[it] ·will require some flow data on stream, and may 
even get some legal advice before signing something it might regret. 
(Plaintiff) 
[We] proved it [the agency] had insufficient data. [We] hear 
rumors that it was embarrassed. Certainly it will get data before 
granting any more such permits-[the case] may have resulted in a 
major change of position. (Plaintiff) 
I heard various rumors indicating that it forced the agency to 
tighten up its procedures for granting variances while other rumors 
indicated that it had no effect. I am convinced ... that because the 
agency viewed the suit as frivolous or otherwise unjust that it will 
favor the polluter on any position taken by it if it possibly can. 
(Plaintiff) 
I announced concurrently with commencing the litigation that 
I would dismiss it if [the defendant] would agree to join the waste 
water plan .... They did join the plan ten days or two weeks [later]. 
While I am sure that the ... litigation was not the only factor which 
compelled reconsideration of their position, I feel that it probably 
played some part and such part may possibly have been decisive. 
(Plaintiff) 
None of these cases has resulted in a tightening up of any atti-
tude except [one case which] I believe is much to do about nothing. 
(Agency) 
Speaking from the agency standpoint, it has made them more 
careful in documenting their positions and more careful re initial 
actions (what is said in a letter or in a meeting). I see no result 
regarding attitude on policy and purposes. (Agency) 
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In my view, the pending litigation has materially affected their 
attitudes toward environmental issues. Both of the agencies have 
tightened up their procedures for the handling of contaminating 
wastes. (Agency) 
Since our plant was an industry, specifically the case substantially 
affected the way of doing business since it terminated its business 
activities. (Defendant) 
The State ... Department is now providing means to [deal with 
the problem so that the issue raised in the case will not arise again]. 
While denying any connection [with the harm] or liability, they are 
very, very aware of the problem. (Defendant) 
The suit was an excellent vehicle to resolve a very controversial 
issue-its final determination had a very settling effect on the affected 
parties .... I think the [federal and state] agencies welcomed the 
opportunity to get the controversy resolved. It took the pressure off 
them since the Court's decision was well accepted and practically 
eliminated further complaints. (Agency) 
6. If your client was a plaintiff, could you have sought the relief 
you wanted without the EPA? E.g., could nuisance law or a claim 
under another statute have done the job? Was the EPA indis-
pensible as to standing-to-sue? 
The EPA was said to be necessary in ten cases, and alternatives 
would have been uncertain or created difficulties of proof in three 
others. In three cases respondents felt that an: alternative ground, 
such as nuisance, could have been the basis for the action. Excerpts 
from some of the responses follow: 
Answering from the point of view of the . . . defendant; this 
plaintiff would have no standing to sue without the E.P.A . 
. . . A similar suit was started several years ago in Houghton 
County and the case was dismissed summarily because the court 
found there was no authority under Michigan law to entertain such 
a suit . 
. . . [I]t would appear that the ,nuisance law would have been 
sufficient to get the relief obtained .... The EPA was helpful in this 
case however because the intervening plaintiffs residents could put 
pressure on the administrative agency, which could not have been 
done in a nuisance suit. 
No [we could not have sought the relief] except [as to] the 
Riparians. Note that we brought them in under EPA so as to get 
the protection of the bond limitation. 
. . . [P]laintiff could not have effectively sought the equitable 
relief requested without the EPA. It is clear that we could not obtain 
this relief under theories of common law nuisance, or by proceeding 
under Act 245 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1929, as amended. 
Judicial redetermination of the WRC standards could not have 
been had without the EPA. However, the principal relief sought ... 
was available under common law and other statutes .... 
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... Nuisance law would have done the job with respect to dam-
ages but probably would not have afforded as good a level for 
injunctive relief. I have not yet filed a case in which the EPA was 
indispensable as to standing. 
The Environmental Protection Act was essential in this case 
since -the Drain Code provides very little avenue of appeal from 
decisions of the Drain Commissioner, whether environmental or not. 
With regard to the EPA specifically, this represents but one count 
of our lawsuit. In addition we have alleged that the project consti-
tutes a violation of the common law riparian rights of other propri-
etors in the area as an unreasonable overuse of riparian property 
and that it violates a local Zoning Ordinance. At various stages in 
the lawsuit the various claims have assumed different relative posi-
tions of importance. It is our opinion that the EPA did provide 
initial access to the Court for the individual Plaintiffs that could 
not otherwise have been obtained by them. We regard the granting 
of standing to individuals to sue for present or future damage to 
the environment as one of the major accomplishments of our legis-
lature in the recent past .... 
EPA was essential to joining the State . . . Department in this 
case. 
7. The EPA was drafted to be as concise as possible. Was this a 
mistake? Do you find the statute too cryptic? Does its brevity 
help to cut down time-consuming litigation over details, or in-
crease it? 
A sample of the comments follows: 
I do not think it was a mistake to keep this statute brief and 
concise .... One of the arguments made by the Attorney General's 
office in their motion for a summary judgment was that attempting 
to enjoin [the agency] from issuing ... permits does not come under 
the statute. The court specifically found that this was a proper ob-
ject under the statute. (Plaintift) . 
I thought in my particular case . . . the statute was clear. . . . 
[R]egardless of how a statute is drafted the first few years of litiga-
tion under it always require ironing out procedural matters. (Plain-
tift) 
[A] possible problem ... is ... that, in suing an administrative 
agency, the Courts may incorporate some of the old appellate re-
view standards such as "whether the findings were supported by the 
law .... " (Plaintift) 
The EPA was drafted in a concise manner and perhaps this is 
the best way to start. I am not in a position at this time to say that 
there should be any amendments. We need to obtain some Court 
decisions and then determine the direction of where our efforts and 
pressures should be put. Case by case method appears to be the best. 
(Plaintiff) 
I think the [EPA] was drafted in too concise [ of a] manner and I en-
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vision that this will be apparent as time goes along. It is my position 
that there will need to be a substantial amount of legal precedent 
before the statute is finally settled in its niche and I don't believe 
the brevity of it is going to cut down on time-consuming litigation. 
(Defendant) 
The EPA is a definite benefit to plaintiffs filing suit under it. 
It allows for very little quibbling over procedural details and forces 
the parties to get to the merits of the case. (Plaintiff) 
The statute is too indefinite to be of any value. I am of the 
personal opinion that it is unconstitutional, as it delegates complete 
powers to the judge to set up regulations and standards without 
any guidelines. (Defendant) 
It is not too cryptic. I believe it does help cut down time-con-
suming litigation. (Defendant) 
It is too cryptic. Litigation ... doesn't come about because of too 
many details, but because people who have to spend money to com-
ply with the law ·will .•. fight whenever it costs less to fight than 
to comply. (Defendant) 
8. In general have you found judges sympathetic, hostile, or neutral 
on the goals of the EPA? 
Thirteen judges were found to be "sympathetic" to the goals of 
the Act; thirteen "neutral," three "hostile," and one "really didn't 
want to get involved." 
9. Any other comments? (We need a provision for attorneys' fees; 
the provision on bonds is helpful, harmful? The venue provision 
creates problems, etc.). 
Concerning the bond requirement (§ 2a), the lawyers responded as 
follows: 
The provision with respect to a bond is neither helpful nor harm-
ful. While my client was never requested to put up a bond it could 
have done so easily and since the bond requirement is so minimal 
the ·willingness of a plaintiff to put up a bond may have some in-
fluence on a judge. (Plaintiff) 
This is a double edged sword. The low limit is helpful because 
without it I think few cases would be started. On the other hand, it 
may lead some judges to refuse to issue TRO's or preliminary in-
junctions. (Plaintiff) . 
The bond provision has merit and should be continued in order 
to prevent harassment by litigious plaintiffs. (Defendant) 
I understand [the bond provision's] purpose but believe it does 
cause injustice as to a private defendant who is subject to great fi-
nancial loss because of delays, etc. (Agency Ia-wyer) 
Provision on bonds may be contrary to equal protection notions. 
(Plaintiff) 
The provision on bonds is extremely helpful since none of the 
parties plaintiff in [EPA] suits whom I have represented have had 
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the wherewithal to pay any substantial bond fee and might well have 
been precluded from achieving any relief by way of preliminary in-
junction if the bond maximum had not been set by the statute. 
(Plaintiff) 
Four lawyers gave unqualified support to a provision allowing 
attorneys' fees to be awarded to the prevailing party; another found 
the idea "intriguing"; and three others offered more extended dis-
cussions: 
I would be careful about attorney fees. Very careful. I don't want 
them being assessed against plaintiffs when a public question is in-
volved. While the experts are expensive, their expense limits vex-
atious suits. If costs could include attorneys fees and be assessed 
only if defendant loses, who would buy that? Necessarily these ac-
tions will be self-limiting because of expenses and attorneys fees. 
Many attorneys will have to be at least partially pro bono, as I have 
been .... We need a state bar section of EPA-type attorneys. (Plain-
tiff) 
[A good idea] as long as it only works one wayl It would obvi-
ously stimulate suits. Too soon for this, in my opinion, in Michigan. 
(Plaintiff) 
In our judgment, the [EPA] opens the door to a plague of law 
suits in which any defendant needs protection from expense . . . . 
[W]hen the suits are brought, redress should be available for the 
defendant to recoup its legal and financial expenses and losses re-
sulting from the litigation if the defendant prevails. (Defendant) 
